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Abstract  
 
 
 
This project presents a model of expanded musical form. Arguing that music’s expanded field 
is a field of experiences, rather than of discrete things, it sets out an approach to composition 
that centres not on the creation of aesthetic works, but on supporting an aesthetic attitude. 
Integrating theory and practice, this research endeavours to give definition to an attitude that 
apprehends music as experience. Under this attitude, the perceiver assumes no distance from 
the perceived as she produces the content of her musical experience in and through her 
dynamic bodily interactivity. This project comprises a thesis and four ephemeral performance 
sound installations. The thesis sets out the terms of music’s expanded condition, drawing 
upon a range of disciplines – artistic, aesthetic, philosophical – to chart the pluralistic, 
indeterminate, open-ended structure of the expanded field. The performance sound 
installations explored the operations of expanded artistic practice, critiquing conceptual, 
ideological, and institutional terms of music and sound installation to foreground the 
productivity of the perceiver. In both theory and practice, this research contests the concept 
of “sound art” as a distinct category. It makes the case that expanded musical form is not a 
break with the musical past, but its background made focal. It proposes that the presence, 
physicality, and place in which expanded musical form consists are music’s always 
presupposed foundation.   
 ii 
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It has been my privilege to have been supervised on this project by a person with the artistic 
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Preface  
 
 
A blissful sense of liberating non-objectivity drew me forth into the 
“desert”, where nothing is real except feeling … I realised that the 
“thing” and the “concept” were substituted for feeling and 
understood the falsity of the world of will and ideas.  
 
– Kazimir Malevich1 
 
 
 
These words, written by the painter Malevich in 1927, encapsulate the aesthetic of expanded 
musical form. Alluding to the ‘falsity’ of ontological dualism, specifically Schopenhauer’s 
dualistic conception, Malevich recognised that beneath the objective world of separations 
and oppositions, there exists a world in which no clear-cut distinctions obtain. Anticipating 
the arguments of Merleau-Ponty’s work, a key resource for this project, Malevich’s non-
objective “desert of pure feeling” describes the field of the perceiving body in touch with the 
world.  
 This, I argue, is the field of expanded artistic practice. It is a pluralistic, indeterminate, 
and open-ended field, a field of touch-like interchanges, overlaps, and continuities. As the 
field of the touching / touched body, the expanded field is a field without fixed boundaries; 
here, there are no inherent divisions between subject and object, mind and body, inner and 
outer, between different areas of artistic practice, or between art and life. This is the field of 
the perceiver who produces the content of her aesthetic experience in and through dynamic 
interactivity, the field which lies beneath that of the detached spectator who posits the idea 
of an autonomous aesthetic thing. The expanded field is the always presupposed ground of 
the discrete art object. Expanded form is this background made focal.  
 Building on the work of Lydia Goehr, the model of expanded musical form put forward 
with this project starts from an understanding that the work-concept does not have ‘universal 
and absolute validity’ (Goehr 2007, 273). To paraphrase Malevich, this account maintains that 
the work-concept and the idea of music as a thing are substituted for musical experience’s 
lived, physical event; that the musical object, posited as discrete and ‘perfectly explicit in 
itself’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 44), is a projection of contingent bodily interactivity and 
meaning. The musical object, the idea of music as thing, rests upon a ground of dynamic, 
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touch-like being-in-the-world, and the work-concept describes a domain which is one figure 
within music’s tactile expanded field. Expanded musical form, which is neither subject nor 
object, is not a break with the musical past, but its background made focal.  
 The structure of the work-concept, according to Goehr, is a structure of “separability” 
(see Goehr 2007, 148 – 175). Music’s objectification, she tells us, ‘required sophisticated 
thought and strategic action’ (ibid., 175) that consisted in separating music from the physical 
world and everyday life, separating music from the extra-musical, separating music from 
other discrete areas of fine arts practice,2 separating the musical work from its score-copies 
and performances, and, critically, from the involved participation of perceivers. The 
separability structure brackets off context to separate detached spectating subjects from 
autonomous aesthetic objects, which, in their abstraction, appear in the imagination fully 
determinate and fully present in themselves. It is the abstract field of mind separated from 
body, of inner separated from outer. The separability structure is the field of the detached 
transcendental ego.  
 This project aims to open up other musical possibilities. It centres upon the premise 
that facilitating access to the expanded field beyond and beneath the domain of the work-
concept is not so much a question of creating aesthetic work as it is a question of supporting 
an aesthetic attitude. Expanded musical form, I argue, is not something a composer creates, 
but an experience that the perceiver enacts. The difference between the work-concept and 
expanded musical form is describable in terms of the different attitudes that are proper to 
each of them. Requiring the successful positing of discrete musical objects, the separability 
structure of the work-concept supports an attitude of music as thing. Seeking to make the 
perceiver aware that music is something that she produces in and through her dynamic bodily 
interactivity, expanded musical practice supports an attitude of music as experience. Both in 
theory and in practice, this project sets out to activate the open potential of expanded musical 
form by giving definition to, by supporting, by explicating the terms of the attitude of music 
as experience.  
 By describing the relationship between the work-concept and expanded musical form 
in terms of attitudes, I hope to cast this relationship as a difference of degree, not a difference 
of kind. These two attitudes, I want to show, are not opposed to one another. They are two 
points of aesthetic emphasis on a continuum of aesthetic experience, and there is room for 
both in music’s pluralistic, indeterminate, open-ended expanded field. Apprehended in the 
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attitude of music as experience, it is perfectly possible for any musical work to function as a 
framework for the interactive production of expanded musical form. Apprehended in the 
attitude of music as thing, it is perfectly possible for any artwork, no matter how “expanded”, 
to be posited as an autonomous object. In the expanded field, the field of the touching / 
touched body, music has no inherent ontological status. What music is is entirely dependent 
upon the perceiver.  
 In its inclusion of the work-concept, of the attitude of music as thing, as one of its 
possible terms, the model of expanded musical form put forward here criticises the “sound 
art” concept. As is discussed in the chapters that follow, “sound art” is defined in opposition 
to music, and specifically the work-concept. “Sound art” is a loose term, aptly described by 
Brian Kane as “musicophobic” (Kane 2013), used to describe any sonic artwork that, for 
whatever reason, is not considered to be a musical work. But its existence as a distinct 
category betrays an inability to see past the work-concept to the wider field of musical 
possibilities. It speaks of an assumption that the work-concept inheres within music per se. It 
fails to recognise the open potential of the attitude of music as experience. In its separability, 
it impedes the possibility of expanded musical form and undermines the open-ended, tactile 
nature of many of the practices it describes. Absolute categories, separations, oppositions 
belong to what Mondrian described as ‘the culture of particular form’, not the ‘culture of 
determined relations’ (Mondrian 1937 / 1964, 121). They are proper to the field of abstracted 
mind, and not to the touching / touched body, which determines the content of its own 
experience through its contingent interactions.  
 By placing the productivity of the perceiving body at the heart of this model, I follow 
Rosalind Krauss’ conception of art in the expanded field. I also follow the thought of Robert 
Morris, for whom the dynamic interactivity of the body opens up sculpture’s “expanded 
situation”. Expanded practice, in Krauss’ account, centres upon a critique of the artwork’s 
function as a “natural sign”. Through its critical operations, expanded practice solicits the 
perceiver’s direct involvement in the artwork’s production. Marko Ciciliani’s recent 
description of music in the expanded field (Ciciliani 2017) describes the media substitutions 
of contemporary transdisciplinary compositional practice, which highlight the perceiver’s 
productivity by opening up possibilities for musical experience beyond autonomous listening. 
Musical experience, Ciciliani and the practices he recounts affirm, is not necessarily confined 
to aurality. It is perfectly possible to look musically, to touch musically, to smell and to taste 
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musically. The expanded musical form of the attitude of music as experience is an open 
potential. Whilst there are certain differences between Ciciliani’s account and that which is 
put forward in this project, there are also many overlaps. However, the model of “expanded 
sonic practice” proposed by Seth Kim-Cohen, an arch proponent of the “sound art” concept, 
fundamentally conflicts with this research. The relationship between my account of expanded 
musical form and other notions of expanded practice will be considered in depth in Chapter 
Two.  
 This project approaches the goal of giving definition to the attitude of music as 
experience in two intertwined ways. With the thesis, I map out the terms of music’s expanded 
field, exploring its ontological, perceptual, and aesthetic structures. And with a series of 
ephemeral performance sound installations, I set out to realise these terms. As is detailed in 
some depth in Chapter Three, the practical and theoretic components of this research 
iteratively picked up, developed, tested, and explored questions raised by one another. In the 
expanded field, where the role of the artist consists in supporting attitudes, practice and 
theory are equally important. With this project, I make the case that theoretic work, geared 
towards opening up possibilities for expanded musical form, is in itself composition. In the 
expanded field, both artistic practice and artistic theory function as frameworks for 
production.  
 Chapter One of this thesis, “Presence”, investigates the ontological terms of the 
attitude of music as experience and the attitude of music as thing. Using Michael Fried’s 
categories of presentness and presence as a framework, it explicates the non-oppositional 
relation between these two attitudes to cast the work-concept as one of the terms of music’s 
expanded situation. Chapter Two, “Physicality”, explores the perceptual structures of the 
attitude of music as experience. Drawing upon enactivist and phenomenological thought, it 
elaborates on how touch provides a fitting model for expanded musical form, and how the 
experiential characteristics of the touching / touched body describe the structures of the 
expanded field. Chapter Three, “Place - Performance”, looks at how sound installation 
expands the terms of music and unites it with other areas of creative practice in the durational 
performance of place. Sound installation, I argue, fosters the possibility for expanded musical 
form to be both music and sculpture, freeing musical experience from the confines of 
separability to activate its open potential. Here, I pick up and expand upon on a thread that 
runs throughout this thesis. Sound installation is not a distinct practice from music; rather, it 
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makes music’s always presupposed background of presence, physicality, and place focal. 
Within this chapter, I also explain how the performance sound installation endeavours to 
make this explicit, endeavours to establish the continuity between music and sound 
installation, by highlighting sound installation’s nature as an event in time.   
 This project describes a shift from thing to experience that is the basis of expanded 
artistic practice. The quote from Malevich with which we began bespeaks this. Holding time 
and not sound to be music’s elemental concern, this model of expanded musical form aspires 
to facilitate the possibilities of a pluralistic, indeterminate, open-ended field of unique, 
contingent, bodily musical experiences. As experience, music exists wherever the perceiver 
finds it, whether within the structures of an artwork or elsewhere within her dynamic 
involvement with the world.  
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 Malevich 1927 / 1964, 95 
2 Whilst replicating some of their characteristics, as is discussed in Chapter One. 
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Presence  
 
 
The world, the real, is not an object. It is a process. 
  – John Cage1 
 
 
In a well-known essay from 1967, the critic Michael Fried schematised a dichotomy between 
the presentness of modernist art and the presence of minimalist – or as he called it, “literalist” 
– art. Fried believed that subject / object distinctions dissolve in the experience of 
“successful” modernist art, and he understood this to be a function of the artwork’s ability to 
“convince” the perceiver into suspending the flow of duration in favour of sharing in its one 
transcendent present. In contrast, the presence of the “literalist” artwork is its situatedness 
in the flux and flow of the physical world. It becomes within the time of experience as an event 
of dynamic interaction between the perceiver and sculptural object (or rather between the 
perceiver and a set of environmental conditions that includes the sculptural object), and Fried 
saw this as an “espousal” of the subject / object distinction. The central emphasis that the 
literalist artwork places upon ‘the duration of the experience’ (Fried 1998, 167) amounts, for 
Fried, to a ‘distancing or isolating’ (ibid., 159) that ‘makes the beholder a subject and the piece 
in question … an object’ (ibid., 154; original emphasis). In the argument that follows, I take a 
different view as I aim to show how Fried’s categories of presentness and presence describe 
the attitudes of music as thing and music as experience, respectively.  
 The central question on which ‘Art and Objecthood’ turns, that of time and the subject 
/ object relation, is the focus of this chapter. Its purpose is to give definition to expanded 
musical form as a unique, physical event produced through interaction, a living form which is 
neither subject nor object, but rather both / and. Fried’s concepts provide a useful framework 
for this endeavour, however I adopt this frame with caution. Numerous scholars have pointed 
to the problem of ‘Art and Objecthood’’s divisional nature. Rosalind Krauss, for example, has 
described it as ‘a theoretical wedge’, for Caroline Jones it is a ‘world dividing doxology’ (both 
quoted in Green and Morra 2017), and, similarly, Rex Butler writes that ‘it breaks the world 
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in two’ (Butler 2017). This problem is of particular concern here. As outlined in the preface, 
the aesthetic of expanded musical form consists in the resolution of oppositions / divisions / 
separations: between subject and object, mind and body, inner and outer, between music 
and other areas of artistic practice (most pressingly, perhaps, “sound art”), and between art 
and life. Fried’s strategy of defining modernism in opposition to literalism and wider 
“theatricality” in the arts, of structuring his aesthetic conception around a network of 
dualisms – “authentic art” / “theatre”, “art” / “life”, “presentness” / “presence”, etc. – directly 
contradicts this.  
To appropriate Fried’s terms for the purpose of describing expanded musical form, it 
is necessary to overcome their dualistic conception. But there is an important sense in which 
this contributes to their usefulness. By mapping Fried’s categories of presentness and 
presence onto the attitudes of music as thing and music as experience and collapsing their 
dichotomy, I want to demonstrate the continuity between work-based and non-work-based 
musical practice. Fried gives manifest expression to the separability structure of ‘the culture 
of particular form’ (Mondrian 1937 / 1964, 121); by dismantling his oppositions, I hope to 
reveal the expanded field of ‘determined relations’ (ibid.) that lies beneath. The non-
oppositional relationship between presentness and presence, and correlatively of music as 
thing and music as experience is a critical theme of this chapter, which explores how the latter 
of these terms is the always presupposed foundation of the former, how they are 
representative of two points of aesthetic emphasis on a continuum of experience, how they 
are differences of degree, rather than differences of kind. The Friedian frame is an effective 
tool for elaborating on how expanded musical form is not a break with the past so much as a 
background made focal.  
  ‘Art and Objecthood’’s divisive argument has unsurprisingly provoked fierce debate, 
but what those on both sides tend to be able to find in common is an admiration for Fried’s 
‘remarkable descriptions’ (Young 2017) of fundamental aesthetic issues.2 As Stephen Melville 
writes, ‘the view that Fried’s “description” is fine but that he draws the wrong conclusion 
from it … is probably the dominant way ‘Art and Objecthood’ is read in both the academy and 
the artworld’ (Melville 2017), and this accords with how Fried’s concepts will be used here. A 
wave of recent scholarship exploring the impact of ‘Art and Objecthood’ fifty years on from 
its publication attests to the enduring relevance and value of Fried’s “description” (if not 
necessarily his conclusion) as a means of negotiating disparate areas of creative practice and 
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aesthetic theory – from videogames to scriptural analysis, from architecture to film to art 
education, to the concerns of painting and sculpture that are the primary focus of the original 
text. In all of this, consideration of how Fried’s ideas relate to, and might be used as a tool for 
investigating music is conspicuously absent.3  
 In the penultimate paragraph of ‘Art and Objecthood’, Fried makes the following 
claim:  
 
It is above all to the condition of painting and sculpture – the condition, that is, of existing in, indeed, 
of evoking or constituting, a continuous and perpetual present – that the other contemporary 
modernist arts, most notably poetry and music, aspire. (Fried 1998, 167) 
 
These words conflict with the prevailing narratives of musicians breaking away from music, 
at precisely at this moment in history, in order to establish new art forms that aspire to the 
condition of the plastic arts.4 In the very same year that ‘Art and Objecthood’ was written, 
Max Neuhaus produced his first sound installation (Drive In Music, 1967), and Neuhaus 
insisted that his efforts to emulate the timelessness of sculpture with this work took his 
practice beyond the ambit of music. The aim of creating a ‘permanent’ work ‘without a 
beginning or an end’, not ‘an event’ but something ‘continuous’ was enough for Neuhaus to 
justify a complete departure from music and to enter ‘into the purview of the visual arts’ 
(Neuhaus 1994, 42-3). ‘The important idea about this kind of work is that it’s not music’, he 
remarked. ‘It doesn’t exist in time. I’ve taken sound out of time and made it into an entity’ 
(Neuhaus, quoted in Cox 2006 / 2011, 84). Given this, Fried’s notion that the music of the 
period targeted the presentness of painting and sculpture might appear to be somewhat wide 
of the mark. Seth Kim-Cohen seems to think so, dismissing Fried’s claim as ‘a performative bit 
of wishful thinking; an attempt to make it so by declaring it so’ (Kim-Cohen 2009, 41). But, in 
an important sense, Fried was correct. As we will see, his claim does indeed describe the 
creative intent behind contemporaneous compositional work; however, it speaks of 
something far more fundamental than a “modernist” musical sensibility.  
Lydia Goehr has shown that the work-concept was founded upon a historical exigency 
to replicate ‘the characteristics of the plastic arts of painting and sculpture’: 
 
As it entered the world of the fine arts [around the beginning of the nineteenth century], music had 
to find a plastic or equivalent commodity, a valuable and permanently existing product, that could 
be treated in the same way as the objects of the already respectable fine arts … Neither transitory 
performances nor incomplete scores would serve this purpose since, apart from anything else, they 
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were worldly or at least transitory and concrete items. So an object was found through projection 
or hypostatisation. The object was called “the work”. (Goehr 2007, 173-4) 
 
The concept of the musical work, according to Goehr, arose from the imperative to overcome 
music’s transitory nature, its durational nature as a unique event in time. So did Neuhaus’ 
concept of the sound installation work. There is a continuity between the musical work and 
the sound installation that, first by Neuhaus and then by a whole generation of “sound art” 
theorists and practitioners, has been largely overlooked. Both the sound installation as 
envisaged by Neuhaus and the musical work aspire to ‘the condition of existing in … a 
continuous and perpetual present’ (Fried 1998, 167; original emphasis), and in both cases this 
presentness is not the condition of subject / object unity, as Fried would have us believe, but 
rather the very condition of objecthood. Presentness is the work’s exteriority to the time of 
experience, its difference to the perceiver. When Neuhaus spoke of ‘removing sound from 
time’ (Neuhaus, quoted in Cox 2006 / 2011, 83) and turning it into a continuously present 
“entity”, he precisely described the ‘projection or hypostatisation’ (Goehr 2007, 174) of the 
musical object.  
 There is, however, an important difference between sound installation and work-
based musical practice in the main. Whilst the autonomous musical work is situated within 
what Goehr describes as an ‘imaginary museum’ (ibid.), shielded from the dynamics of the 
physical world by, amongst other things, the structures of concert-hall experience, the sound 
installation is situated in place. Set within the physical flux and flow of worldly becoming, 
sound installation’s presentness as a “permanent entity” is superseded by its presence as an 
interactive event. Contrary to his claims, Neuhaus took music out of the concert hall and in 
doing so made focal its transitory nature as a unique event in time. By integrally incorporating 
the durational phenomena of physicality and place, which, we will see, are necessarily 
suppressed by the attitude of music as thing as it passes over to the idea of a transcendent 
presentness, sound installation foregrounds the uniqueness and contingency of music as 
experience: the presence of a living form – neither subject nor object – produced in time 
through dynamic interaction. Presentness, I want to show, is projected from presence; it is 
the out-of-time condition of the idea of a discrete in-itself posited at the end of a stream of 
changing perspectives: a being substituted for a becoming. Both the sound installation (as 
Neuhaus’ remarks suggest) and the musical work (as I aim to demonstrate) can be 
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experienced either way, as an object of detached contemplation or an event of dynamic 
interaction. The difference between the two is the greater emphasis that sound installation 
practice is able to give to the latter by making explicit musical experience’s situatedness 
within the flux and flow of the physical world. Sound installation, which is well-suited to 
fostering expanded musical form, and work-based musical practice are differences of degree, 
not differences of kind. To substantiate these claims, it is first necessary to analyse Fried’s 
ontological categories of presentness and presence in further depth.  
 
 
Dynamic interactivity 
 
Fried locates presence at the heart of the literalist sensibility,5 and he characterises this 
sensibility from the outset as being ‘concerned with the actual circumstances in which the 
beholder encounters the literalist work’ (Fried 1998, 153). ‘The experience of literalist art’, he 
writes, ‘is of an object in a situation – one that, virtually by definition, includes the beholder’ 
(ibid.; original emphasis). Minimalist sculptural objects – Donald Judd’s metal boxes, say, or 
Robert Morris’ plywood L-beams – ‘do not represent, signify, or allude to anything: they are 
what they are and nothing more’ (ibid., 165). In their raw, literal, concrete physicality, they 
are directly involved in the world, co-situated with the perceiver in and amongst a contingent 
set of dynamic environmental conditions.  
 
“The entire situation” means exactly that: all of it – including, it seems, the beholder’s body. There 
is nothing within his field of vision – nothing that he takes note of in any way – that declares its 
irrelevance to the situation, and therefore to the experience, in question. On the contrary, for 
something to be perceived at all is for it to be perceived as part of that situation. Everything counts 
– not as part of the object, but as part of the situation... (ibid., 155; original emphasis) 
 
On account of the minimalist sculptural object’s literalness – it is what it is and nothing more 
– the “beholder’s” attention is not drawn towards the single locus of an autonomous 
aesthetic content, as it would be in an experience of modernist painting and sculpture, but 
rather towards her interaction with this literal, physical object in context and through time. 
This contextual, temporally-extended relation between the beholder and the sculptural 
object, which integrally incorporates phenomena of physicality and place, constitutes the 
literalist artwork; thus, ‘the literalist work depends on the beholder, is incomplete without 
him’ (ibid., 163). 
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  Presence connotes the literalist artwork’s lack of self-sufficiency and solicitation of 
the perceiver’s involvement. As Fried disparagingly puts it, ‘the presence of literalist art … is 
basically a theatrical effect or quality – a kind of stage presence. It is a function … of the special 
complicity that that work extorts from the beholder’ (ibid., 155; original emphasis). Fried’s 
concept of presence, as indicated here, is bound up with his notion of “theatricality”, and we 
get a sense of what he means by this complex term from his claim that ‘theatre has an 
audience – it exists for one – in a way the other arts do not’ (ibid., 163). The “theatrical” 
artwork is not a self-sufficient being – it becomes as an event of dynamic interaction – and 
‘this more than anything is what modernist sensibility finds intolerable’ (ibid.). ‘Something is 
said to have presence’, Fried writes, ‘when it demands that the beholder take it into account 
… and when the fulfilment of that demand consists simply of being aware of [it]’ (ibid., 155): 
of apprehending it not as something autonomously ‘self-important’ (Morris, quoted in ibid., 
154), but as something set in and amongst a dynamic of environmental conditions, and ‘acting 
accordingly’ (ibid., 155; my emphasis). Something can be said to have presence when it solicits 
the perceiver’s engagement, when it invites her action. The literal presence of the minimalist 
sculptural object is its direct involvement in a concrete situation and its appeal for the 
perceiver’s direct involvement within that situation. The presence of the sculptural object 
implicates the presence of the perceiver – her “demand” that the artwork take her into 
account.  
For Fried, the presence of the literalist artwork consists in a “confrontation” that 
valorises subjective experience,6 and this is the point at which I draw a different conclusion 
from his “description”. As Fried’s descriptions, and as the writings of the literalist artists that 
he cites imply, the literalist artwork is precisely not a self-sufficient object to be appreciated 
in detached contemplation, but a temporally-extended relation between the perceiver and 
the physical phenomena of her environment (in which the sculptural object is ‘but one of the 
terms’ (Morris 1993, 17)). What, crucially, Fried passed over in Morris’ writings is the 
significance of his conception, related to Jasper Johns’ notion of “things the mind already 
knows”, of the “unitary” geometric form as an ideal “constant” that functions as a background 
against which a unique, contingent, living form stands out as figure: 
 
Even its most patently unalterable property, shape, does not remain constant. For it is the viewer 
who changes the shape constantly by his change in position … Oddly, it is the strength of the 
constant, known shape, the gestalt, that allows this awareness to become so much more emphatic 
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in these [“literalist”] works than in previous sculpture … The constant shape of the cube held in the 
mind, but which the viewer never literally experiences, is an actuality against which the literal 
changing perspective views are related. There are two distinct terms: the known constant and the 
experienced variable. (ibid., 16-17)  
 
In Morris’ account and, indeed, in my own experiences of minimalist art, the “expanded 
situation” is not one ‘in which [the sculptural object’s] objecthood is established’ (Fried 1998, 
155), as Fried suggests, but quite the opposite: one in which “objecthood” dissolves and does 
so in time.7 The ‘known constant’ – the (apperceptive) idea of the object which is 
transcendent to perception and ‘which the viewer never literally experiences’; the gestalt 
initially carved out of, or recognised amongst the phenomenal plenum – is superseded by the 
‘experienced variable’, an event that occurs in the world  and not in the mind. The perceiver 
and the sculptural object, and the other conditions of the environment, are intertwined in the 
production of a unique, durational, worldly form that unfolds through dynamic interaction. 
This is a living form that is neither subject nor object, but rather both / and. In the experience 
of literalist art, ‘there is not just the unidirectional relationship of the one who perceives to 
what he perceives’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964 / 2004, 183) as Fried evidently construed it; rather, 
the literalist artwork consists in a ‘reflexive’ (Morris 1993, 15), reciprocal relation between 
the perceiver and her surroundings in which the perceiver experiences herself not as a 
detached subject, “distanced” and “isolated”, but as embodied, engaged, and dynamically 
coupled with the world. Building on Fried’s observations of the literalist artwork’s 
“inclusivity”, its “dependence” on the beholder, its “incompleteness” without her, its nature 
not as an autonomous, timeless being, but as a participatory, durational becoming, the term 
presence – whether of human or non-human bodies – is used here to describe, instead of 
“confrontation”, direct involvement in the world, dynamic interactivity.  
 
 
The “known constant” in performance sound installation  
 
The performance sound installation, like the minimalist sculptural artwork, is produced in the 
dynamic interactivity between perceivers and their environment. It is not an autonomous, 
self-contained, singular object of detached contemplation (“particular form”), but rather a 
participatory, contextual, heterogenous event: an expanded situation set within the flux and 
flow of the physical world. The performance sound installation becomes as a multiplicity of 
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unique, living forms (“determined relations”) generated through the actions and interactions 
of each participant.  
Within the practice of performance sound installation, the role of the composer is not 
that of creating a “work”, that is, a permanently existing, discrete aesthetic product or thing; 
rather, the composer of the performance sound installation establishes the conditions for an 
ephemeral, situational aesthetic event (or multiplicity of events). The performance sound 
installation composer devises measures to support the attitude of music as experience, to 
focus presence, to make explicit each participant’s agential role in the artwork’s dynamic 
production. For all of the installations of this project, I have sought to foreground phenomena 
of physicality and place – phenomena that attest to the perceiver’s direct involvement in a 
real-world situation. A pivotal aspect of my approach has been to give special emphasis to 
dimensions of distance and proximity – qualities of the perceiver’s physical relation to her 
surroundings – as a means of activating perspective (and perspectival shifts) and harnessing 
its performative potentiality to actuate form. As Merleau-Ponty wrote,  
 
[Distance] is not indicated upon the object itself, it clearly belongs to perspective and not to things. 
It can, then, neither be extracted from the perspective, nor even placed there by consciousness. It 
announces a certain indissoluble link between the things and me by which I am situated in front of 
them.  (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 267) 
 
Distance is a phenomenon of dynamic interactivity with an environment; it attests to the 
interconnectedness of the self and things. A musical form that comprises phenomena of 
distance and proximity is a living form that is neither subject nor object, but rather both / and. 
By virtue of its ‘very relational, spatial, and temporal nature’ (LaBelle 2015, xiv), sound 
is a powerful means of effecting a physical flux of distance and proximity that implicates the 
perceiver as embodied, engaged, and dynamically coupled with her surroundings. Ironically, 
in the context (expanded situation) of the performance sound installations of this project, it 
is distance itself, as a physical, fluctuating phenomenon – as bodily perspective – that 
counteracts the “distance” and “isolation” of the perceiver as subject (i.e., in the Friedian 
sense). Here, and in the minimalist sculptural artwork, distance makes the perceiver being-in 
(and-of) -the-world.  
The elements for each of the performance sound installations of this project were 
dispersed in physical space. Within the perceiver’s omnidirectional auditory field every sonic 
component carried a specific quality of distance. These qualities, and the relations between 
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sonic (and non-sonic) components were determined from the perceiver’s unique perspective 
and modulated by her movements. To make the contingent qualities of bodily perspective – 
the phenomena of distance and proximity – available for inclusion within an expanded 
musical form, I adopted Morris’ notion of the “known constant”. In Morris’ sculpture, as 
discussed, an ideal object – ‘which the viewer never literally experiences’ – provides a 
background against which ‘experienced variables’ stand out in relief as figure, and in the 
performance sound installations of this project, ideal types served an equivalent function. 
Self-similarity of basic structural components was a common feature of all of the performance 
sound installations. The same type of sounds (for example, the short breath sounds of Kai’bur 
for Shoreditch Church (2015)), the same type of sound sources (for example, the five 
trombones of Copeland Park … Trombones (2016), or the five steel sheets and five bullroarers 
of The Bunker / Forest … Steel Sheet / Bullroarer (2016)), the same type of sound patterns or 
processes (for example, the continuous durational contraction – expansion – contraction – 
etc. executed by all four performers of The Bunker / String Quartet (2014)) dispersed 
throughout the physical space of the installation environment each carried unique spatial 
signatures (contingent qualities of bodily perspective) that stood out as perceivable 
distinctions (‘experienced variables’) against a background of other shared attributes. The 
‘known constant’ of the ideal type – of what might objectively be apprehended as the “same” 
sound etc. – was superseded by a physical flux of phenomena of distance and proximity, 
determined and modulated by the perceiver who dimensionalised an aural flatness from her 
bodily perspective.8 The reflexive operations of Morris’ “known constant” procedure permit 
background (the unique dynamics of music as experience that consists in bodily being-in-the-
world) to be made focal.  
It is worth noting that this is the inverse of Pierre Schaeffer’s approach. Whilst it has 
been my interest to engender a reciprocal, reflexive interrelation between the perceiver and 
the perceived, in which subject / object distinctions dissolve, by establishing conditions for 
the “same” “sonorous object” to function as background to specific, contingent qualities of 
situated bodily perspective, Schaeffer sought to highlight ‘our will to comparison’ (Schaeffer 
1966 / 2004, 80) as the “sonorous object” maintains its ‘intrinsic existence’ (ibid.) – or essence 
– in spite of perspectival variations. By ‘presenting the listener with several versions of what 
was originally a unique event’ (ibid., 79), he directed listening towards the synthetic 
intentional object that transcends the spatiotemporal adumbrations of which it is constituted, 
 15 
that is, towards the idea of an in-itself. ‘It is indeed the same sonorous object’, he wrote, 
‘subjected to different means of observation’ (ibid., 79; original emphasis). “Reduced 
listening” substitutes a distinct, independently existing object – a being that remains 
continuously present through time – for the dynamic becoming of ‘phenomena that attest to 
the union of subject and world’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 334). It ‘cuts the ties that unite the 
thing and embodied subject’ and posits ‘the subject as pure consciousness’ (ibid.) – ‘a pure 
ear devoid of body’ (LaBelle 2015, 32). Reduced listening is subject / object dichotomy; it 
happens in the mind, and not in the world. It describes the attitude of music as thing. 
    Like Morris’ “unitary forms”, I chose the types for the performance sound 
installations, in part, to give ‘strong gestalt sensations’ (Morris 1993, 6).9 The familiar cultural 
object (‘known constant’) of the “trombone”, for example, was an immediately apprehensible 
gestalt that, once carved out of the background phenomenal plenum, was itself well-suited 
(on account of its familiarity) to serve as a clear background against which the unique 
experienced variables (phenomena of distance and proximity, etc.) that were a function of its 
unusual situation (see Chapter Three) could stand out in sharp relief. These unique qualities 
of bodily perspective (and socio-cultural perspective, see Chapter Three), qualities that 
attested to the perceiver’s direct involvement in a real-world situation, would then 
intermingle with – reciprocally test, challenge, transfigure – a host of contingent, dynamic 
associations triggered by the strong “trombone” gestalt. The living form(s) of the 
performance sound installation – its specific materiality – comprised an iterative, interactive 
unfolding: an event, or a multiplicity of events, that occurred in the world and not in the mind 
(of a detached subject).  
 
 
Entanglement 
 
Fried’s notion of presence, I’ve tried to make clear, refers to the minimalist sculptural form’s 
real-world condition, which he considered to be “non-representational” (it does ‘not 
represent, signify, or allude to anything’: it is what it is and nothing more (Fried 1998, 165)).10 
The performance studies theorist Erika Fischer-Lichte also differentiates presence from 
“representation”:  
 
To perceive the actor’s body in his bodily being-in-the-world establishes one order of perception, 
while understanding the actor as signifying a character establishes another. The first order 
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generates meaning around the perceived’s phenomenal being … while the second order produces 
meaning which, in its entirety, constitutes the character … we can identify them as, first, the order 
of presence, and second, the order of representation. (Fischer-Lichte 2008, 148) 
 
To perceive something in its “phenomenal being”, according to Fischer-Lichte, is to perceive 
it in its ‘specific materiality’ as ‘self-referential’ (ibid., 141), and this accords with Fried’s 
descriptions of the “material” of the minimalist sculptural object.11 But self-referentiality does 
not, pace Fried, equate to not signifying anything. As Fischer-Lichte explains,  
 
To perceive something as something means to perceive it as meaningful. Materiality, signifier, and 
signified coincide in the case of self-referentiality. Materiality does not act as a signifier to which 
this or that signified can be attributed. Rather, materiality itself has to be seen as the signified 
already given in the materiality perceived … the thing’s materiality adopts the meaning of its 
materiality … (ibid.) 
 
Materiality here, to read Fischer-Lichte’s conception through Karen Barad’s theory of 
“agential realism”,12 ‘does not refer to an inherent, fixed property of … independently existing 
objects’ (Barad 2007, 151); rather, ‘matter is a dynamic intra-active becoming that never sits 
still’ (ibid., 170). The specific materiality of Fischer-Lichte’s description is, as Barad puts it, 
‘always already material-discursive’ (ibid., 153). And ‘once perceived in their materiality’, 
Fischer-Lichte’s phenomenal beings are liable to ‘trigger a wealth of associations, ideas, 
thoughts, memories, and emotions’ in the perceiver (Fischer-Lichte 2008, 140). Rather than 
being separate from this specific materiality, these discursive elements are integrally 
‘interlinked’ with it (ibid., 142): implicated within a specific feedback loop in which ‘matter 
comes to matter’ (Barad 2007, 152), part of its iterative, ‘intra-active’13 becoming. They are 
included within its “self-referentiality”,14 which, for Fischer-Lichte, is a process that ‘collapses 
the binary opposition … between the sensual perception of an object, seen mostly as a 
physiological [activity], and the attribution of meaning, considered a mental activity’ (Fischer-
Lichte 2008, 142). ‘The order of presence’ consists in the experience of “the entanglement of 
matter and meaning”, to borrow Barad’s phrase, in which the perceiver’s agential role in the 
production of a specific materiality is made perspicuous. This perspicuous entanglement 
describes the real-world condition, the expanded situation, of the minimalist sculptural form, 
which is open to, and inherently comprises contingent meanings ‘generated in and through 
the act of the perception’ (ibid., 141).15 So too does it describe the expanded musical form of 
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the attitude of music as experience; John Cage – whose work, in contrast to the “modernism” 
(“authentic art”) of Elliott Carter, Fried denounced as “theatre”16 – expressed this well:  
 
Most people think that when they hear a piece of music, they’re not doing anything but that 
something is being done to them. Now this is not true, and we must arrange our music … so that 
people realise that they themselves are doing it, and not that something is being done to them. 
(Cage, quoted in Nyman 1999, 24) 
 
The structure we should think about is that of each person … In other words, his consciousness is 
structuring the experience differently from anybody else’s … (Cage, quoted in LaBelle 2015, 18) 
 
 If the ‘order of presence’ is a mode of aesthetic experience in which the perceiver’s 
‘structuring faculty’ (ibid.) – her agential role in the interactive production of a specific 
materiality, her direct involvement in a real-world situation – is made perspicuous, then ‘the 
order of representation’ is one in which this dynamic interactivity is obscured. Cage’s remarks 
articulate the belief that the perceiver is always directly involved in the production of musical 
form, but that awareness of this involvement is often suppressed by the impression (or 
illusion) of passively receiving an autonomous aesthetic content. Fischer-Lichte indicates 
something similar: that the ‘order of presence’ comes first before the second ‘order of 
representation’ ‘produces meaning which, in its entirety, constitutes the character’ (Fischer-
Lichte 2008, 148). The actor’s “phenomenal being” – his literal ‘stage presence’, to use Fried’s 
term, that implicates the perceiver within an event of dynamic interaction – is the always 
presupposed foundation of the representational content of the “character”, which, by 
absorbing the “entirety” of meaning, shuts out the contingency of meaning generated in and 
through perception, and presents itself as fully autonomous. The ‘order of representation’, 
where physical phenomena of dynamic interactivity are supplanted by the idea of an 
autonomous aesthetic content, describes the experience of modernist painting and sculpture 
set out in ‘Art and Objecthood’. ‘One’s view of the sculpture is, so to speak, eclipsed by the 
sculpture itself’, Fried writes (Fried 1998, 167).  
  The concluding statement of ‘Art and Objecthood’ confirms that, like Cage and 
Fischer-Lichte, Fried recognised the primacy of presence. ‘We are all literalists most or all of 
our lives. Presentness is grace’ (ibid., 168). Fried understood presence as the basic condition 
of real-world experience and activity, and posited presentness – indicated here by his 
invocation of the absolute – as its binary opposite, as the transcendental condition of the 
autonomous work of art. Whilst Fischer-Lichte, as will be given further consideration below, 
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seeks to demonstrate the non-oppositional relation between “presence” and 
“representation” to highlight, in John Dewey’s words, ‘the continuity of aesthetic experience 
with normal processes of living’ (Dewey 1980, 9), Fried cast presentness and presence in 
dualistic relation precisely so as to enforce the art / life dichotomy. In its staunch defence of 
the ideal of aesthetic autonomy, Fried’s argument is a world apart from the projects of Cage 
and Fischer-Lichte. But importantly all three believe in the dissolution of subject / object 
distinction as an aesthetic imperative.17 Here we arrive at a crucial point. Whilst Fried, in 
keeping with his dualistic thinking, locates this distinction within our immanent relation to 
the world, Cage and Fischer-Lichte reject this premise. As Cage said, ‘the world, the real, is 
not an object. It is a process’ (Cage 1981, 80).  
Cage’s thinking accords with that of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and numerous others 
(including Barad) who over the past century have shown that what we are ‘most or all of our 
lives’ (Fried 1998, 168) is not a detached, self-sufficient subject – distanced and isolated – 
contemplating remote and independent objects, but a being-in, or being-of the world, directly 
involved in its process of becoming. Fischer-Lichte tells us that the aesthetic event of 
‘presence makes the ordinary remarkable’ (Fischer-Lichte 2008, 173). And the inclusivity of 
the literalist artwork’s expanded situation; the ‘mutual determination’ of Fischer-Lichte’s 
“autopoietic feedback loop”; Cage’s emphasis on the perceiver’s ‘structuring faculty’ in the 
“doing” of musical form; and, indeed, Earle Brown’s efforts to institute ‘an “actual” event … 
to bring the “audience” and the work together in/at the same “time”’ (Brown 2002 / 2004, 
193) would all suggest that ‘the collapse of the opposition between art and reality’ (Fischer-
Lichte 2008, 176), inherent in presence, is not an ‘espousal of objecthood’ (Fried 1998, 153), 
but a making-perspicuous (‘remarkable’) of the perceiver’s dynamic entanglement with her 
surroundings that describes the “ordinary” condition of being-in-the-world in its becoming.  
Presence’s unique event of dynamic interaction is where subject / object distinctions 
are dissolved within the flux and flow of the physical world. It describes music as experience, 
and not music as thing. The presentness of an autonomous aesthetic content is its 
transcendence to the flux and flow of the physical world, its exteriority to the time of 
experience. Presentness is the artwork’s difference to the perceiver who is always implicated 
within the becoming of the world. It distances and isolates her, it makes her subject. It 
describes music as thing, and not music as experience.  
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Presentness is grace 
 
Brown’s description of an “attempt” to ‘close the gap between art (reflection) and life (being 
… in the moment and not somewhere else)’ – i.e., being-in-the-world in its becoming – by 
bringing ‘the “audience” and the work together in/at the same “time”’ (Brown 2002 / 2004, 
193; original emphasis) indicates the intent to support the attitude of music as experience. 
The scare quotes that he places around “audience” suggest that, under these conditions, 
perceivers are not distanced or isolated as detached spectators, but rather implicated as 
participants. Here, the audience are involved in the production of a unique, living expanded 
musical form – not a single object of attention, but a heterogeneity of different perspectives 
– generated through dynamic interaction as ‘an “actual” event’ in time. Those placed around 
“actual” and “time” imply an understanding that musical experience is always an actual event 
in time, but that the musical work typically exists on a separate plane. No doubt, Fried would 
have considered Brown’s notion intolerably theatrical. For in its presence, in its situatedness 
in time, in its explicit condition as an “actual”, interactive event, the “work” of Brown’s 
description fails entirely to engender the illusion of self-sufficiency. Fried’s “authentic” work 
does not become in the time of experience; rather, it is, fully and continuously present 
throughout the time of experience. In its presentness, the “authentic” work’s autonomous 
aesthetic content hangs over every perspectival change. It ‘defeat[s] or suspend[s] theatre’ 
(Fried 1998, 160; original emphasis) by “eclipsing” the dynamic interactivity in which the 
‘normal processes of living’ (Dewey 1980, 9) consist.  
 ‘The sense which, at bottom, theatre addresses is a sense of temporality’ (Fried 1998, 
167). The aesthetic order of presence, as we have seen, makes perspicuous ‘the duration of 
the experience’ (ibid., 166-7; original emphasis). In contrast,  
 
It is as though one’s experience [of modernist painting and sculpture] has no duration – not because 
one in fact experiences a picture by Noland or Otlinski or a sculpture by David Smith or Caro in no 
time at all, but because at every moment the work itself is wholly manifest. (ibid., 167; original 
emphasis) 
 
The modernist artwork of Fried’s description transcends the duration of the experience. It 
makes its “claim” on the perceiver “instantaneously” and this “claim” is “renewed” ‘at every 
moment’ (ibid., 47). It has, in itself, no past and no future, just one continuous present. Within 
the experience of the modernist painting and sculpture, it is ‘as though if only one were 
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infinitely more acute, a single infinitely brief instant would be long enough to see everything, 
to experience the work in all its depth and fullness’ (ibid.).  
 The literalist sensibility’s ‘preoccupation with time’ (ibid., 166) evinces, for Fried, its 
preoccupation with subjectivity. The literalist theatrical experience, he argues, is an 
experience ‘of time both passing and to come, simultaneously approaching and receding, as 
if apprehended in an infinite perspective’ (ibid., 167; original emphasis). If this describes what 
we all are ‘most or all of our lives’ (ibid., 168), then it is our “normal” condition to experience 
ourselves as detached egos who constitute time (from ‘an infinite perspective’) and for whom 
time is fully spread out as an object of knowledge. ‘Some non-temporal subject’, as Merleau-
Ponty describes it, ‘given the task of thinking and positing time’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 438). 
The autonomous subject of Fried’s ‘infinite perspective’ is always present to itself, and is, 
thus, always a ‘spectator’ (ibid., 444) of the passage of time. Whilst the literalist artwork 
confronts Fried’s subject with duration that isolates it – spread out before it as an object of 
knowledge, emphasising its distance to an external world – the modernist artwork, which 
makes its claim instantaneously, which exists purely in the present, collapses this distance 
and neutralises subject / object dichotomy in a moment of metaphysical “grace”. In contrast 
to Morris, Fischer-Lichte, Cage, and Brown, who variously express the aesthetic goal of 
dismantling imposed subject / object structures in order to make focal the “ordinary” 
entanglement of being-in-the-world, Fried, as his theological allusions indicate, conceived of 
the dissolution of subject / object dichotomy as a state that exceeds the range of experience 
within the physical, spatiotemporal world, a state of transcendence. Fried has often cited 
Merleau-Ponty’s thought as an influence on his project (see, for example, Fried 1998, 28). 
However, as we will see, his conception of a transcendent aesthetic state – his belief in the 
separation of art and life, that an artwork’s success rests upon its ability to convince the 
perceiver to suspend duration and share in its one continuous present – has far more in 
common with the Romantic / Idealist thinking that fostered the concept of an autonomous 
musical work.  
 Already in the Phenomenology of Perception (which Fried later referred to directly as 
a key source text for his art critical thought of the late 1960s (ibid.)) there are signs of 
Merleau-Ponty’s later rejection of the reality of a discrete present.18 The present moment, he 
observed, occurs ‘with its originary horizons of past and future’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 447): 
it is always a figure on a background of surrounding past and future moments. It can, 
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therefore, never be fully present because, in Nancy Holland’s words, ‘it will always give us the 
non-posited horizons of its appearance’ (Holland 1986, 116).19 As Merleau-Ponty would go on 
to write, the present is ‘not a segment of time with defined contours that would come and 
set itself in place. It is a cycle defined by a central and dominant region and with indecisive 
contours – a swelling or bulb of time’ (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 184). The present described in 
the Phenomenology of Perception, furthermore, is also never fully present because ‘it always 
refers away from itself, back to the past on which it was built and forward to the future which 
will build on it in turn’ (Holland 1986, 116). As Merleau-Ponty put it, ‘”in” my present … there 
is an ecstasy toward the future and toward the past that makes the dimensions of time 
appear, not as rivals, but as inseparable’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 446).  
 Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the present moment corresponds to his formulation 
of the perceived thing. ‘The perceptual “something” is always in the middle of some other 
thing, it always belongs to a “field”’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 4). Perceptual experience does not 
give us the thing in-itself; the perceived thing is always given to us ‘in a situated context, 
surrounded by other things and an expanse of phenomena’ (Ihde 2007, 73; my emphasis). 
‘We never perceive just one [thing]’, Holland writes, ‘but always a background of 
indeterminate contours against which specific [things] may appear’ (Holland 1986, 113). 
Perception of the thing always includes what is not the thing, thus the thing – like the present 
moment that always gives us its non-posited horizons of past and future – is never fully 
present. Moreover, the perceived thing is always ‘given to [us] in a “deformed” way, from the 
point of view which [we] occupy’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964 Pr.P., 16; original emphasis). 
Perceptual experience presents things ‘from only one point of view at a time and always with 
reference to a surrounding penumbra of other possible perspectives from which the [thing] 
might be seen’ (Holland 1986, 113). The background of other possible perspectives confirms 
the uniqueness and contingency of each perspective as a specific quality of one’s direct 
involvement in a real-world situation. Thus, ‘the perceived thing is not an ideal unity in the 
possession of the intellect, like a geometrical notion, for example; it is rather a totality open 
to a horizon of an indefinite number of perspectival views’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964 Pr.P, 16). 
‘These non-present views of the [thing] are themselves part of our perception of it, which 
therefore can never itself be purely present’ (Holland 1986, 113). Presence, for Merleau-
Ponty, is always attended with absence: ‘the kind of evidence proper to the perceived, the 
appearance of “something”, requires both this presence and this absence’ (Merleau-Ponty 
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1964, Pr.P, 16). Absence lies at the core of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception because it 
is a theory of perception as bodily activity, and ‘the body creates this absence in perception 
because, unlike the transcendental ego, it has a perspective on the world’. The body ‘always 
presents [things] in a partial way’ (Holland 1986, 113).   
 The aesthetic ‘order of presence’ as defined above is rooted in the situated, corporeal 
perceptual experience that Merleau-Ponty described and is, therefore, integrally intertwined 
with absence. If, under the attitude of music as experience, the unique, living musical form 
produced through dynamic interaction becomes focal, it does so only against the background 
of the perceiver’s awareness that hers is just one amongst an indefinite number of other 
possible perspectives. Within the performance sound installation that foregrounds 
contingent qualities of bodily perspective – where, for example, the perceiver is enfolded in 
a physical flux of phenomena of distance and proximity that is entirely determined by her 
specific situation and modulated by her movements – this is made explicit. And to return to 
the example of the “literalist” artwork – which, to recall, is expressly not an ‘ideal unity in the 
possession of the intellect’, but a real-world living form – the non-present (possible) views of 
the perceived thing are fundamental to the artwork’s expanded situation. They constitute a 
field that surrounds, and therefore confirms the uniqueness and contingency of each dynamic 
perspective, each interactive event.  In its presence, the minimalist perceived thing refers 
away from itself: to its ‘horizon of an indefinite number of perspectival views’; to its context 
– to the other things and the expanse of phenomena that surround it and that comprise the 
specific set of environmental conditions of which it is a part; and to the ‘wealth of [contingent] 
associations, ideas, thoughts, memories, and emotions’ (Fischer-Lichte 2008, 140) that it 
might trigger and that are implicated in the iterative unfolding of the artwork’s specific 
materiality. Crucially, in its presence, the minimalist perceived thing’s present also always 
refers away from itself: ‘back to the past on which it was built and forward to the future which 
will build on it in turn’ (Holland 1986, 116). This is underscored by the continuously ‘changing 
perspective views’ (Morris 1993, 16) in which the living form of the literalist artwork consists. 
As a real-world situation that, as Fried notes, includes ‘the beholder’s body’ (Fried 1998, 155; 
original emphasis), the literalist artwork makes focal the bodily perceptual experience 
wherein presence and absence entangled. This mode of experience never ‘in possession of 
fully determinate objects’ (Merleau-Ponty, quoted in Holland 1986, 144), nor of a discrete 
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present. The direct implication of the body ensures the artwork’s condition as a reciprocal, 
reflexive becoming, and not an autonomous being.  
 The indeterminacy and ambiguity of bodily perceptual experience are fundamental 
aspects of our pre-objective condition of living in the world and having no vantage point 
outside of it. In the context of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, indeterminacy and ambiguity are 
pivotal to our open-ended, reciprocal, interdependent relationship with the world. 
‘Ambiguity is essential to human existence’, he writes, ‘and everything that we live or think 
always has several senses … existence is indeterminate in itself because of its fundamental 
structure’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 172-3). The incompleteness of our perception of things (and 
of our knowledge of ourselves) undercuts empiricism and intellectualism’s ‘unquestioned 
belief in a universe perfectly explicit in itself’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 44) and controverts 
inherent subject / object dualism. Moreover, it is our continual drive for greater 
determination that underpins our temporal situation. ‘The ambiguity of the being in the world 
is expressed by the ambiguity of our body, and this latter is understood through the ambiguity 
of time’ (ibid., 87). Within the flux and flow of the physical world we are involved in a 
continual, mutual, and open-ended process of determination, implicating both body and 
mind, as neither subject nor object, but rather both/and. ‘The active constitution of a new 
object … makes explicit and articulate what was until then presented as no more than an 
indeterminate horizon’ (ibid., 33). It is only through some intellectual act that we “step out of 
time” to perform the subject / object cut and posit the object in its full determination as fully 
present and complete in-itself.  
 It is precisely this intellectual act that Fried’s account of the experience of “modernist” 
painting and sculpture describes. In a particularly revealing passage, he tells us that the 
modernist artwork’s instantaneousness, 
 
Is true of sculpture despite the obvious fact that being three-dimensional, it can be seen from an 
infinite number of points of view. One’s experience of a Caro is not incomplete, and one’s conviction 
as to its quality is not suspended, simply because one has seen it only from where one is standing. 
Moreover, in the grip of his best work one’s view of the sculpture is, so to speak, eclipsed by the 
sculpture itself – which it is plainly meaningless to speak of as only partly present. (Fried 1998, 167) 
 
In this, there is none of the indeterminacy and ambiguity proper to bodily perceptual 
experience. ‘At every moment’, and from every aspect, the beholder apprehends something 
‘wholly manifest’, complete, and fully present.20 Fried’s description is of an experience in 
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which the beholder’s perception has transcended the perspective of his bodily being-in-the-
world. The beholder has transcended the spatiotemporality of terrestrial experience and 
coincided with the thing-in-itself. ‘Presentness is grace’, and for one who assumes inherent 
subject / object dualism, such transcendence of the conditions of the physical world is a 
transcendence of the distance and isolation that characterise what we are ‘most or all of our 
lives’ (ibid., 168). Not locked into any perspective, the beholder brackets off the situation 
(that isolates him) and anchors himself in the “pure impression”. But ‘the pure impression’, 
Merleau-Ponty writes, ‘is inconceivable as a moment of perception. If it is introduced’, and it 
is the very essence of presentness, ‘this is because, rather than being attentive to perceptual 
experience, this experience is neglected in favour of the perceived object’ (Merleau-Ponty 
2012, 4; my emphasis). The object posited in the mind – an autonomous being – takes 
precedence over an interactive becoming.  
 
 
Experience to idea (one) 
 
‘Obsessed with being, and forgetting the perspectivism of my experience, I henceforth treat 
my experience as an object’ (ibid., 73). There are clear parallels between Fried’s description 
of modernist art experience and phenomenology’s descriptions of the act of constituting, 
positing, projecting an object, and whilst to this point I’ve drawn only upon Merleau-Ponty’s 
work to illustrate this, there is a telling correspondence with Husserl’s theory here too. Fried’s 
modernist artwork, ‘wholly manifest’ at ‘every moment’ of the perceiver’s experience and 
from every perspectival view, brings to mind Husserl’s “intentional object”, whose identity as 
the same fixed and stable being eclipses the spatiotemporal “adumbrations” – that is, the 
dynamic stream of perspectives, ‘the continuum of changing perceptions’ (Husserl 2012, 76) 
– from which it is synthesised in consciousness.  
 
We start by taking an example. Keeping this table steadily in view as I go round it, changing my 
position in space all the time, I have continually the consciousness of the bodily presence out there 
of this one and self-same table, which in itself remains unchanged throughout. But the perception 
of the table is one that changes continuously, it is a continuum of changing perceptions. I close my 
eyes. My other senses are inactive in relation to the table. I have now no perception of it. I open 
my eyes, and the perception returns. The perception? Let us be more accurate. Under no 
circumstances does it return to me individually the same. Only the table is the same, known as 
identical throughout the synthetic consciousness which connects the new perception with the 
recollection … The perception itself is what it is within the steady flow of consciousness, and is itself 
constantly in flux; the perceptual now is ever passing over into the adjacent consciousness of the 
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just-past, a new now simultaneously gleams forth, and so on. The perceived thing in general, and 
all its parts, aspects, and phases, whether the quality be primary or secondary, are necessarily 
transcendent to the perception. (ibid., 76-7) 
 
In every ‘perceptual now’, the table itself, like Caro’s sculpture, is fully present; whilst every 
perception of the table is different, the table ‘in itself’, like Caro’s sculpture, ‘remains 
unchanged throughout’ the duration of the experience of it. The table is posited as ‘one … 
self-same’ object because an intentional act of consciousness ‘connects’ each distinct 
‘perception’. Posited at the end of, projected from, a stream of changing spatiotemporal 
perspectives, the synthesised intentional object is ‘necessarily transcendent to’ perception. It 
appears in the mind, and not in the world, as a fully determinate thing-in-itself.  
 Husserl’s intentional object, ‘being the correlate of an act of synthesis’, is 
‘independent of any factual context’ (Kane 2007, 17). It is ‘not the same as the physically 
material object’, Brian Kane writes: ‘no longer bound to any particular spatiotemporal 
adumbration’, no longer bound to the contingencies of bodily perspective, ‘it has become an 
essence’ (ibid.; original emphasis). This is consistent with Fried’s project of distinguishing the 
modernist artwork from the literalist sculpture whose physical materiality implicates the 
perceiver within a real-world situation. Indeed, ‘the imperative that modernist [art] defeat or 
suspend objecthood’ (Fried 1998, 160) is basically the imperative that it defeat or suspend its 
physical materiality. This is the imperative that overcomes its ‘factual context’, its condition 
as a real (physical, material) body caught up in the world’s dynamic and open-ended process 
of mattering, and manifests as a transcendent, autonomous aesthetic content, an ideal thing-
in-itself above the spatiotemporal flux of terrestrial experience. The experience of modernist 
art, in Fried’s account, is a pure contemplation of an essence. And this is not an experience in 
which subject / object distinctions are “allayed”; ‘wholly manifest’ ‘at every moment’ like 
Husserl’s intentional object, ‘existing in … a continuous and perpetual present’ (ibid., 167; 
original emphasis), Fried’s modernist artwork is ‘the correlate of an act of synthesis’ that 
‘connects’ a stream of distinct ‘perceptions’. Its presentness presupposes a self-same 
consciousness (above perception) that performs a synthesis of “perceptual nows”. Whilst the 
durational literalist artwork describes a dynamic, embodied perceiver intertwined in the 
dynamic unfolding of a specific materiality, Fried’s timeless modernist artwork describes the 
positing operations of the detached transcendental ego.  
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  In Husserl’s intentional act ‘[perceptual] experience is neglected in favour of the 
perceived object’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 4), and correspondingly Fried’s modernist artwork, 
‘rather than being attentive to perceptual experience’ (ibid.), implores the perceiver to ‘take 
flight from [her] experience’ and ‘pass over to the idea’ (ibid., 73; original emphasis). The 
imperative that it defeat or overcome its physical materiality, transcend its ‘factual context’, 
is the imperative that it convince the perceiver to sublimate the contingent, spatiotemporal 
flux of bodily being-in-the-world into the thought self-same essence: ‘to reduce all of the 
phenomena that attest to the union of the subject and the world, and to substitute for them 
the clear idea of the object as an in-itself and of the subject as a pure consciousness’ (ibid., 
334). This process ‘cuts the ties that unite the thing and the embodied subject and leaves 
behind … an autonomous appearance’ (ibid.). But this detachment is illusory: the 
“autonomous thing” – the self-sufficient aesthetic content – posited in the mind is a 
projection (synthesis, sublimation) of the dynamic interactivity of the body. A passage in ‘Art 
and Objecthood’ attests to this. Fried grasps “essentialised” in Caro’s sculptures ‘the efficacy 
of gesture’, ‘the knowledge of the human body and how, in innumerable ways and moods, it 
makes meaning’ (Fried 1998, 162; original emphasis). The aesthetic meaning-content of the 
“autonomous” artwork fundamentally derives from the expressions of the perceiving and 
interacting body. As Merleau-Ponty reminds us,  
 
The thing can never be separated from someone who perceives it; nor can it ever actually be in 
itself because its articulations are the very ones of our existence, and because it is posited at the 
end of a gaze or at the conclusion of a sensory exploration that invests it with humanity. (Merleau-
Ponty 2012, 334) 
 
In the experience of art, there is not a unidirectional relationship between the 
perceiver and the perceived. The perceiver does not passively receive a self-sufficient 
aesthetic content; rather, she is actively and directly involved in the production of this 
content. John Dewey made a similar point: ‘what is overlooked is that it is not the painting as 
a picture (that is, the object in aesthetic experience) that causes certain effects “in us”. The 
painting as a picture is itself a total effect brought about by the interaction of external and 
organic causes’ (Dewey 1980, 261; original emphasis). Yet, Fried’s modernist artwork must 
appear self-sufficient. ‘It is by virtue of their presentness and instantaneousness that 
modernist painting and sculpture defeat theatre’ (Fried 1998, 167). The imperative that the 
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modernist artwork “defeat theatre” is the imperative that it engender the illusion of self-
sufficiency (remember, ‘theatre has an audience – it exists for one – in a way the other arts 
do not’ and ‘this more than anything else is what modernist sensibility finds intolerable’ (ibid., 
163)). The modernist artwork must convince the perceiver to “forget” ‘the perspectivism of 
[her] experience’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 73), to bracket off her dynamic interactivity and 
attend purely to thing-in-itself.  ‘The sculpture itself’ must “eclipse” ‘one’s view of the 
sculpture’; the idea must eclipse the experience. For the perceiver convinced of the artwork’s 
self-sufficiency, the bodily experience – the bodily meaning and activity – that Fried described 
becomes an object of detached contemplation.  
 
 
A non-oppositional relation  
 
In the light of phenomenological explanation, Fried’s description of modernist art experience 
is exposed as a description of the act in which the subject / object cut is performed. 
Furthermore, under the light of this explanation the dichotomous structure of Fried’s 
argument – his separability structure – begins to erode. The thought of Husserl and Merleau-
Ponty (particularly the latter) helps to frame Fried’s autonomous, fully determinate artwork 
as an ideal construct projected from dynamic bodily experience. The immanent 
spatiotemporal flux of perception’s direct involvement in the world is sublimated into (the 
idea of) a transcendent essence that ‘remains unchanged’: presence is sublimated into 
presentness. Fried’s ontological categories are not fundamentally oppositional, but 
connected. Presentness is a second-order modality of presence – a kind of crystallisation. 
Presence is the always presupposed foundation of presentness – its basic ground. The 
perceiver takes flight from the experience of presence and passes over to the idea of 
presentness. Presentness is substituted for presence, projected from, synthesised from, 
distilled from presence. It is a continuation and a possibility of presence. The literalist artwork 
(theatre) and the modernist artwork can thus be understood not as differences of kind, but 
differences of degree: representative of different points of aesthetic emphasis on a 
continuum of experience.  
 Fischer-Lichte’s closely related categories of “presence” and “representation” reflect 
this characterisation. Presence comes “first” before representation and they ‘are not one and 
the same’ (Fischer-Lichte 2008, 148); but ‘an absolute opposition between “presence” and 
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“representation” is not sustainable’ (ibid., 147). The order of presence, to recall, consists in 
the generation of contingent meaning through direct (physical) involvement with the specific 
materiality of the perceived, and the order of representation consists in the appreciation of a 
projected aesthetic content (an intentional object) that encompasses the ‘entirety’ (ibid., 
148) of meaning. Fischer-Lichte indicates that it is perfectly possible for an artwork to be 
experienced in and through either of these modalities and, moreover, for the perceiver to 
“shift” unpredictably between them. By grounding itself in presence, performance art since 
the 1960s, according to Fischer-Lichte, has not so much broken with the previously dominant 
representational models as enabled ‘perceptual multistability to far greater extents’ (ibid.). 
Waking audiences up to the fact that ‘the actor’s phenomenal body, their bodily being-in-the-
world, constitutes the existential ground for the coming into being of the character’ (ibid.), 
presence-based performance art does not exclude the possibility of representation, but 
opens up other possibilities alongside – or beneath – it. Cast in a ‘liminal state’ of ‘betwixt and 
between’ (ibid.), as potential ‘wanders between two worlds, between two orders of 
perception’ (ibid., 149), perceivers are handed responsibility for the artwork’s determination. 
It might be apprehended as an autonomous “particular form”, or it might be apprehended as 
an event of “determined relations”, or it might be apprehended as both. Whilst the order of 
representation is, in itself, delimiting – the perceiver brackets off contingent, dynamic bodily 
interactivity to posit a single object of attention – the order of presence, as fundamentally 
indeterminate and open-ended, has no respect for clear-cut boundaries or inherent 
oppositions. As background made focal, presence is an open field of possibilities, which 
includes, but is by no means limited to, presentness.  
 Fischer-Lichte’s account of a field of artistic practice that, grounded in presence, opens 
up new possibilities alongside or beneath pre-existing ones describes the conception of 
expanded practice that this project puts forward. Music’s expanded field, as conceived here, 
includes the work-concept as one possibility – as one figure on an expanded ground. 
Expanded musical form and the autonomous musical work are not differences of kind, but 
differences of degree. The lived, interactive, physical event of the former is the always 
presupposed foundation of the latter; the posited discrete, determinate, self-sufficient object 
of the latter is a projection – a kind of crystallisation – of the former. It is perfectly possible 
for music to be apprehended either way, and it is perfectly possible for music to be 
apprehended in both ways. In the expanded field, the attitude of music as experience and the 
 29 
attitude of music as thing are non-oppositional terms. Having gone some way towards 
clarifying how presence describes the attitude of music as experience, and having broken 
down (with the help of phenomenology and Fischer-Lichte’s example) Fried’s dualistic 
formulation, we will now turn to explore, in further depth, the question of how presentness 
describes the attitude of music as thing.  
 
 
Music as frozen time  
 
At the start of this chapter, I pointed to Fried’s suggestion that ‘faced with the need to defeat 
theatre’ (Fried 1998, 167), music aspires to the presentness of the plastic arts, and proposed 
that this is not as far-fetched as it might seem. Indeed, given that we have since discovered 
that ‘the need to defeat theatre’ is the need to engender the illusion of self-sufficiency – to 
convince the perceiver to suspend the indeterminacy and open-endedness of dynamic bodily 
perspective and interactivity, and posit the clear idea of the artwork as a fully determinate 
thing-in-itself – Fried’s suggestion, even more than before, can be seen to accurately describe 
the motivations and operations of the work-concept. With regards to defeating theatre, he 
qualifies in a footnote, ‘music’s situation is especially difficult in that music shares with 
theatre the convention … of duration’ (ibid., 172 n.23). The concept of the musical work, as 
noted earlier, arose from the imperative to overcome music’s transitory nature, its durational 
nature as a unique event in time. Overcoming (defeating, suspending) duration is the very 
condition of music’s objecthood.  
 The following statement from Ligeti could hardly be a clearer expression of a 
composer’s desire to induce presentness: 
 
I favour musical forms that are less process-like and more object-like. Music as frozen time, as an 
object in imaginary space that is evoked in our imagination through music itself. Music as a structure 
that, despite it unfolding in the flux of time, is still synchronically conceivable, simultaneously 
present in all its moments. To hold on to time, to suspend its disappearance, to confine it in the 
present moment, this is my primary goal in composition. (Ligeti 1988, 13) 
 
It is easy enough to appreciate how Ligeti may have intended the “micropolyphony” – the 
dense, multiplex, polytempic canons – of works such as Apparitions (1958-9), Atmosphères 
(1961), Lux Aeterna (1966), and Lontano (1967) to engender an impression of timelessness 
befitting the other-worldly connotations of their titles. Contemporaneous with ‘Art and 
 30 
Objecthood’, these works – which, as the passage above would suggest, aspire towards the 
condition ‘of existing in … of evoking or constituting, a continuous and perpetual present’ – 
serve to demonstrate the accuracy of Fried’s assertion. Yet, far from being a condition of 
subject / object unity, presentness is precisely what makes Ligeti’s music an object.  
 A couple of years after Ligeti wrote these words, the musicologist Barbara Barry, using 
virtually identical language, posited a set of criteria that musical objects need to satisfy. In 
order for music to be apprehended as an object, Barry tells us, ‘the temporal dimension with 
its continuously disappearing parts must be frozen so that work can be expressed as 
simultaneity’ (Barry 1990, 58). It must be “seen” as ‘a complete unit’, “seen” ‘all at once, or 
by sections, necessary’ (ibid.). ‘It must contradict the … ephemerality of passing time’ and 
‘instead create the illusion of substance’ (ibid., 65). Ligeti’s aim of creating musical objects by 
evoking an impression of “frozen time”, of “confining” his music ‘in the present moment’, of 
presenting the perceiver with the idea of a ‘synchronically conceivable’ structure finds 
support in Barry’s account. But Fried’s understanding that an aspiration towards presentness 
is an aspiration towards the dissolution of subject / object distinction is, here, emphatically 
refuted.   
 As with Fried’s description of modernist art experience – one experiences presentness 
‘not because one in fact experiences a picture by Noland or Olitski or a sculpture by David 
Smith or Caro in no time at all’ (Fried 1998, 167) – the ‘object-like form’ of Ligeti’s description 
is necessary experienced ‘in the flux of time’. However, despite the fact that one’s perception 
of the ‘object-like form’ is, thereby, continuously changing, the ‘object-like form’ in itself, like 
Caro’s sculpture, is ‘simultaneously present’ – i.e., ‘wholly manifest’ (ibid.) – ‘in all its 
moments’. ‘At every moment’ (ibid.) of the experience, in every ‘perceptual now’, the ‘object-
like form’ itself is fully present. Again, this recalls Husserl’s intentional object, which, posited 
at the end of a stream of changing perspectives, itself ‘remains unchanged throughout’ as the 
‘one’, ‘self-same’ being. Indeed, Husserl’s own description of the intentional act of positing a 
musical object bears a close resemblance to Ligeti’s statement. ‘The whole melody [or work]’, 
he wrote, ‘appears as present so long as it still sounds, so long as the notes belonging to it, 
intended in the one nexus of apprehensions, still sound’ (Husserl, quoted in Clifton 1976, 82; 
original emphasis). From the first in the stream of percepts to the last that are ‘connected’ in 
the act of synthesis, the whole intentional musical object is present. The perceptions change, 
but the musical object ‘is the same, known as identical throughout the synthetic 
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consciousness which connects the new perception with the recollection’ (Husserl 2012, 76). 
The musical object is transcendent to perception, an ideal thing-in-itself: a ‘synchronically 
conceivable’ structure (a ‘complete unit’ “seen” ‘all at once’) ‘evoked in [the] imagination’. It 
is ‘as though’, in Fried’s words, ‘if only one were infinitely more acute, a single infinitely brief 
instant would be long enough to see everything, to experience the work in all its depth and 
fullness’ (Fried 1998, 167).  
 Ligeti’s micropolyphonic forms effectively ‘contradict the ephemerality of passing 
time’ and ‘create the illusion of substance’ (Barry 1990, 65). Lontano is a fitting example: it 
was written in the same year as ‘Art and Objecthood’, and its title explicitly conjures the image 
of an object at a distance from the perceiving subject. Its layered canonic entries assist 
consciousness’ act of connecting “new perceptions” with “recollections”, enabling 
consciousness to ‘hold on to time’, to suspend the music’s ‘continuously disappearing parts’. 
In their canonic relation, Lontano’s expansive and densely woven melodic lines obfuscate one 
another’s movement, engendering an impression of “frozen time” and of self-sameness that 
helps consciousness gather its percepts into ‘one nexus of apprehensions’. By virtue of its 
construction, which evokes a time-sense that contradicts the flux of experience, Lontano 
distances itself from the perceiver. In its transcendent presentness, it stands out against the 
background of world-time – the time of experience’s lived, physical event – as a sharply 
delineated, differentiated, determinate object. Posited at the end of (hanging over) a stream 
of changing perspectives, the ideal musical object is, in itself, ‘fully spread out and its parts 
coexist while [perception] skims over them one by one’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 73).  
 
 
The supratemporal object 
 
To posit the musical object, the attitude of music as thing cuts the ties that unite the time of 
music and the time of dynamic, bodily interactivity in the physical world. Roman Ingarden 
indicated this with his influential ontology of the late 1920s,21 which offers a theory of the 
musical work as a purely intentional, “supratemporal” object whose autonomous identity 
depends upon its distinction from world-time.  
 
If one considers the musical work … as it forms an Object of the aesthetic apprehension that opens 
to us the access to all its [parts] … and if at the same time one contrasts it with all individual events 
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unfolding in time in the real world … [it] then presents itself as a peculiar supratemporal object. 
(Ingarden 1989, 37)  
 
The supratemporal musical work does, according to Ingarden, have a “quasi-temporal 
structure”,  
 
But it cannot be considered a temporal object in the strict sense, because the finished work 
possesses all its parts … simultaneously in each moment of its existence, which is impossible for a 
genuine real process that unfolds only in the course of time. (ibid., 40) 
 
Precisely describing Ligeti’s ‘simultaneously present’ ‘object-like form’, and echoing Fried’s 
notion of an artwork which, in itself, is ‘wholly manifest’ ‘at every moment’, Ingarden’s 
supratemporal musical object is distinct from ‘the course of time’ in which it is experienced, 
and thus, ‘the temporal structure of the musical work itself is completely proof … against all 
events and processes of the real world taking place outside the work’ (ibid., 43). ‘The 
supratemporality of the musical work confers upon it the character of “not belonging to this 
world” and contributes to the complete delimitation and closure of the work’ (ibid., 44). As 
Ligeti’s statement, which situates the musical object in ‘imaginary space’, acknowledges, the 
intentional, supratemporal musical object is independent of any ‘factual context’ (Kane 2007, 
17. The illusion of ‘continuous and entire presentness’ (Fried 1998, 167), of a temporality 
transcendent to flux of experience and the ‘events and processes of the real world’, is the 
condition of music’s objecthood and a basic structure of the attitude of music as thing.  
 Jonathan Kramer’s arguments, put forward some years later, also attest to this “cut” 
– this differentiation between the time of music and the time of experience – that subsists in 
the attitude of music as thing. Kramer tells us that music divorces ‘succession from duration’, 
that ‘music makes the past-present-future [what he calls “duration”] exist on a plane other 
than that of earlier-simultaneous-later [succession]’ (Kramer 1973, 134). Whilst ‘succession 
occurs in clock-time [‘the time of everyday life’ (ibid., 123)] and in linear-subjective-time’, 
‘duration occurs in gestural-time’ – his term for the “supratemporality” of the musical work – 
which means that ‘the physical order of musical events as linearly-perceived’ in direct 
experience is quite separate from ‘the past-present-future quality’ of the music itself (ibid., 
134).  
This is consistent with Ingarden’s theory, where it is suggested that that ‘the work’s 
individual parts exhibit specific “temporal colourations” which are immanent in the work 
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itself’ (Ingarden 1989, 40) and constitute its quasi-temporal structure. Divorced from 
‘succession’, these qualities of past, present, and future are not those which are proper to 
experience. They are, rather, properties of an autonomous aesthetic content: of the holistic 
quasi-temporal structure (the differentiated “time”) of the musical work that hovers above 
the physical order of its parts as ‘linearly-perceived’ on an entirely abstract (transcendent, 
supratemporal) plane. These qualities, these ‘specific “temporal colourations”’, might be 
exhibited by any of the work’s parts. For instance, Kramer hears the cadence in bar 10 of 
Beethoven’s Op. 135 / I (1826) as ‘a final cadence’: although this part ‘occurs at the beginning 
of the movement, in very real sense it is the end’ (ibid., 124; original emphasis). Furthermore, 
the temporal colourations of any part might signal connections to any other part. Kramer 
claims, for example, ‘that in gestural-time m. 9 [of Beethoven’s Op. 135 / I] leads directly to 
m. 25’, and ‘m. 175 leads to m. 101’: ‘an earlier event may skip across intervening events in 
reaching its goal’ and ‘a later event may lead to an earlier one’ (ibid., 123-4).  
Kramer and Ingarden clearly indicate that it is this abstraction of a quasi-temporal 
structure, and not the physical order of parts as ‘linearly-perceived’ in direct experience, that 
gives the autonomous musical work coherence. As Ingarden put it, ‘the musical work itself 
possesses … a single quasi-temporal structure, which is quite independent of the phases of 
the concretely experienced intersubjective time’ (Ingarden 1986, 40), and it is this structure 
that forms ‘a perfectly closed-off whole’ (ibid., 44). As ‘one nexus of apprehensions’, the 
whole quasi-temporal structure is present. Kramer’s expression of this is somewhat confusing, 
but his musical experience only ‘allows a future event to be earlier than a past event, a past 
event to be later than a present event, etc.’ (Kramer 1973, 134) insofar as he conceives the 
musical work’s past, present, and future to be fully exposed and simultaneously available; 
insofar as he knows the quasi-temporal structure of the work ‘to possess all its parts … 
simultaneously’ (Ingarden 1989, 40) and determines the order in which these parts are 
surveyed by experience to be extraneous to the autonomous form that they comprise; insofar 
as the temporal colourations that he perceives to be immanent within the work itself do not 
indicate for him ‘a genuine real process that unfolds only in the course of time’ (ibid.), but 
rather the abstract contours of ‘a peculiar supratemporal object’ (ibid., 37); insofar as he does 
not posit a becoming: he posits a being (as his description of Beethoven’s Op. 135 / I reveals). 
Kramer’s conceptions of music’s past, present, future coexisting on the one plane of 
supratemporal “gestural time”, where, divorced from “succession”, they all occur in the 
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present, are testament to the fundamental conditions of its constitution as object. As though 
contemplating a “frozen” time structure from various angles (from contingently changing 
perspectives) which, in itself, as a holistic entity, is fully present before him, Kramer “sees” 
the work as ‘a complete unit’, available ‘all at once’ (Barry 1990, 58).  
‘Music frees us from the tyranny of the linear-time of the physical world’ (Kramer 
1973, 134) insofar as the attitude of music as thing takes flight from experience and passes 
over to the idea (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 73). The lived, physical event of bodily being-in-the-
world, of direct involvement in the world’s dynamic becoming, is projected into the 
intentional supratemporal being posited in the imagination. The attitude of music as thing 
beholds, in Susanne Langer’s words, an “image of time”. ‘Musical duration is an image of what 
might be termed “lived” or “experienced” time’ (Langer 1953, 109); for the attitude of music 
as thing, ‘music spreads out time for … direct and complete apprehension’ (ibid., 110). 
Likewise, for David Greene, music ‘offers us aural images of temporality’ (Greene 1982, vii), 
and, similarly, Georg Picht indicates that ‘music is a representation of time’ (Picht, quoted in 
Taylor 2016, 63). The visio-centric language of these, and Barry’s, descriptions is telling – as 
will be explored in some depth in the following chapter, the attitude of music as thing has a 
visual basis. Metaphors of an “image” of time connote an instantaneous impression of a 
spectacle, fully spread out at a distance, “represented” in consciousness in all its detail. Time 
has become an object of detached contemplation that, in itself, is fully present ‘at every 
moment’ of the experience. Projecting an image of lived, experienced time, the attitude of 
music as thing ‘[reduces] all of the phenomena that attest to the union of the subject and the 
world, and [substitutes] for them the clear idea of the [supratemporal] object as an in-itself’ 
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 334). Presentness is substituted for presence, and the ties that unite 
the time of music and the time of dynamic bodily interactivity in the world are cut.  
Kramer’s well-known (and widely discussed) taxonomy of musical time (see Kramer 
1988) is a taxonomy of quasi-temporal structures – of images, of representations of time. 
Whether “linear” or “non-linear”, “multiply-directed”, “vertical”, “circular”, etc., the quasi-
temporal structure is an ideal projection of experience’s lived, physical event. The time of ‘the 
physical world’ is not “linear” (Kramer 1973, 134) and uniform, but heterogenous and open-
ended. ‘Time’, in Karen Barad’s words, ‘is not a succession of evenly spaced individual 
moments’; rather, ‘temporality is constituted through the world’s iterative intra-activity’ 
(Barad 2007, 180). Time, neither subject nor object, is produced through the dynamic 
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interactions between bodies (human and non-human) directly involved in the world’s 
becoming. The time of music is fundamentally the time of experience; the diversity of musical 
time is the diversity of experience, and to quantise musical time in a stratified system is to 
objectify it. Kramer’s taxonomy exemplifies the attitude that sublimates the contingent 
qualities of experience into the autonomous properties of things; the attitude that sublimates 
the indeterminate, open-ended, heterogenous flux of dynamic bodily interactivity into the 
clear idea of a fully determinate, fully delimited (discrete) supratemporal object; the attitude 
that sublimates presence into presentness: involvement in an event into the concept of a 
work. 
 
 
Presentness and the Romantic work-concept  
 
Although Ligeti’s applications of micropolyphony to evoke in the imagination autonomous, 
timeless forms – ontologically akin to the forms of the plastic arts – might, on Fried’s terms 
at least, be considered decidedly “modernist”, notions of ‘music as frozen time’, of 
‘synchronically conceivable’ musical structures existing in, evoking and constituting, a 
continuous present, and, by extension, conceptions of musical experience as pure 
contemplation of a transcendent essence, are traceable to the very origins of the work-
concept at the beginning of the nineteenth century (Goehr 2007). An understanding that the 
establishment of the Romantic work-concept (or Romantic musical aesthetic) was attended 
by an emergent concern with notions of presentness is plainly reflected by the Beethoven 
scholarship. Benedict Taylor’s recent survey (Taylor 2016) highlights the wide consensus – 
amongst musicological thinkers of the past two centuries – that considers Beethoven’s work 
to have matured in terms of a shift away from the dynamic, process-driven temporality 
inherited from his Classical predecessors, and towards a ‘more static, even temporally 
suspended conception’ (Taylor 2016, 29) of musical form that relates to ‘the nature of 
aesthetic experience as conceived by Kant, and thus in turn to the musical theories of E.T.A. 
Hoffmann and Schopenhauer’ (ibid., 28). 
 A contemporary of Beethoven, Schopenhauer’s meditations on the nunc stans give a 
sense of the Romantic attitudes towards time that formed the backdrop of the composer’s 
stylistic development.  
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There is only one present, and this always exists; for it is the sole form of actual existence. We must 
arrive at the insight that the past is not in itself different from the present, but is so only in our 
apprehension. This has time as its form, by virtue of which alone the present shows itself as 
different from the past. To make this insight easier, let us imagine all the events and scenes of 
human life … which are presented to us successively in the course of time and variety of places, in 
the most motley multifariousness and succession, as existing all at once and simultaneously and 
forever, in the Nunc stans. (Schopenhauer, quoted in ibid., 35; original emphasis)  
 
This passage describes Taylor’s experience of the final movement of Op. 109 (1820); indeed, 
he claims, ‘it would be hard to find a more apt analogy’ (ibid.). Taylor hears Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysical simultaneity of that is, was, or ever will be - the timelessness that ‘is really 
essential in things, in man, in the world’ (Schopenhauer, quoted in ibid.) – expressed in the 
movement’s variation structure. ‘The latent equivalence of each variation to another suggests 
presence at the same time on different levels’ (ibid., 34), demonstrating ‘that what is 
separated in time may be overlaid, superimposed, embracing the whole of everlasting life in 
one simultaneous present’ (ibid.). The E major sonata’s finale, for Taylor (using Karol Berger’s 
words), ‘makes simultaneous what should be successive – abolishing the succession of past, 
present, and future in favour of the simultaneity of the present and thus neutralising the flow 
of time in favour of the eternal Now’ (ibid.). Taylor posits Beethoven’s work as a 
supratemporal object that transcends the time of the physical world and is thereby delimited, 
demarcated, discrete. The flux of presence is sublimated into the clear idea of the presentness 
of a thing-in-itself.  
 Schopenhauer (after Kant) conceived of a transcendent aesthetic state where, 
liberated from terrestrial spatiotemporal constraints, one is able to grasp the metaphysical 
presentness of the nunc stans. The parallels with Fried’s aesthetic conception are clear. Like 
Fried, Schopenhauer saw artistic practice aspiring towards the condition of ‘evoking or 
constituting [this] continuous and perpetual present’ (Fried 1998, 167); however, he believed 
that music has special transportive powers, for ‘it distinguishes itself from all other arts by its 
not being a copy of the phenomenon … but [rather] the direct copy of the will itself’ 
(Schopenhauer 1995, 170). The perpetual present of the nunc stans is ‘the only form in which 
the will manifests itself’ (ibid., 182), and thus – unlike the other arts, which ‘speak only of the 
shadow’ (as copies of the Ideas) – music speaks purely of this timeless essence (ibid., 164), 
offering a special glimpse of the eternal oneness. For Schopenhauer, the musical work is a 
direct “objectification” of the will (ibid.) whose content is the one simultaneous present.  
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 Taylor was by no means the first to bring these Idealist conceptions to bear upon the 
experience of Beethoven’s work. The conflation of Beethoven’s music and Romantic / Idealist 
concepts was firmly established by E. T. A. Hoffmann’s 1810 review of the Fifth Symphony, a 
text judged by numerous scholars to be one of the ‘founding documents’ of the Romantic 
aesthetic (Dahlhaus 1989, 90) – ‘the critical benchmark to which all others must relate’ 
(Charlton 1989, 235). With this seminal essay, which ‘set the “tone” of musical discourse for 
an entire century’ (Dahlhaus 1989, 91), Hoffmann ineffaceably cast Beethoven as a ‘purely 
Romantic composer’ whose work ‘awakens the infinite yearning that is the essence of 
Romanticism’ (Hoffmann, quoted in Cassedy 2010, 6), and elevated the Fifth Symphony – 
‘which irresistibly carries the listener away into the wondrous spirit realm of the infinite’ 
(Hoffmann, quoted in ibid., 8) – to the metaphysical locus that it would occupy thereafter as 
the ultimate archetype of the autonomous musical work.22 
 Stephen Rumph points out that for Hoffmann, ‘the Fifth Symphony appears less as a 
linear trajectory than as a state of timelessness’ (Rumph 2004, 31; my emphasis). This is 
evident not only his repeated invocation of the “infinite”, but also in his clear resolve to 
accentuate properties of structural and experiential oneness – both of which are redolent of 
Schopenhauer’s thinking. The overriding focus of Hoffmann’s analysis is on what makes the 
work ‘cohere at its inmost essence’ (Hoffmann, quoted in Dahlhaus 1989, 91; my emphasis); 
on how ‘everything … is ultimately intertwined and arranged in the service of a perfect unity’ 
(Hoffmann 2007; my emphasis); on how all elements seem to be ‘sprouted from a single seed’ 
(ibid.; my emphasis); on how ‘the inner arrangement of the movements, their development, 
instrumentation, the manner in which they are ordered, all works toward a single point’ 
(Hoffmann, quoted in Rosen 1971, 37; my emphasis); on ‘the intimate relationship among the 
themes which creates this unity [and] alone is able to keep the listener held in one sentiment’ 
(Hoffmann, quoted in ibid.; original emphasis), arrested by one continuously present idea / 
essence.23 Hoffmann was patently intent on characterising this ‘Romantic musical 
composition par excellence’ (Cassedy 2010, 8) as an ontological singularity: a ‘perfect unity’ 
whose specific essence is manifest, simultaneously present, in all of its parts, transcendent to 
the time in which it is revealed to experience, and therefore accessible to the contemplating 
mind divorced from the flux of ‘the external sensual world that surrounds’ it (Hoffmann, 
quoted in Goehr 2007, 169). Anchored in one, self-same essence – the idea of one, self-same 
object – this is a mind held in a suspended now. Anticipating Kramer’s contention that music 
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frees us from the “tyranny” of the time of ‘the physical world and of daily life’ (Kramer 1973, 
134) by some hundred and sixty years, Hoffmann tells that music ‘leads us out’ of ‘the 
transient sensations of life’ and ‘into the realm of the infinite’ (Hoffmann 2007), out of the 
flux of presence and into the transcendent domain of presentness. The Fifth Symphony of his 
description is a synchronically conceivable (and objectively examinable) thing-in-itself; and 
according to Carl Dahlhaus, ‘it would appear to be just this notion of a holistic entity, endlessly 
rich in relations and thereby directed toward something higher than mere acoustic 
phenomenon [sic], that Beethoven had in mind when he spoke of the “poetic idea” that 
guided him in a conception of a work of music’ (Dahlhaus 1989, 91; my emphasis). 
 Hoffmann’s 1810 review of the Fifth Symphony is an early and highly influential 
formulation of the attitude of music as thing that centres upon notions of presentness. It is a 
conception of musical experience, as the detached contemplation of an autonomous 
aesthetic content transcendent to the time and space of the physical world, that relates to 
Fried’s aesthetic. Whilst there is not any explicit evidence to suggest that Beethoven engaged 
with Schopenhauer’s musical theories directly, it seems highly unlikely that he would not have 
encountered Hoffmann’s review of his own work. For numerous scholars, extracts in the 
composer’s Tagebuch confirm his embrace of the Romantic / Idealistic temporal thinking 
championed by these and other contemporaneous thinkers. One frequently instanced 
passage, a quote from William Jones,24 copied out in the composer’s diary of 1816, is 
considered particularly revealing: ‘time, they say, exists not at all with GOD’ (see Taylor 2016, 
13; Lodes 2006, 186; Solomon 2003, 207; original emphasis). Musicological discourse 
emphasises a marked turn in Beethoven’s thought around the beginning of the late period 
towards a preoccupation with transcendence, with a mind ‘directed toward something 
higher’ than the phenomena of spatiotemporal experience. This preoccupation is understood 
to be manifested in a novel and distinctive approach to musical time, which pivots upon the 
presentness that Hoffmann made a fundamental condition of the nascent Romantic work-
concept.  
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Two types of musical time: presence / presentness thematised in Beethoven’s late 
work 
 
Karol Berger tracks a proclivity for ‘shifts from one ontological level to another … from the 
“real” to the “imaginary”’ (Berger 1999, 18) throughout Beethoven’s corpus: an ‘exploration 
of a mind that shifts its attention from the here and now to “another world”’ that was 
‘rehearsed’ in the composer’s early work and then ‘taken up anew’, ‘endowed with an 
unprecedented significance and depth’ (ibid., 25) in the late instrumental music. According to 
Berger, Beethoven defines these two ontological levels, or worlds, through contrasts between 
‘sharply differentiated’ (ibid., 32) musical materials that evoke opposing senses of time. 
 
The most fundamental feature of the “other world” is that in it the normal laws governing the 
musical time and space, the sense of directed motion, and the concomitant sense of change are 
suspended. At the least, their operation is radically slowed down … in relation to the surrounding 
“real world”. The alternative world is not one of action and change, but of contemplation of the 
eternal and timeless. (ibid., 31-2) 
 
Ostensibly indicating a Kantian ‘phenomenal-noumenal’ dualism (ibid., 39), disclosing an 
“other world” distinct from the space and time of terrestrial experience, these contrasts that 
are heard to co-express temporality and timelessness (of the “real” and the “imaginary”) are 
thought to be the linchpin of Beethoven’s transcendental initiative. Whilst, as Taylor notes, 
‘the purported “timeless” temporal quality of Beethoven’s late music is neither unique nor 
especially new’ in and of itself (Taylor 2006, 20 n.10 ), its effect is intensified (‘set into greater 
relief’ (ibid.)) and it assumes a special sense of metaphysical presentness as it is perceived to 
transcend the more dynamic (i.e., “real world”) temporal impressions with which it is 
contrasted. Juxtapositional relations of this sort have been observed on every scale – from 
within a single phrase, or even between simultaneously occurring elements,25 to the interplay 
of motives over a wider passage,26 to the thematic architecture of a movement,27 to the 
relationships between different movements28 – throughout the music of Beethoven’s late 
period.29 One of the most widely discussed aspects of the late style, this is a procedure that, 
for Berger, ‘makes palpable a shifting of attention’ (Berger 1999, 31) from the “real world” of 
action to the “other world” of contemplation: to ‘the world within or the world beyond’ (ibid., 
40). It is an operation that, for innumerable scholars, thematises a shift from the 
spatiotemporal flux of terrestrial experience to the idea of the eternal now of the in-itself. In 
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Beethoven’s late work, musicological thinkers of the past two centuries have heard the 
sublimation of presence into presentness.  
 The weight of scholarly opinion on this peculiar compositional trait does not 
necessarily reveal anything of Beethoven’s intent, but it does reveal something critical about 
how the work-concept functions. Berger states quite explicitly that in its “representation” of 
‘a mind drawn from this to another world’, Beethoven’s work ‘[stages] its own mode of 
reception, dramatising the act of aesthetic contemplation, of absorption in the 
transcendental realm disclosed by the art, in short … embodying the [transcendent] aesthetic 
state’ (ibid.). Nietzsche is said to have similarly remarked that ‘Beethoven not only writes 
“music about music”, he also writes music about hearing music’ (ibid.). The ontological shifts 
that Berger and others perceive in Beethoven’s late work reflect the ontological shift 
demanded by the work-concept. Believing Beethoven to have embraced the Romantic / 
Idealist musical aesthetic, they hear its experiential structures within his music. It is as though, 
having espoused the theories of Hoffmann and others, Beethoven used his music to exemplify 
how a musical work should be received: to stipulate the terms on which a distinct musical 
subject and musical object are constituted, to demonstrate the process of directing one’s 
attention away from direct involvement (action) in a real-world, situational event and 
towards pure contemplation of a transcendent entity that in its conceived presentness, 
contradicts the ‘ephemerality of passing time’ (Barry 1990, 65), overcomes ‘the transient 
sensations of life’ (Hoffmann 2007). Whether or not they describe Beethoven’s compositional 
intent, the myriad descriptions of the transcendental procedure perceived to function in his 
music speak of the fundamental structure of the attitude of music as thing.  
 Accounts of temporality in Beethoven’s late work also attest to the “cut” that was 
discussed earlier which produces two basic types of musical time: the abstract 
supratemporality of the musical object – which, in itself, is present – and the dynamic flux of 
musical experience’s lived, physical event – which, as bodily experience, is indeterminate, 
open-ended, and heterogenous. The Romantic musical aspiration to replicate ‘the 
characteristics of the plastic arts of painting and sculpture’, to ‘find a plastic or equivalent 
commodity, a valuable and permanently existing product, that could be treated in the same 
way as the objects of the already respectable fine arts’ (Goehr 2007, 173) necessitated a 
solution to the problem of music’s durational nature (theatre). The metaphysics of the 
German Idealists, who conveniently took a deep interest in music, provided an answer, and 
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the musical work came to be conceived as an existent on a distinct temporal plane. For the 
musical work, overcoming duration entails overcoming the unique, transitory, interactive 
event of its performance. As Goehr writes, ‘performances take place in real time; their parts 
succeed one another. The temporal dimension of works is different; their parts exist 
simultaneously’ (Goehr 2007. 3). The Romantic solution to the problem of duration was found 
in the imperative that the musical work exist in, evoke, and constitute a self-contained, 
differentiated time-sense by which it presents itself as a discrete, autonomous, determinate 
object.  
 Beethoven’s powers of manipulating or ‘structuring’ time (Kramer 1973, 123) are 
frequently adduced to distinguish his practice from that of other composers. For Kramer, 
‘Beethoven’s time-sense – as rhythm in the large, as proportions, as pacing of tensions and 
releases – is unsurpassed’ (ibid.). Similarly, Charles Rosen maintains that ‘Beethoven was the 
greatest master of musical time’ (Rosen 1971, 445): that elements of rhythm, ‘harmonic mass, 
the weight and scope of a line or of a phrase, [and] thickness of texture’ “fused” in his work 
‘with a synthesis that not even Mozart knew [allowing] him a command [of musical time] 
previously unknown’ (ibid., 446). Daniel Chua goes further to suggest that Beethoven’s late 
work originated an entirely new conception of temporality in music: 
 
Music manipulates time, makes it audible, purposeful or amorphous, sometimes contingent and 
sometimes static. It is as if Beethoven had discovered … this new technique of time manipulation, 
breaking out of the dynamic time mode of Classical procedures into a kaleidoscopic differentiated 
time sense. (Chua 1995, 130-1) 
 
As Taylor puts it, neatly capturing the significance of these perspectives, ‘such is Beethoven’s 
mastery over time that music is heard not in time, but rather time is now in the music’ (Taylor 
2016, 17; my emphasis).  
 Reflecting the work-concept’s aspirations towards the condition of the plastic arts, 
here and elsewhere Beethoven is characterised as the innovator of a quasi-sculptural 
approach to time, which markedly deviated from the temporal attitudes of his predecessors 
and gave the concept of “musical time” a whole new meaning. Casting Beethoven as the 
“master” of manipulating and structuring time, of moulding time – as though it were a plastic 
material – to fashion autonomous, quasi-sculptural time-structures, musicological thought 
indicates his practice as a critical point at which “music as thing" – as a being that has its own 
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abstract “time” – emerges as a distinct category from “music as experience” – as a becoming 
(perceived) in time. Where ‘the dynamic time mode of Classical procedures’ might, on 
Thrasybulos Georgiades’ view at least, direct attention to the ‘here and now’, ‘[consist] in our 
becoming conscious of time’ as experienced in the physical world (Georgiades 1982, 113), 
Beethoven’s ‘new technique of time manipulation’ is understood to take his music ‘out of 
time’ (Berger 1999, 43), and thus to effectuate the Romantic vision of an autonomous musical 
work that embodies the metaphysical (Schopenhauer 1995, 170) in the form of a self-
sufficient, transcendent, ‘differentiated time sense’. The conceived ‘Beethovenian 
abstraction out of time’ (Berger 1999, 43) marks the bifurcation of the supratemporality of 
the musical object and musical experience’s lived, physical event: the “cut” that produces the 
two basic types of musical time described by the ontological categories of presentness and 
presence. The numerous observations of schisms in Beethoven’s late music bespeak this cut; 
the juxtapositional procedure identified – depicted as an ‘exploration of a mind that shifts its 
attention from the here and now’ (ibid., 25) to a distinct temporal plane – reflects the process 
wherein the attitude of music as thing takes flight from dynamic bodily experience, from 
direct involvement in the unique, transitory, situational event of the performance, and passes 
over to the idea of the musical work as an in-itself. The contrasts between ‘ordinary’ flux and 
‘self-contained, hermetic’ timelessness (Kerman 1979, 254) perceived on every scale describe 
a structural self-similarity that extends to the way in which the attitude of music as thing 
posits a transcendent being that stands out in contrast, sharply delineated, against the 
background becoming of world-time or duration.   
 
 
Experience to idea (two) 
 
The new concept of musical time that purportedly originated in Beethoven’s (late) work 
describes the new structure of musical experience ushered in by the work-concept. To recall, 
the account of expanded musical form put forward with this project maintains that the 
specific properties of the quasi-temporal structure are projected from the time of experience. 
As conceived here, the attitude of music as thing cuts the ties that unite the “time” of the 
musical work and the time of experience, leaving behind the impression (illusion) of an 
autonomous supratemporal object that has a distinct quasi-temporal structure. Music is no 
longer heard in time, ‘rather time is now in the music’ (Taylor 2016, 17). But the musical work, 
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which possess all its parts simultaneously, is, in itself, always present: presentness is the 
fundamental condition of the posited musical “thing”. All of the diversity of musical time is a 
function of presence, of the dynamic interactivity that constitutes a real-world situation in 
which the “work” is but one of the terms. Musical time is not something that the perceiver 
passively receives: it is something that she produces. This is not to say that the particular 
features of musical “works” do not affect musical time – they obviously do; rather, that 
musical time is generated in and though the interaction between the perceiver and the 
musical “work” (or more specifically between the perceiver and a contingent dynamic of 
physical, environmental phenomena that the “work” partially instigates and which 
constitutes the “work’s” (physically) material basis). An awareness of this differentiates the 
attitude of music as experience from the attitude of music as thing, which brackets off its 
productivity as it attributes the contingent qualities of experience to the properties of a 
projected autonomous thing.  
 Such attribution is fully evident in Birgit Lodes’ analysis of Beethoven’s Op. 127 / I 
(1825), which details how the macro-level coherence of a self-sufficient supratemporal object 
arises out of ‘the binary opposition of two contrasting musical phrases’ (Lodes 2006, 201) on 
the micro level. In line with the thinking of other Beethoven scholars, the movement’s 
alternating Maestoso and Allegro themes, for Lodes, engender opposing time-senses that 
relate to ‘the transcendental and the human’ (ibid., 201), respectively. The Maestoso chords, 
which open the movement and recur (largely unchanged) multiple times throughout, ‘do not 
allow the listener to grasp a sense of metre’ (ibid., 189):  
 
The chord progressions and dynamics suggest units of 5/8 and 3/8 in twofold change, and only at 
the very end is a 4/8 metre audible, although it is unstable even then, because of the foregoing 
ambiguities … Despite the majestic character of the chords, we discern that time in a directional 
sense does not exist. We are rather left within a space without temporal calibration. Concerning its 
timing, [the Maestoso theme] is not tangible, not earthbound. (ibid.) 
 
In contrast, the ‘contrapuntal complex’ (ibid., 176) of the Allegro comprises flowing, 
intertwined melodic lines that indicate a triple metre and vary in a regular fashion, articulating 
more of a ‘tangible’ earthly flux, providing a frame for experience that mirrors its mundane 
temporal structures:  
 
The Allegro parts … consist almost exclusively of constant four-measure units, which are neither 
prolonged nor shortened, but repeated, combined or varied. These units seem to act like a basic 
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category for perceiving time, like days, months, seasons, or years ... It is as if Beethoven adhered to 
a law that set out a fixed space, in this instance, a four-measure unit, to be filled with music that 
was often, but never quite, the same … As we never know what the next day will be like, we also 
do not know what music we will hear in the next unit. We do know, however, that there will be a 
next unit, of a given length. (ibid.) 
 
Alternately obfuscating and then accentuating means for experience to involve itself in the 
passage of time, situating the perceiver in ‘a space without’, and then with ‘temporal 
calibration’, the Maestoso-Allegro of Lodes’ description provokes “palpable” perceptual shifts 
between the timeless “world of (detached) contemplation” and the dynamic “world of 
action”, between a withdrawn state of introspective focus on an essence and a state of direct 
involvement in the becoming of a physical (situational) event. On the micro level, Lodes seems 
to be caught in a liminal state of betwixt and between, teetering on the threshold between 
presentness and presence, transitioning back and forth between the idea of an in-itself and 
the experience of interacting with real-world phenomena, i.e., participating in the unfolding 
performance.  
 Defined by certain periods in which, disorientated by Beethoven’s metrical contortion, 
attention strays out of the time of terrestrial experience, the Maestoso sections are perceived 
/ conceived as transcendent to the “human” / “earthly” Allegro passages (ibid., 198). As Lodes 
writes, the Maestoso comes to be associated with ‘the principle of a sublime transcendence’ 
(ibid) and, accordingly, its contrasting alternation (“binary opposition”) with the Allegro ‘can 
be heard as part of a myth about the relationship between the transcendental and the human’ 
(ibid., 201). The juxtapositions which carve up Lodes’ temporal experience into these clearly 
delineated and differentiated periods – periods of detached contemplation (“transcendent”) 
that contrast sharply with periods of dynamic interaction (“human”) – thus initiate a process 
whereby experiential qualities are attributed to the properties of an autonomous aesthetic 
content. For Lodes, the consistent iteration of the Maestoso chords through time affirm the 
presentness of a distinct entity that hangs over the duration of the experience. Interpreting 
this iteration as ‘a static rather than a dynamic procedure’ (ibid., 181), she perceives in these 
‘recurring blocks that are not integrated, developed, or otherwise elaborated’ (ibid.) the self-
same sense of a singular essence that ‘retains its identity throughout’ (ibid.). A self-sufficient, 
continuously present being transcends the temporality – the becoming – of the varying, ‘lyric, 
flowing Allegro’ (ibid., 196) and, more importantly, the real-world event of the performance 
with which it is connected.  
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  As the movement proceeds, as Lodes’ attention zooms out (or is drawn away) from 
the micro level, the frame of the iterated now of the Maestoso causes the experiential, human 
time of the Allegro to take on a specific, differentiated sense of its own. Heard to repeatedly 
emanate from (ibid., 198), adumbrate (ibid., 182), and then return to this one transcendent 
present, its flow is felt ever less as a directional impetus – after the third iteration of the 
Maestoso, the Allegro ‘does not convey a directional sense’ (ibid., 181) – and ‘yields’, ever 
more, ‘the impression of a constantly moving time-wheel’ (ibid., 180). Contrast gives way to 
an increasing internal coherence: ‘in emanating smoothly from the godly sphere, the human 
realm takes on different existences’ (ibid., 202). Beethoven’s juxtapositional procedure – 
which, in Lodes’ account, amounts to a quasi-sculptural ‘structuring of time’ (ibid., 203) – has 
the effect, over a longer duration, of spreading experiential or human time, as well as 
transcendental time, out before Lodes as an object of contemplation. In the macro-scale 
perspective that she articulates, there is no longer the teetering between the real-world 
situational event and the autonomous aesthetic content posited in the imagination. 
Reminiscent of Schopenhauer’s thought, the time of the Allegro is described as an ideal 
(human) variant of an overarching presentness, ‘spinning around’ (ibid., 180) the axis of this 
stable constant in a way that makes the succession of past, present, and future seem 
increasingly unimportant. ‘Time is now in the music’ (Taylor 2016, 17), and its “human” time 
is quite distinct from the time of Lodes’ direct, dynamic involvement in the spatiotemporal 
world. It is a projection, an abstraction, a remote and self-sufficient representational object 
that has expressly diverged from experience’s lived physical event.   
 From the initial “binary opposition”, which tears a rift between the timelessness of an 
autonomous entity and the time of lived experience that grows exponentially wider from the 
micro to the macro level, as the movement unfolds (as perception zooms out), a ‘mythical, 
circling … static structure’ (Lodes 2006, 189) gradually takes shape. Successive iterations of 
the juxtapositional procedure, which iteratively distance Lodes from this ‘nondirectional or 
cyclic’ object (ibid., 203), disclose a differentiated, self-sufficient, remote ‘mythic time’ (ibid., 
168) that stands out in contrast against the background of world-time or duration. For Lodes, 
this “mythic time” constitutes the ‘everlasting essence’ (ibid., 187) of the Maestoso-Allegro, 
that which binds all of its parts together into ‘a perfect unity’ (Hoffmann 2007). This is the 
“poetic idea”, ‘something higher than mere acoustic phenomenon [sic]’, that delimits ‘a 
holistic entity’ (Dahlhaus 1989, 91). In the “image” of a fully present, spinning time-wheel 
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which describes the “mythic” quasi-temporal structure that she posits, Lodes “sees” the time 
of her experience spread out for her ‘direct and complete apprehension’ (Langer 1953, 110). 
 
 
The contingency of musical time 
 
Lodes experiences the first movement of the E-flat quartet through the prism of Romantic / 
Idealist philosophy and generations of Beethoven scholarship, drawing upon instances of 
both throughout her analysis. The quasi-temporal structure that she posits is the perfect 
conflation of these two bodies of thought: one that promotes the notion of a 
“transcendental” plane distinct from “human” experience in the physical, spatiotemporal 
world, and the other that promotes the notion of a “master” quasi-sculptor of abstract time-
structures who inscribed into his work the specific terms by which it should be constituted as 
a discrete, metaphysical being. Both can be seen as examples of “mythic” thinking – the idea 
of “the Beethoven myth” is well established (see, for example, Goehr 2007, 208) – and, 
tellingly, Lodes cites Claude Lévi-Strauss’ claim that ‘binary oppositions are necessary for the 
structure’ of such thinking (Lodes 2006, 187). The musical experience that she describes 
emphatically reflects the impact of the “binary opposition” structure of these two influences. 
It is an experience in which time is carved up into clearly delineated oppositional periods, an 
experience that shifts between contrasting states of detached contemplation and involved 
action, an experience that ultimately distances itself from the idea of an autonomous 
aesthetic content, that ultimately posits a discrete supratemporal object, sharply 
differentiated from the time of the world in its transcendent presentness. Whilst the specifics 
of Lodes’ experience reflect her specific discursive engagements, so too does her experience 
reflect her situation within the wider discursive practice of the work-concept. The “mythic” 
“binary opposition” structure that frames her experience is a particular expression of the 
separability structure of the attitude of music as thing.  
Beneath the separability structure – which, as we will explore in the following chapter, 
is the field of the transcendental ego – is the field of the body directly involved in the world’s 
becoming. Prior to its being carved up, cut, abstracted in the mind, attributed to the 
properties of conceived autonomous musical things, the time of musical experience is 
produced in the world, in and through the body’s dynamic interactivity. As Thomas Clifton 
put it, ‘a description of a composition’s “movement” is really a description of our bodily 
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behaviour. In the presence of a composition, we move; if it “changes tempo” it is because we 
do so’ (Clifton 1976, 88; original emphasis). The quasi-temporal structure of the musical work 
is not somehow given to us complete, self-sufficient, and fully determined: ‘if it begins to 
make sense, it is because we are there, attuned to the world’, because ‘it is [we] who give 
sense to’ it (ibid.). Lodes posits a ‘cyclic time structure’ (Lodes 2006, 188) because in and 
through her interaction with the Maestoso-Allegro she produces a fluctuating musical time 
that ebbs and flows as her body engages with a dynamic of different phenomena in differing 
ways, at differing rates – because her sensorimotor activity varies in a cyclical fashion. 
Beneath the projected image of a spinning time-wheel, the projected presentness of a 
supratemporal object conceived to be of Beethoven’s ‘structuring’ (ibid., 196), beneath all 
ideas of binary opposition which eventuate in the (illusory) condition of a detached spectator 
contemplating a discrete, distant “mythic” thing-in-itself, there is the fluid, heterogenous flux 
of presence’s lived, physical event which is neither subject nor object, but rather both / and.  
The event of dynamic interactivity that constitutes musical time is unique and 
contingent. Every perceiver is a unique and continuously changing body with unique 
properties and a unique history of physical and socio-cultural experience. Every musical 
experience is a unique “entanglement of matter and meaning” that iteratively unfolds in a 
specific place at a specific moment in the world’s dynamic becoming. At the level of presence, 
musical time is always different: the musical time that Lodes produced is different to that 
which anyone else has produced or will produce, and the musical time that she produced in 
and through one interaction with the Maestoso-Allegro is different to the musical time that 
she produced (or will produce) in and through any other. As the attitude of music as thing 
substitutes for this real-world, generative event the clear idea of a supratemporal thing-in-
itself that possesses a distinct quasi-temporal structure, musical time is deprived of its 
uniqueness and contingency. ‘The idea claims to be the same for everyone, valid for all times 
and for all places’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 73-4). Attributed to the properties of objects – 
“intentional” objects that transcend the duration of the experience, “fictional” objects 
permanently housed in the “imaginary museum”, or perhaps “Platonic” objects existing in the 
eternal world of ideal forms (see, for example, Levinson 1980, Dodd 2000) – that are unbound 
to any specific (factual) spatiotemporal context, musical time becomes universal and 
“continuously and perpetually present” (Fried 1998, 167). This is the illusion of the attitude of 
music as thing. The work-concept engenders the illusion of self-sufficiency, “overcomes 
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theatre” (duration), by convincing its participants to project the presence of the time of 
musical experience into the presentness of the autonomous musical thing.  
 Yet, the presentness of the musical work has the potential to function differently. Like 
the ideal, “unitary form” of Morris’ sculpture, the ideal, one present of the musical work can 
serve as a “constant” against which “experienced variables” – the uniqueness and 
contingency of the indeterminate, open-ended, heterogenous flux of bodily musical time – 
can be related. Apprehending the musical work not as the music itself, but as a framework 
with which to interactively generate music, the attitude of music as experience reverses the 
terms of the attitude of music as thing, making foreground background, and making 
background focal. For the attitude of music as experience, any musical work has the potential 
to support the becoming of expanded musical form in this way: expanded musical form is not 
something created by the composer, but a function of perceptual attitude. In apparent 
recognition of this crucial point, which will be elaborated on in some depth in the following 
chapter, a number of composers have expressed the aim of making the presentness of their 
work explicit so as to foster an awareness of the unique, living musical time contingently 
produced in and through the perceiver’s dynamic interactivity. Feldman’s descriptions of his 
works as ‘time canvasses’ that he would merely ‘prime’ speak of the intent to provide a 
timeless ground for the becoming of ‘Time Undisturbed’ (Feldman 1988, 4). ‘I feel the idea is 
more to let Time be, than to treat it as a compositional element’ (ibid., 3); ‘I am interested in 
getting Time in its unstructured existence … in how this wild beast lives in the jungle, not in 
the zoo’ (ibid., 4). If the attitude of music as thing consists in ‘putting the “wild beast” in a 
cage’ (ibid., 5), then the attitude of music as experience consists in living its untamed, 
unconstrained, ‘unstructured existence’. When Jurg Frey writes of his concern with ‘the 
precise threshold where static sonic thinking … acquires direction, where static, wholly 
motionless sounds meet the onset of movement and directionality’ (Frey 2004), he describes 
the juncture where the idea of presentness meets the experience of presence. This is a 
threshold between ‘two experiential worlds: the world of the path and the world of expanse’, 
between “the world of action”, where the music is ‘organically grown, evolving its path in 
time’ (ibid.), and “the world of contemplation”, where the music has a ‘timeless presence’ 
[i.e., is present] (ibid.). It is the point at which supratemporality turns back upon the flux of 
bodily being-in -the-world to set into relief a unique, contingent event that ‘distinguishes itself 
from a musical experience centred upon listening to an object’ (ibid.). Facilitating the 
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becoming of such events, in which music is heard (or better, produced) in time because time 
is not heard in the musical work, is the goal of Bryn Harrison, who has explained how the 
‘timelessness … inherent in the construction’ of his work –  ‘there is no sense of progress and 
no sense of “getting anywhere”’ – enables the emergence of ‘a living, breathing entity’ 
(Glover and Harrison 2013, 59), the emergence of a unique, physical expanded musical form. 
The ‘spatial dimension’ of repetitions in extended time (2008), for example, allows musical 
‘motion’ to become perspicuously ‘bodily’: this ‘singular … obsessively repetitious’ structure, 
that appears to be ‘suspended in time’, functions as a constant against which ‘the 
embodiment of a living, breathing, experiential time’ (ibid., 56) stands out as figure. The work 
is not the music itself, but a framework with which music is interactively produced; musical 
time is not attributed to the idea of an autonomous thing, but lived as contingent physical 
experience. Music occurs in the world and not in the mind. 
As bodily perspective, expanded musical form gains definition in its relation to ‘a 
surrounding penumbra of other possible perspectives’ (Holland 1986, 113). For the attitude 
of music as experience, the one present of the musical work, like the “unitary form” of Morris’ 
sculpture, is ‘a totality open to a horizon of an indefinite number of perspectival views’ 
(Merleau-Ponty 1964 Pr. P., 16). It refers to an indefinite (infinite) number of possible musical 
times against the background of which the specific time of the perceiver’s musical experience 
is defined – confirmed as contingent and unique. Any musical work might be apprehended in 
this way and thereby support the becoming of expanded musical form. But the works of 
Feldman, Frey, and Harrison (and others, of course – Eliane Radigue’s work springs to mind) 
that are explicit in their presentness are, perhaps, particularly well-suited to foregrounding 
the uniqueness and contingency of the musical time produced in and through the body’s 
dynamic interactivity. Under the attitude of music as experience, the presentness of the 
musical work (one possibility of presence) is one of the terms of an expanded situation. 
However, under the attitude of music as thing, the presentness of the musical work – like the 
“character” in Fischer-Lichte’s ‘order of representation’ – is a single object of attention that 
absorbs the “entirety” of meaning. Like any musical work, those of Feldman, Frey, and 
Harrison have every potential to present themselves to perception as autonomous time-
structures, as discrete, fully-determinate supratemporal beings, ‘perfectly explicit in 
[themselves]’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 44).  
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Harrison’s recent work, To Shadow (2018), premiered in Union Chapel in February of 
this year, did not solicit my involved participation. The work’s densely layered fabric of 
multiple repeating fragments, simultaneously voiced on top of one another and successively 
passed from one player to another, together with its macro-scale alternating “panels” 
engendered an intense sense of self-sameness that eclipsed the phenomenal flux of my direct 
bodily interaction. Abetted by the conditions of the performance environment, which 
comprised a very clearly demarcated performing space and listening space, and boasted a 
rich, sustaining, all-encompassing resonance that obfuscated detailed, dynamic sonic activity, 
the work distanced itself from me and its parts merged into a thick, autonomous, holistic mass 
– ‘wholly manifest’ ‘at every moment’, hanging over (posited at the end of) my stream of 
changing perspectives – that I observed from a detached position. This “frozen” time-
structure, fully spread out before me and fully present in itself, constituted a single object of 
attention, transcendent to my perception – external to me, different to me – in its 
supratemporality. The music, to me, was a thing-in-itself, and not my experience, a self-
sufficient being, and not a becoming that I interactively produced.  
Later that evening, after contemplating my encounter with Harrison’s work on the 
journey home, I put on a recording of the Alban Berg Quartet performing the Maestoso-
Allegro. Against the background of every interaction that I have had with this work since 
childhood, I endeavoured to allow this specific event of musical experience stand out in relief, 
in all its uniqueness and contingency. Under the attitude of music as experience, I attended 
to the movements of my listening focus about a dynamic of phenomena, recognising how the 
content of my musical experience was determined by the patterns of my engagement, 
generated by my action. Although it was mediated through my speakers, I approached the 
work in a perceptual attitude that assumed no distance from the perceived, and it appeared 
to me as an incomplete framework whose structure I could freely navigate. I moved between 
its strata – shifting from one line of sound to another, variously concentrating on a single line 
or multiple lines, concurrently; coalesced its various parts into different configurations; 
zoomed in on and out of different sounds, combinations of sounds, and properties of sounds 
(including those proper to the specific situation: the colourations of my speakers and of the 
ambient acoustic attributes of my room); and determined relations between these and other 
(acoustic and non-acoustic) phenomena in my environment to interactively produce a living 
musical form whose time I felt unfold in and through my bodily being-in-the-world. 
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Afterwards (having made notes on the experience that I’d just had), I put on the same 
recording and co-produced a very different musical form.30 My interactions with the “same” 
work, the same framework that consists of a specific set of conditions, resulted in two 
different musics. The work was not the music – the music was not a thing: the music was my 
experience and the presentness of the work foregrounded its uniqueness and contingency. 
In my encounter with Harrison’s work, presence was supplanted by presentness; in my 
encounter with Beethoven’s work, presentness gave way to presence. In the former, I 
projected my musical experience into the idea of a musical object as an in-itself; in the latter, 
I lived my musical experience, positing an ideal object as one of the terms of an expanded 
situation. In both cases, presentness was the condition of objecthood, but the ontology of the 
music was a function of perceptual attitude. “What a musical work is” (Levinson 1980) 
depends upon the perceiver.  
 
 
Sound installation: not a break with the past, but a background made focal 
 
The same is true of the sound installation work as conceived by Max Neuhaus, which shares 
with the musical work the condition of presentness. Reiterating the basic terms of the 
Romantic / Idealist work-concept, Neuhaus’ vision of a sonic art form that –  modelled on the 
visual arts (see Neuhaus 1994, 42) – ‘doesn’t exist in time’, his intent to ‘[take] sound out of 
time and [make] it into an entity’ (Neuhaus, quoted in Cox 2006 / 2011, 84), to create a 
‘permanent’ being that overcomes music’s nature as ‘an event’ (Neuhaus 1994, 43) 
materialised in Times Square (1977) which, after a ten-year hiatus (between 1992 and 2002), 
remains in situ today. From beneath a metal grating on a pedestrian island in the heart of 
Manhattan, a loudspeaker continuously and singularly emits a constant, industrial-sounding 
drone. ‘You don’t come to a sound work of mine at the beginning and leave at the end’ (ibid., 
130); this “permanent entity” does not share the time of experience. It is fully spread out 
before the perceiver, existing in ‘a continuous and perpetual present’ – ‘wholly manifest’ ‘at 
every moment’ (Fried 1998, 167). Transcendent to duration, hanging over every changing 
perspective, Times Square’s drone constitutes one, self-same object: autonomous, external, 
different to the perceiver. In its ‘continuous and entire presentness’ (ibid.; original emphasis), 
Times Square distances the perceiver, makes her subject.  
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 Apprehended as an “entity” that ‘doesn’t exist in time’, Times Square is a synchronic 
thing-in-itself: a fully determinate ‘complete unit’ “seen” ‘all at once’ (Barry 1990, 58). Yet, 
with his notion of using sound as a ‘means of transforming space into place’ (Neuhaus 1994, 
130), Neuhaus articulated an intent that contradicts this. Place, we will see in Chapter Three, 
is the dynamically interactive experience of direct involvement in a real-world situation: the 
experience of place is a performance of presence. Just as the musical work can be taken in 
itself or as one of the terms of an expanded situation, so too can Times Square, in its 
presentness, manifest as a single object of attention or as a framework that activates 
presence. As the latter, its drone functions as the ground for an indefinite number of possible 
experiences – each a unique, transitory event of dynamic interaction. Taken not in-itself, but 
as directly involved in the world, its hum – bolstered by the resonant cavities of the 
underground vent from which it emanates, and harmonically-complex so as to conciliate 
sounds across a wide spectrum of frequency – intermingles with the contingent flux of 
physical environmental phenomena. Against the explicit constant of the drone, the 
experienced variables are perspicuously foregrounded: the perceiver is made aware that she 
produces the content of her experience as she determines relations between a unique 
phenomenal dynamic from the specific perspective of her bodily being-in-the-world. 
Presentness is supplanted by presence. As an experience of place, the sound installation work 
lasts for the exact duration of each perceiver’s interaction: the perceiver comes to a sound 
installation at the beginning and leaves at the end. In the order of presence, the artwork is no 
longer a determinate thing, a singular, “permanent entity”, but an indeterminate, open-
ended, heterogeneity of unique, transitory experiences. The artwork is produced by the 
perceiver(s).  
 From the condition of the sound installation work, which will be explored in greater 
depth in Chapter Three, we can learn about the condition of the musical work in the expanded 
field. Here, apprehended in bodily perspective, it is always situated in place. As a framework 
‘open to a horizon of an indefinite number of perspectival views’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964 Pr. P., 
16), a framework that gives rise to an indefinite number of possible musics, the work of music 
in the order of presence is not an ‘ideal unity in the possession of the intellect’ (ibid.), not a 
singular thing-in-itself, but a heterogeneity of unique bodily experiences, of contingent 
physical events produced through interaction. As presentness is supplanted by presence, the 
artwork is expanded. 
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The chapters that follow will elaborate on how, unlike “sound art” and despite 
Neuhaus’ initial claims to the contrary, sound installation does not gain definition in 
opposition to music, but in its expansion of music’s situation. In the expanded situation that 
it opens up, the presentness of the work is not a single object of attention, but one of the 
terms of an indeterminate, open-ended, heterogenous field of presence. This describes 
music’s expanded field, where the work-concept does not have ‘absolute and universal 
validity’ (Goehr 2007, 273), but neither is it excluded: in music’s expanded field, the musical 
work is one possibility or one of the terms of music as experience. Fried’s ontological 
categories of presentness and presence have served as a powerful tool for explicating the 
non-oppositional relation of the musical work and expanded musical form. They correspond 
to the Nietzschean concepts of the Apollonian and Dionysian – the first associated with the 
metaphysics of individualism, critical distance, and the discrete objects of the visual arts, the 
second with unity, entanglement, the wild flux of nature’s dynamic interactivity, and music 
(see Nietzsche 2003). As the work-concept aspired towards the condition of painting and 
sculpture, aspired to “overcome theatre” – i.e., duration – it substituted the Apollonian for 
the Dionysian. But just as we ultimately learn that the relationship between Nietzsche’s two 
“art impulses” is not one of opposition, that the Apollonian is a particular (stabilised) 
manifestation of the Dionysian, so too have we discovered that an absolute dichotomy of 
presentness and presence is not sustainable. Although relegated to background beneath the 
Apollonian presentness in the attitude of music as thing, the presence of the Dionysian 
inheres in every musical experience. It is this becoming beneath the being, the interactivity 
of bodily being-in-the-world beneath the posited autonomous object, the experience 
beneath the idea that is the lived, physical event of expanded musical form.  
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Notes 
 
1 Cage 1981, 80. 
2 As well as of issues pertaining to art criticism and history that are beyond the purview of this discussion.  
3 Rex Butler’s evaluation of ‘Art and Objecthood’ (and Fried’s later work) touches upon musical questions in the 
context of a discussion about Douglas Gordon’s k:364: A Journey by Train (2010), but his focus is not so much 
music per se as the presentness of Gordon’s video art and how this presentness is engendered by the ways in 
which Gordon handles footage of musical performance (see Butler 2017).   
4 Brandon LaBelle, for instance, tells us that ‘with sound installation, and the works of Neuhaus and others [from 
the late 1960s onwards], sound art finds definition, demarcating itself from … music and entering into a more 
thorough conversation with the visual arts’ (LaBelle 2015, xvi). For LaBelle, like many others, the late 1960s saw 
the ‘beginnings of sound art as a distinct discipline’ (ibid.): the consequence of a ‘move from “music” to “sound”’ 
(ibid., 154), coupled with a growing interest in ‘incorporating, referring to, or drawing upon materials, ideas, and 
concerns’ of the visual arts (ibid., 151).   
5 ‘Art and Objecthood’ hinges upon a raft of peculiar terms for which Fried offers no specific definition. Over the 
next few sections of the chapter, I set out my interpretation of Fried’s terms “presence” and “presentness”, and 
clarify how these terms will be used going forward.  
6 ‘Here again the experience of being distanced by the work in question seems crucial: the beholder knows 
himself to stand in an indeterminate, open-ended, and unexacting relation as subject to the impassive object on 
the wall or floor’ (Fried 1998, 155; original emphasis). 
7 ‘Only one aspect of the work is immediate: the apprehension of the gestalt. The experience of the work 
necessarily exists in time’ (Morris 1993, 17).  
8 The body is ‘the system of systems devoted to the inspection of the world … outlining hollows and reliefs, 
distances and deviations – a meaning – in the inconceivable flatness of being’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964 Si., 67) 
9 Decisions were also based on concerns of context and performance – for example, a certain sound source’s 
capacity to bring out the innate resonances of a specific installation environment and / or to exhibit performer 
physicality in a particular way – that will be discussed in the chapters that follow.  
10 Morris’ comment suggests that the sculptural object is, in fact, representational: it is posited in the mind as 
an ideal, geometric shape which is one of the terms of the reflexive, interactive event that constitutes the 
artwork. The form of the artwork could be seen as “non-representational” insofar as it becomes in the world 
through the dynamic interaction between perceiver, sculptural object, and other environmental conditions.  The 
perceiver is not “distanced” or “isolated” as a detached subject contemplating a remote, external object (posited 
in the mind); the relationship is reversed: she is implicated in the production of real-world, living form that 
constantly tests her immediate mental representation (apperception). She is, to borrow Fischer-Lichte’s 
wording, ‘an actively perceiving’ embodied mind, ‘pervaded by the perceived’ (Fischer-Lichte 2008, 173). She 
becomes a subject-object.  
11 ‘The “obdurate identity” of a specific material, like the wholeness of shape, is simply given or stated’ (Fried 
1998, 165).  
12 Correspondences between the thought of Fischer-Lichte and Barad can partially be attributed to the shared 
influence of Judith Butler’s work.  
13 Barad uses the term “intra-action” in the place of “interaction” to obviate the implication that ‘there are 
separate individual agencies that precede their interaction’; ‘”distinct” agencies’, she argues, ‘are distinct only 
in a relational, not an absolute, sense, that is, agencies are only distinct in relation to their mutual entanglement; 
they don’t exist as individual elements’ (Barad 2007, 33). I agree with Barad, however I have chosen to stick with 
the usual “interaction” partly for the sake of clarity, but also because this project attends to the coming-together 
of subject / object, mind / body, inner / outer, etc. in the wake of their separation under the auspices of the 
Romantic / Idealist work-concept. In this specific music-aesthetic context, I think it is fair to say that there are 
‘separate individual agencies that precede’ the unique, interactive event of expanded musical form.  
14 To recall Merleau-Ponty, ‘the thing can never be separated from someone who perceives it; nor can it ever 
actually be in itself because its articulations are the very ones of our existence, and because it is posited at the 
end of a gaze or at the conclusion of a sensory exploration that invests it with humanity. To this extent, every 
perception is a communication or a communion’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 334).  
15 As Krauss puts it, ‘in the minimalist work of Donald Judd or Robert Morris … abstract geometries are constantly 
submitted to the definition of a sited vision’ (Krauss 1986, 267).  
16 Cage and Carter are the only composers that Fried mentioned by name (see Fried 1998, 164). 
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17 For Fried, “objecthood” is ‘the condition of non-art’ (Fried 1998, 152); Cage tells us that if ‘one says, “Yes! I do 
not discriminate between intention and non-intention”, the splits subject-object, art-life, etc., disappear’ (Cage 
1978, 14); and Fischer-Lichte describes her flagship aesthetic notion of the “autopoietic feedback loop” as an 
exchange ‘which dissolves the fundamental subject-object opposition that philosophy and history of ideas so 
ardently insist on … we experience ourselves as actively perceiving subjects and simultaneously pervaded by the 
perceived; we become subjects and objects alike’ (Fischer-Lichte 2008, 172-3). Dewey also considers subject / 
object unity critical for aesthetic experience: ‘the professional thinker (and naturally he is the one who writes 
treatises on aesthetic theory) is the one who is most perpetually haunted by the difference between self and 
world. He approaches the discussion of art with a reinforced bias, and one, which, most unfortunately, is just 
the one most fatal to aesthetic understanding. For the uniquely distinguishing feature of aesthetic experience is 
exactly the fact that no such distinction of self and object exists in it, since it is aesthetic in the degree in which 
organism and environment cooperate to institute an experience in which the two are so fully integrated that 
each disappears’ (Dewey 1980, 259).   
18 There is a strong emphasis on the present moment in the ‘Temporality’ chapter of Phenomenology of 
Perception, which has led to some confusion with respect to the distinction between Merleau-Ponty’s embodied 
subject and Husserl’s transcendental ego. For the embodied subject, as we will see, the present never appears 
in-itself, but always within a background, surrounded by past and future. Merleau-Ponty would subsequently 
renounce the account of temporality posited in the Phenomenology of Perception for the reason that it adhered 
too closely to the Husserlian philosophy of consciousness and its Cartesian basis (see Merleau-Ponty 1968, 244). 
His revised understanding of temporality is clearly formulated in The Visible and the Invisible – where subject 
and object are conceived as the same flesh – which was first published in English translation in 1968: a year after 
the publication of ‘Art and Objecthood’. 
19 These paragraphs are indebted to Nancy Holland’s careful reading of Merleau-Ponty in the light of Derrida’s 
critique of phenomenology, the salient points of which she finds to be already within Merleau-Ponty’s work.  
20 In contrast, “indeterminate”, “open-ended”, “incomplete”, “indefinite”, etc., appear throughout ‘Art and 
Objecthood’ as descriptors of the “literalist” art experience.  
21 Ingarden began work on the text principally cited here, Ontology of the Work of Art: The Musical Work, The 
Picture, The Architectural Work, The Film, in 1928, following on directly from, and elaborating ideas set out in 
The Work of Music and the Problem of its Identity (1928) (Ingarden 1986). It was not published, however, until 
1961, and the English translation did not appear until 1989. 
22 As Goehr writes, ‘theories of musical works have been formulated on the basis of examples drawn from the 
classical repertoire of the early nineteenth century. Beethoven is the composer, and the Fifth Symphony the 
work, most commonly referred to’ (Goehr 2007, 83). 
23 Dahlhaus –  whilst referring to Beethoven’s late style, rather than the works of the middle period – offers an 
explanation as to how unity can be achieved across multiple movements, and how this unity causes temporal 
suspension, that helps to clarify Hoffmann’s interpretation: ‘when a thematic – or “subthematic” – connection 
reaches across from one movement to another [as Hoffmann identifies in the Fifth Symphony] that is one of the 
traits of a musical logic that is less a goal-directed process than a network, the strands of which can radiate in 
all directions. Associations that take this form are … the corollary of a lyricism that beckons us to linger in 
contemplation, and eschews the drama of determining the present from the vantage point of the future’ 
(Dahlhaus, quoted in Taylor 2016, 37).] 
24 Whose work is also cited  in book one of Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Idea (Schopenhauer 1995, 
4). 
25 According to Charles Rosen, for example, at its climax (b.106) the second movement of Op. 111 (1821-2) 
concurrently ‘reaches the extremes of rapidity and of immobility’, and towards its close, ‘the rhythmic 
accompaniment of Variation IV (the fastest measured motion) and the theme in its original form (the slowest) 
are both suspended under the unmeasured stillness of the trill’. ‘With all their tension’, he continues, ‘these 
effects are essentially meditative in character’ (Rosen 1971, 448). 
26 William Kinderman, for example, writes of how relationships between conflicting motives voiced by the first 
violin and the ‘cello (‘juxtaposed short fragments of music in contrasting tempos’) at the beginning of the 
development section of Op. 130 / I (1825) ‘heighten the effect of temporal stasis – the trance-like suspension 
characteristic of this remarkable episode’ (Kinderman 2006, 296-7). 
27 The ABABA form of the Heiliger Dankgesang of Op. 132 (1825) is a commonly cited example of this: for 
Kinderman, ‘no other slow movement in Beethoven exploits such radical contrasts’, which ‘[pit] a strictly modal 
[Molto Adagio (A)] hymn setting evoking a mystic, archaic [‘unearthly’] aura against a vigorous, dance-like 
Andante [B]’ to capture ‘a remote or timeless ethos’ (Kinderman 1995, 296-7); for Berger ‘a worldly modern 
galant dance in D major twice interrupts thoughts lost in another world’, framing a focus ‘on the beyond, on the 
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transcendent divine world’ (Berger 1999, 31); and similarly for Joseph Kerman the Molto Adagio defines a ‘self-
contained, hermetic world’, which is ‘twice confronted with the ordinary world’ (Kerman 1979, 254). Another 
prominent example is the relationship between the Vivace and Adagio themes of Op. 109 / I (1820), which Barry 
Cooper describes as ‘a contrast between 2/4 and 3/4, dynamism and stasis, regular and irregular rhythm – 
suggesting images of action set against thought … time against timelessness’ (Cooper, quoted in Taylor 2016, 
25). 
28 The macro-structure of the late quartets are often described on these terms (see Kinderman 2006; Chua 1995; 
Kerman 1979), as are the Op. 109, 110, and 111 piano sonatas (see Taylor 2016) – on Op. 111, for example, 
Stephen Rumph tells us that ‘the sonata aspires to timelessness’: ‘if the first movement “falls” into horizontal 
time, the second movement finds redemption in a timeless verticality’ (Rumph 2004, 130-1). Rumph is not alone 
in drawing attention to the timelessness of the Arietta of Op. 111, which contrasts markedly with the dynamic 
first movement. Donald Tovey writes of ‘static and ecstatic visions’ (quoted in Taylor 2016, 43), whilst for Charles 
Rosen it ‘succeeds as almost no other work in suspending the passage of time’ (Rosen 1971, 446); similarly, for 
Wilfred Mellers, ‘the Arietta effaces time’ (quoted in Taylor 2016, 43), and Robert Taub identifies within it ‘a 
moment of transcendence’ where ‘time seems to stand still’ (quoted in ibid.).  
29 Indeed, for some scholars, this transcendental juxtaposition also describes the relationship of the late ‘dream 
phantasmagoria’ period to the middle ‘heroic’ period (see Taylor 2016, 29). 
30 Recording technology has important implications with respect to how musical works might function in the 
expanded field, to provide a “constant” function against which “experienced variables” can be related. It is, 
however, beyond the scope of this project to explore this point, which will perhaps be the subject of future 
research. 
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Physicality  
 
 
[Music] is not simply a thing in the world, but a humanly meaningful 
way of being, of lived experience ... Most importantly, music is a bodily 
experience in the fullest sense: a richly corporeal mode of being that 
integrates mind, emotion, all the senses, an entire person.  
 
– Wayne Bowman1  
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, we established the basic ontological terms of music’s expanded field. 
We will now turn to investigate, in depth, the structures of the perceptual attitude that opens 
on to it. This is an attitude that assumes no distance from the perceived and has no respect 
for boundaries. It is an attitude that produces the content of its experience, in the world and 
not in the mind, through temporally-extended exploratory contact, movement, and 
interaction. With this chapter, I posit touch as a model for expanded musical form, and set 
out how the characteristics of the touching / touched body legitimate the pluralistic, open-
ended continuity of the expanded field.  
 
 
 
Music as bodily experience  
 
When, in the 1970s, Thomas Clifton applied phenomenological analysis to musical experience 
he found that the musical object rests upon (is projected from) a background of contingent 
bodily activity. With this realisation, he declared, ‘the reality of music is no longer assumed 
as a fixed and stable reference point; it will, in fact, have to be constituted by a human act’ 
(Clifton 1976, 74). In its detailed investigations of the ties that unite the musical “thing” and 
the embodied perceiver, Clifton’s work presents an alternative to conceptions that view 
musical experience consisting in the detached contemplation of discrete, determinate, 
autonomous aesthetic objects. The central emphasis that his account places upon the body’s 
active role in the generation of musical meaning contests the structures of the attitude of 
music as thing and describes the basis for an attitude of music as experience.  
Notions pertaining to the autonomy (autonomous content) of the musical work are, 
for Clifton, ‘non-illuminative metaphors’ (ibid., 88) that overlay musical experience’s lived, 
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physical event. ‘When we say that a composition has unity, we are really saying that it is our 
experience of the composition which is unified’ (ibid., 75); ‘a description of a composition’s 
movement is really a description of our bodily behaviour … if it “changes tempo” it is because 
we do so’ (ibid., 88); ‘I recognise “rising line” in this texture because “rising line” is already an 
acquisition of my body’ (ibid., 87). ‘I have not the slightest idea what could be meant by the 
[work] in-itself – nor does anyone else’ (ibid.) because musical meaning is bodily meaning – 
“synaesthetic” meaning (ibid.) – and because the aesthetic content of every experience of the 
work is dependent upon the bodily skills and sensorimotor knowledge that the perceiver 
possesses. Music is not a thing that we appreciate, or passively receive from a distance. We 
are physically intertwined in music as it unfolds through our bodily actions.  
 The autonomous musical object, then, is an illusory, or as Lydia Goehr puts it, 
“fictional” object – a “projection” or “hypostatisation” (Goehr 2007, 106) whose properties 
derive from the expressions of the perceiving body. If, under the attitude of music as thing, 
the perceiver posits the clear idea of the musical object as an in-itself, this is because she 
brackets off or suppresses the unique, physical processes of her own bodily actions and 
interactions in and through which this “object” becomes. ‘Obsessed with being, and 
forgetting the perspectivism of my experience, I henceforth treat my experience as an object’ 
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 73). Projected from bodily experience, the musical object is not fixed 
and stable, but rather contingent and unique, not universal and predetermined, but 
fundamentally open-ended. Its aesthetic content is performed or enacted – and not merely 
received – by the perceiver, thus every experience of the work produces a different musical 
object or meaning-content. As Clifton explained:  
 
While it is self-evident that “I perceive movement”, it is not at all self-evident that “there is 
movement” or even that “the movement is always the same”. If it were the same, there would be 
no reason why my “responses” to it should be any different now than they were ten years ago. On 
the contrary, the movement of the perceived [work] has since changed because the meaning of the 
[work] has changed, just as it is likely to continue changing … this is why constitution is an endless 
task, and why the “reality” of the [work] can never be completely disclosed. (Clifton 1976, 88)  
 
In its directness towards the fully-determinate thing-in-itself posited in the mind, the attitude 
of music as thing covers over the difference, uniqueness, incompleteness, and open-
endedness that Clifton described. If the perceiver has different “responses” to a particular 
work, this is attributed to variations of subjective orientation towards the same object, and 
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not to the production of different musics. The attitude of music as experience, on the other 
hand, consists in an awareness that every musical experience, as Clifton recognised, 
constitutes a different music. The work is not a fully-determinate structure, but a framework 
with which to interact, and with which to co-generate a unique, living musical form. Clifton’s 
account of the covered-over experiential ground of the attitude of music as thing describes 
the field of the attitude of music as experience that attends directly to the contingencies of 
bodily activity. In doing so, it does not allow musical experience’s lived, physical event to be 
projected into an illusory independent object. Excavating the structures of the attitude of 
music as thing, Clifton hit upon music’s expanded field.  
Directly involved in the production of a unique, living form that unfolds through her 
own bodily actions and interactions, and aware of the perspectivism of her experience that 
determines this specific materiality, the perceiver, under the attitude of music as experience, 
is not a detached spectator of an autonomous being, but a participant in a reflexive, reciprocal 
becoming. As Clifton’s work clearly illustrates, however, this attitude is not a difference of 
kind to the attitude of music as thing, but a difference of degree. Both grounded in contingent 
bodily activity, they are different points of aesthetic emphasis on a continuum of experience. 
The expanded musical form of the attitude of music as experience – a physical, lived, 
interactive event – is a background made focal. 
 
 
Enactivism and the physicality of perception  
 
Clifton’s theories from the 1970s of music as bodily experience,2 his understanding that 
musical meaning is produced in and through the actions and interactions of the perceiving 
body, anticipated many of the tenets of recent “enactive” accounts of musical experience. In 
their repudiation of conceptions of musical experience as a primarily mental process of 
subjects relating to objects, enactive approaches to music cognition provide a useful 
framework for defining expanded musical form. Before turning to specifically musical 
questions, I will first briefly consider enactivism’s general basis and then spell out how it has 
yielded a model of perception that befits the attitude of music as experience.  
 Enactivism claims that mental content arises from the body’s interactions with the 
world. As Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, who introduced the term 
“enactive”, wrote,  
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We propose as a name the term enactive to emphasise the growing conviction that cognition is not 
the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given mind but is rather the enactment of a world 
and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs. 
(Varela et al 1991, 9) 
 
The enactive approach, in Joel Krueger’s words, ‘can be expressed in a simple slogan: body 
shapes mind’ (Krueger 2009, 100; original emphasis). It posits physical, embodied action – 
‘the situated subject’s temporally-extended, exploratory activity as it navigates and 
manipulates the biological and social structures of its everyday environments’ (ibid.) – as the 
fundamental ground of thought and experience, and conceives of subject and world ‘as 
dynamically coupled and reciprocally determining’ (ibid.). According to Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, 
Marieke Rohde, and Hanne De Jaegher,  
 
Organisms to do not passively receive information from their environments, which they then 
translate into internal representations. Natural cognitive systems are simply not in the business of 
accessing their world in order to build accurate pictures of it. They participate in the generation of 
meaning through their bodies and action often engaging in transformational and not merely 
informational interactions; they enact a world. (Di Paolo et al 2010, 39) 
 
‘Organisms create their own experience through their actions’, Edwin Hutchins writes; they 
‘are actors in the environment such that what they experience is shaped by how they act’ 
(Hutchins 2010, 428).  
There is a clear correspondence between enactivism, which eschews ontological 
dualism, and the aesthetic of expanded artistic practice. Predicated upon presence, expanded 
practice, like enactivism, casts the perceiver as an embodied agent, dynamically coupled with 
her surroundings, directly involved in the becoming of a real-world situation. Mirroring the 
sentiments above, Robert Irwin describes the “pure subject of art” – that is, art’s always 
presupposed background, its expanded field3 – as ‘an inquiry of our potential to know the 
world around us and our actively being in it’. ‘This world is not just somehow given to us 
whole’, he writes, ‘we perceive, we shape the world’ (Irwin 2011, 296-7; original emphasis). 
The perceiver of the expanded artwork does not ‘passively receive information’ from her 
environment to ‘translate’ into an ‘internal representation’ of an external reality. She does 
not cognise, from a detached position, remote, determinate meanings belonging to 
autonomous art objects. Rather, she participates ‘in the generation of meaning’ through her 
body and action. She is engaged in a “transformational interaction”, intertwined in an artwork 
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that unfolds in the dynamics of her bodily being-in-the-world; she creates her own aesthetic 
experience through her situated, physical interactivity. The enactive paradigm, which 
describes the physicality that inheres within expanded artistic practice, lends weight to its 
shift from thing to experience. It affirms that this shift accords with broader contemporary 
understanding of how we relate to the world as embodied minds. 
 Alva Noë’s work, which brings the enactive approach to bear upon the specific focus 
of perception, has particular importance for the goal of defining and supporting the attitude 
of music as experience. With Action in Perception, Noë urges that we ‘reject the idea – 
widespread in both philosophy and science – that perception is a process in the brain whereby 
the perceptual system constructs an internal representation of the world’ (Noë 2006, 2; 
original emphasis) and argues, instead, that perception is ‘a kind of skilful activity on the part 
of the animal as a whole’ (ibid.). As he writes,   
 
Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. It is something we do … The world makes 
itself available to the perceiver through physical movement and interaction … What we perceive is 
determined by what we do (or what we know how to do); it is determined by what we are ready to 
do … we enact our perceptual experience; we act it out. (ibid., 1; original emphasis) 
 
According to Noë, all perception is ‘intrinsically active’ (ibid., 3): perceptual experience 
acquires content through our physical interactions – contact – with the world and through 
our implicit understandings of the sensorimotor capabilities of our bodies (i.e., our ‘practical 
understanding of the ways movement and sensory stimulation depend on each other’ (ibid., 
12)). Perception is not ‘the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given mind’ (Varela 
et al 1991, 9), it is the dynamic, ongoing shaping of a world and a mind in and through bodily 
action.  
 Art is an important concern for Noë, he has recently devoted a book to it, and he has 
used his enactive approach to perception to describe expanded artistic practice – or as he 
aptly calls it, “experiential art” – directly. In a paper from 2000 entitled ‘Experience and 
Experiment in Art’, Noë investigated the work and thought of Richard Serra, Robert Irwin, and 
others in depth. Practices such as these, he argued, enable ‘us to catch ourselves in the act of 
perceiving and can allow us thus to catch hold of the fact that experience is not a passive 
interior state, but a mode of active engagement with the world’ (Noë 2000, 128). Following 
up on this in Action in Perception, Noë articulates an understanding of experiential art as a 
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field of practices that centre upon making the perceiver aware that she produces her 
experience: 
 
The task … of experiential art ought to be not so much to depict or represent or describe experience, 
but rather to catch experience in the act of making the world available. Experience is a kind of 
activity, an activity that acquires content, as we have seen, thanks to the perceiver’s application of 
a kind of sensorimotor knowledge. The aim of experiential art … ought to be (or maybe simply “is”) 
to draw our attention to an activity that, by dint of the fact that we can perceive, we are very good 
at’ (Noë 2006, 176-7).  
 
Experiential art for Noë is not merely ‘concerned with the making of objects, but more 
significantly with the investigation of perceptual consciousness’ (Noë 2000, 128). It is not an 
art of passively appreciated aesthetic things, but of actively generated aesthetic experiences. 
Its content is the “temporally-extended” (ibid., 126) physical interaction – intertwining – of 
the perceiving body and the world. Noë’s understanding of the expanded practices of Serra, 
Irwin, and others directly corresponds with the understanding of expanded practice that this 
project puts forward. This, and the fact that Noë explicitly equates his theory to the aesthetic 
territory that is the concern of this project, going as far as to claim that experiential art serves 
as ‘model’ for his study of experience (ibid., 128), affirms the suitability of his work as a model 
for defining the attitude of music as experience and for mapping out music’s expanded field. 
The next section gives a brief, preliminary sketch of how Noë’s theory can explain the 
phenomenon of expanded musical form.  
 
 
Perceptual enactivism and expanded musical form 
 
Expanded musical form is the unique, living content of an active perceptual experience. It is 
produced when the perceiver knows that she creates her own musical experience: when she 
knows that what she experiences is determined by what she does. Under the attitude of music 
as experience, music is not, to paraphrase Irwin, somehow given to the perceiver whole – she 
perceives, she shapes the music. She knows that music is experience because it unfolds 
through her physical actions and interactions, because its detailed content is revealed 
through her skilful ‘inquiry and exploration’ (Noë 2006., 33). It is enacted by her ‘probing and 
movement’ (ibid., 1), generated through her direct contact with, and “masterly” (ibid., 1) 
handling of the physical phenomena of her environment. In short, music is experience 
because it is bodily experience – constituted by the contingent sensorimotor structures and 
 63 
capabilities of the body, dependent upon the perceiver’s implicit knowledge of these 
structures and capabilities – and ‘the body is our anchorage in a world’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 
146).  
Music as experience is being-in-the-world made aesthetically perspicuous. It is, as Noë 
writes of experiential art, ‘a mode of active engagement with the world’ (Noë 2000, 128) in 
which the perceiver perceives herself perceiving as a subject-object, embodied and 
dynamically coupled with her surroundings. Music as thing, on the other hand, can be 
understood as bodily experience translated into an object of thought. The attitude of music 
as thing cuts the ties that unite the musical event and the embodied perceiver and posits the 
clear idea of the musical object as an in-itself, fully spread out before perception in all its 
detail. Under this attitude, musical experience is a ‘passive interior state’ (ibid.), an experience 
of a pre-given, external being.4 Music is a thing when the perceiver brackets off the physical 
situation and anchors herself in the pure impression, in the intellectually constructed internal 
representation of a detailed, autonomous musical content. Music is a thing when the 
perceiver transcends, suspends, forgets the perspectivism of her bodily being-in-the-world 
and attends to the illusory, fictional thing-in-itself.  
 
 
Visualism, dualism, and the attitude of music as thing 
 
Noë positions his theory of physically active, bodily perception that occurs in the world and 
not in the mind as an alternative to the visio-centric understanding of perception entrenched 
within Western thought. As he states from the outset of Action and Perception,  
 
This idea of perception as a species of skilful bodily activity is deeply counterintuitive. It goes against 
many of our preconceptions about the nature of perception. We tend, when thinking about 
perception, to make vision … our paradigm, and we tend to think of vision on a photographic model. 
You open your eyes and you are given, at once, a sharply focussed impression of the present world 
in all its detail. (Noë 2006, 2) 
 
On the visio-centric understanding, ‘perception is input from world to mind’ (ibid., 3). The 
content of perception is ‘like the content of a picture’: perceptual experience ‘represents all 
the detail [of the world] all at once in consciousness’ (ibid., 33). The all-at-onceness that Noë 
attributes to the dualistic “pictures in the mind” conception of our relation to the world is the 
correlate of Fried’s ontological category of presentness. Lending further weight to the 
 64 
previous chapter’s argument that presentness is the condition of subject / object dichotomy, 
visio-centric all-at-onceness figures as a foil for Noë’s enactive account of temporally-
extended, interactive perception throughout his work. It recalls descriptions of a mode of 
musical experience that “sees” ‘a complete unit’ ‘all at once’ (Barry 1990. 58), that beholds 
an “image” of time (Langer 1953, 109). It helps to tie the dualistic structures of the attitude 
of music as thing in with an experiential system modelled on vision.  
The visual paradigm describes ‘the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given 
mind’ (Varela et al 1991, 9). The significance of Noë’s rejection of this prevalent paradigm is 
clarified by observations (from scholars of various fields) of the connection between the 
structures of visual experience and the principles of ontological dualism. ‘Vision’, Matthew 
Ratcliffe notes, ‘offers a view of the world that is seemingly uncorrupted by the body’. ‘Vision, 
it seems, is an externally directed sense’ in which ‘a spectatorial construal of world-
experience’ is implied. ‘The subject looks out upon a world of objects’ and views them in a 
way that is unaffected by ‘bodily feeling’ (Ratcliffe 2008, 300; original emphasis). Visual 
experience fosters the impression that our relation to the world is one of detached 
contemplation. As Salomé Voegelin writes, ‘vision, by its very nature, assumes a distance from 
the object, which it receives in its monumentality. Seeing always happens in a meta-position, 
away from the seen, however close. And this distance enables a detachment and objectivity 
that presents itself as truth’ (Voegelin 2010, xi-xii). Vision ‘presents a spectacle spread out 
before us at a distance’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 330), giving us the illusion that what we 
experience is independent of us, that outside of the self there exists a distinct external reality 
‘perfectly explicit in itself’ (ibid., 44). Don Ihde – and Marshall McLuhan made similar 
arguments5 – identifies ‘a latent, presupposed, and dominant visualism to our understanding 
of experience’, which accounts for Western thought’s preoccupation with subject / object 
dichotomy, and which can be traced back to the “visualism” of the Ancient Greeks. ‘The main 
thrust of Aristotle’s visualism lies in the relation between sight and objects’, Ihde writes. ‘The 
preference for vision is tied to a metaphysics of objects. Vision already is on the way to being 
the “objective” sense’ (Ihde 2007, 6-7; original emphasis). And for John Dewey, the whole 
‘theory of knowing is modelled after what was supposed to take place in the act of vision’: 
 
The object refracts light to the eye and is seen; it makes a difference to the eye and to the person 
having an optical experience, but none to the thing seen. The real object is the object so fixed in its 
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regal aloofness that it is a king to any beholding mind that may gaze upon it. A spectator theory of 
knowledge is the inevitable outcome. (Dewey 1984, 19) 
 
 The very concept that there are such things as autonomous musical works – discrete, 
determinate, permanently existing things that transcend the transitory event in which they 
are experienced, things that can be described and analysed, things of which we can gain 
objective knowledge – is consistent with the visualism that, according to the consensus 
reflected by the sentiments above, has dominated Western culture and is, at least partially, 
responsible for the notion of inherent ontological dualism. It cannot be said, in any 
straightforward sense, that the work-concept is an ‘inevitable outcome’ of this visualist 
tendency; as Goehr has shown, the work-concept emerged around 1800, after many 
hundreds of years of Western musical practice, and as a result of myriad peculiar 
circumstances. But it is evident that the attitude of music as thing has a decidedly visual basis. 
It is surely no coincidence that when the work-concept attained ‘institutionalised centrality’ 
(Goehr 2007, 96), when audiences were required to posit the existence of autonomous 
musical objects (that boast ‘some of the characteristics of the plastic [visual] arts of painting 
and sculpture’ (ibid., 173)), a listening environment was created, and quickly adopted as the 
norm,6 that emulates the structures of visual experience. The proscenium conditions of the 
concert hall, a structure designed to encourage audiences ‘to learn how to listen not just to 
music but to each musical work for its own sake’ (ibid., 237), demarcate a distinct performing 
space and listening space. This promotes the illusion that the music is spread out before the 
perceiver at a distance, that the music is external to, and independent of the perceiver’s 
experience of it. The proscenium structure mirrors the way that vision gives us the impression 
of an external world of objects distinct from our perceiving selves.  
As Eric F. Clarke writes, ‘listening to music in a concert hall deliberately [places] 
perceivers in a relationship with the objects of perception that prevents them from acting 
upon or exploring those objects in an unhindered fashion’ (Clarke 2005, 20). Just as visual 
experience ‘offers a view of the world that is seemingly uncorrupted by the body’ (Ratcliffe 
2008, 300) and action, so concert-hall experience offers a view of a musical object that is 
seemingly shielded from, and impervious to the perceiver’s dynamic activity and exploration. 
From her remote vantage point within the enclosure of an insulated listening space, the 
perceiver assumes a spectatorial posture and looks out upon a musical spectacle, which, in 
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its ostensible exteriority and autonomy, in its ‘regal aloofness’ (Dewey 1984, 19), she receives 
as an object ‘in its monumentality’ (Voegelin 2010, xii). The distance that the proscenium 
conditions of the concert hall environment interposes between the music and the perceiver 
‘enables a detachment and objectivity that presents itself as truth’ (ibid.).  
The concert-hall structure, emulating the visual perceptual paradigm that enforces 
ontological dualism, engenders an attitude of music as thing which is the embodiment of this 
paradigm.7 Under the attitude of music as thing, the perceiver’s musical experience ‘makes a 
difference’ to her, ‘but none to the [musical] thing’ perceived (Dewey 1989, 19). Detached 
and isolated as subject contemplating an independently existing object, the perceiver 
withdraws from the world – brackets off the physical situation – and anchors herself in the 
pure impression, in the “autonomous” content of her contemplating mind, in the clear idea 
of an in-itself: 
 
The self-consciousness of human beings means that more than any other living organism they have 
developed the capacity to move towards “autonomy of consciousness” – the capacity to be (or 
imagine themselves to be) cut off from the world. Aesthetic objects often disrupt the normal 
relationship between perception and action, an enforced disengagement that is characteristic of 
many art forms … Everyday, engaged, practical perception is replaced by disengaged, contemplative 
perception. Unable to explore and engage with the environment in a literal sense, listeners in 
conventional concert circumstances may … be drawn into a different kind of awareness in which 
enforced passivity engenders aesthetic contemplation, within which a kind of sublimated and 
internalised exploration can go on … Contemplation leads towards a sense of “things in themselves” 
– and hence autonomy. (Clarke 2005, 137-8) 
 
Congruent with Noë’s work in many respects, Clarke’s “ecological approach to the perception 
of musical meaning” stresses that ‘perception and action are in reciprocal relationship with 
one another’ (ibid., 136). ‘The disengagement of perception from action’ (ibid., 137), the 
‘cutting off’ or distancing of the perceiver from the perceived, prompts ‘a different kind of 
awareness’ in which the perceiver turns her attention inwards towards the posited idea of 
the thing-in-itself. The ‘disengaged, contemplative perception’ that Clarke identifies as 
characteristic of concert-hall experience is the perceptual experience described by the visual 
paradigm and the perceptual attitude that apprehends music as thing. The attitude of music 
as thing, for which the perspectivism of experience and the contingency of bodily action are 
suppressed, cognises music as an object of thought. The perceiver believes that what she 
experiences is independent of her experience of it. The detail of the seemingly pre-given 
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music – external, autonomous, and determinate – is experienced in the mind and not in the 
world.  
 For the attitude of music as thing, the work, to recall Ingarden, ‘possesses all its parts 
… simultaneously’ (Ingarden 1989, 40). Although necessarily experienced in time, the musical 
thing-in-itself, the autonomous being is, as Ligeti said, ‘synchronically conceivable’ (Ligeti 
1988, 13). In its presentness, all the detail of the musical thing is there before the perceiver 
‘in each moment of its existence, which is impossible for a genuine real process that unfolds 
only in the course of time’ (Ingarden 1989, 40). It is as though the perceiver is ‘aware of the 
whole [work] in all its detail all at once’ (Noë 2006, 33) in the same way that visual experience 
– or rather, the visual perceptual attitude – can give us the instantaneous impression, or 
better illusion, of the ‘whole detailed scene’ (ibid.).  
The attitude of music as experience has a different focus. Here perception is not 
disengaged from action. There is no distance between the perceiver and the perceived: the 
perceiver knows that what she experiences is determined by what she does. The expanded 
musical form, the reflexive, reciprocal becoming, the unique, living event of bodily activity is 
fundamentally open-ended. In its presence, the detail of its specific materiality is generated 
through the perceiver’s dynamic interaction with the physical phenomena of her 
environment. Its aesthetic content is a genuine real process that unfolds in the course of time: 
it is enacted within the flux and flow of the physical world. The attitude of music as experience 
needs a different perceptual model to the visual paradigm of the attitude of music as thing, 
and Noë’s work proffers an apt alternative. Formulating perception as physical, bodily activity 
that enacts the content of experience through time in a way that closely corresponds to the 
definition of the attitude of music as experience put forward here, Noë departs from the 
traditional visio-centric understanding of perception and makes touch his perceptual 
paradigm. Tackling the visualist conception head-on by using “tactile vision” as his principal 
example of multi-modal (holistic) touch-like perceptual experience, he tells us that,  
 
Seeing [and this applies to perception generally] is much more like touching than it is like depicting. 
Consider the bottle … which you touch with your eyes closed. The bottle is there in your hands. By 
moving your hands, by palpation, you encounter its shape … The content of your tactile experience 
is enacted by your exploratory hand movements. You perceive the bottle tactilely by means of a 
temporally extended process of directed finger and hand movements. Vision [perception generally] 
acquires content in exactly this way. You aren’t given the visual world all at once. You are in the 
world, and through skilful visual probing – what Merleau-Ponty called “palpation with the eyes” – 
you bring yourself into contact with it … Vision is touch-like. Like touch, vision is active … You move 
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your eyes around the scene the way you move your hands about the bottle. As in touch, the content 
of visual experience is not given all at once. We gain content by looking around just as we gain 
tactile content by moving our hands. You enact your perceptual content, through the activity of 
skilful looking. (ibid., 73).  
 
 
Touch  
 
Touch is world-directed, temporally-extended, exploratory contact and movement. It was by 
modelling his theory of perception on touch that Noë was able to show that perceptual 
experience acquires content through our physical interactions with the world, that the detail 
we perceive in the world ‘is experienced by us as out there, not as in our minds’ (ibid., 33; 
original emphasis). I want to show that a tactile perceptual attitude is incompatible with the 
concept of an autonomous musical work, that touch-like musical experience does not posit 
discrete, determinate, self-sufficient musical things. I hope to clarify how a tactile perceptual 
attitude apprehends music as experience, how touch-like musical experience – in which there 
is no distance between the perceiver and the perceived – generates, through temporally-
extended exploratory contact, movement, and interaction, the unique, physical, lived event 
of expanded musical form. I aim to demonstrate that touch, as a paradigm for the attitude of 
music as experience, opens up music’s expanded field.  
Noë, as the quote above suggests, inherited his hapto-centrism from Merleau-Ponty, 
who stated in the Phenomenology of Perception that, 
 
In visual experience, which pushes objectification further than tactile experience, we can at least at 
first glance flatter ourselves that we constitute the world, because it presents a spectacle spread 
out before us at a distance and it gives us the illusion of being immediately present everywhere and 
of being situated nowhere. Tactile experience, however, adheres to the surface of our body; we 
cannot spread it out before ourselves and it does not fully become an object. Correlatively, as the 
subject of touch, I cannot flatter myself as being everywhere and nowhere, here I cannot forget 
that it is through my body that I go toward the world, tactile experience is accomplished “out in 
front” of me, and is not centred in me. (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 330; my emphasis) 
 
As indicated here, Merleau-Ponty observed that tactile experience counteracts our visualist 
tendency to “forget” the body’s role in perception, confirming, for us, that perception occurs 
in the world rather than in the mind, prompting us to experience ourselves not as detached 
transcendental egos, but rather as embodied beings dynamically coupled with the world. 
Touch engenders a continuity between the embodied self and things outside of the self in 
which no clear-cut distinction obtains; to touch is also to be touched, and it was this 
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reciprocity, this blurred boundary between perception of the body and of things, this 
reversibility of the touching and tangible, that Merleau-Ponty seized upon as the basis for a 
refutation of inner / external, mind / body, subject / object dualisms. Touch, and in particular 
the phenomenon of one hand touching the other, revealed to Merleau-Ponty that the body 
unites these supposedly oppositional categories within itself. As he explained in The 
Philosopher and His Shadow,  
 
There is a relation of my body to itself which makes it the vinculum of the self and things. When my 
right hand touches my left, I am aware of it as a “physical thing”. But at the same moment, if I wish, 
an extraordinary event takes place: here is my left hand as well starting to perceive my right … The 
physical thing becomes animate … Thus I touch myself touching; my body accomplishes a “sort of 
reflection”. In it, through it, there is not just the unidirectional relationship of the one who perceives 
to what he perceives. The relationship is reversed, the touched hand becomes the touching hand, 
and I am obliged to say that the sense of touch is diffused into the body – that the body is a 
“perceiving thing”, a “subject-object”. (Merleau-Ponty 1964 / 2004, 183; original emphasis) 
 
Merleau-Ponty maintained that the experiential characteristics of touch are inherently 
transposable to the other senses; the growth of his concern with touch, as an archetype for 
perception as a whole, underscores his progression towards conceiving subject and object as 
the same “flesh”.  
 The phenomenology of touch – encapsulated in the notion that whatever I touch 
touches me back – casts our relationship with the world as one of connectedness, interaction, 
and reciprocity, rather than of confrontation, opposition, or detached contemplation. As Ihde 
has written,  
 
When the whole of my touch field touches and is touched by the surrounding world, I realise how 
intimate is the I-world relation in touch. Through touch, I am constantly “in touch” with that which 
surrounds me … it is difficult to say just where I end and the world begins. (Ihde 1973, 99) 
 
To understand our perceptual experience as touch-like is to recognise it as becoming through 
our dynamic involvement with our surroundings, and to reject the imposition of clear 
boundaries between inner and outer, subject and object, mind and body. With this frame in 
place, we will now see how a touch-like conception of musical experience radically differs 
from the idealist and formalist thinking that fostered the concept of an autonomous musical 
work.  
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Idealism, formalism, and the “separability principle” 
 
Schelling promoted the view that ‘music is the art that divests itself to the highest degree of 
corporeality’ (Schelling 1989, 31). Hegel, likewise, held that music ‘is the art of the soul and is 
directly addressed to the soul’ (Hegel 1975, 891). And Schopenhauer thought that music is 
the copy or objectification of the will,8 that is, “form without matter”, “soul without body” 
(see Schopenhauer 1995, 169). The German idealists conceived of music as abstract “pure 
form”, which expresses meanings that transcend the physical world, and posited musical 
experience accordingly as deeply internal and disembodied. In their thought, Roger Scruton 
notes, ‘we encounter a growing recognition that the subject / object relation has something 
to do with the power of music’ (Scruton 2016).  
 Musical experience, in the idealist view, is something that happens to us and in us. It 
is, in accordance with the visualist paradigm, perception divorced from action, pure 
contemplation ‘in which the inmost self is moved to the depths of its personality and 
conscious soul’ (Hegel 1975, 891). The formalist account retains the idealist understanding of 
music as an expressive, self-contained, abstract pure form, and of musical experience as a 
primarily mental process of subjects relating to objects, whilst dispensing with some its loftier 
metaphysical postulations. Formalism’s assertions that the meaning and value of music 
resides solely within the music itself – that music is intelligible because ‘it has an internal, 
structural coherence’ (Goehr 2007, 155) – emphatically affirmed the concept of music as an 
autonomous, discrete, determinate thing, and of the perceiver as a detached spectator. The 
impact of formalist thinking is neatly indicated in Schumann’s remark that ‘the work speaks 
for itself’ (Schumann, quoted in ibid., 267); on Eduard Hanslick’s view, ‘the composed piece, 
regardless of whether it is performed or not, is the completed artwork’ (Hanslick 1986, 48). 
In the formalist understanding, ‘musical beauty inheres in musical works construed as ideal 
objects’ (Alperson 2004, 261; original emphasis). Musical experience, therefore, as Philip 
Alperson puts it, ‘is a matter of attending with extreme vigilance to the composer’s designs 
in the composed work’ (ibid., 262) in order to build an accurate representation of it, in all its 
detail, in consciousness. Music happens independently of the perceiver, whose experience 
consists in cognising its ‘tonally moving forms’ (Hanslick 1986, 29). As detached, passive 
visualist spectators, ‘we are moved to aesthetic wonder by an appreciation of a musical 
piece’s form – and nothing else’ (Krueger 2009, 105).  
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According to Goehr, the idealist and formalist thinking of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries coalesced into a single principle that underpins the concept of an 
autonomous musical work: she calls this the “separability principle” (see Goehr 2007, 148–
175). Music’s transformation into a fine art relied upon its separation from ‘the world of the 
ordinary, the mundane, and everyday’ (ibid., 157), upon filtering-out the “extra-musical”, 
upon “projecting” or “hypostatising” a musical object (ibid., 174) to be understood as a 
discrete entity – separate from its performances and score-copies, and independent of 
whatever the perceiver may bring to it. With music’s objectification, musical experience was 
(by necessity) separated from concerns of the physical world; as Hoffman wrote, ‘music 
discloses to man an unknown realm, a world that has nothing in common with the external 
sensual world that surrounds him’ (Hoffmann, quoted in ibid., 169). The work-concept stems 
from the separation of inner and outer, the separation of subject and object, the separation 
of mind and body. Its separability structure describes the field of the detached transcendental 
ego that apprehends ideal musical objects as fully determinate and fully present in 
themselves. 
 
 
Touch-like musical experience  
 
Recent enactive accounts of music cognition have thrown further light upon the work-
concept’s dualistic presuppositions by exposing its vulnerability to the involvement of the 
body. Joel Krueger, for example, building upon Noë’s hapto-centric perceptual model, 
suggests that,  
 
We manipulate sonic phenomena into different phenomenal configurations that comprise the 
content of our particular musical experience ... Clearly, a musical piece exhibits a certain degree of 
compositional structure prior to a listener engaging with it. But it is an open-ended or incomplete 
structure that is only ‘finished’, as it were, within the sensorimotor patterns of the listener’s 
engagement. (Krueger 2009, 114-5) 
 
From this, we can begin to get a sense of where understanding musical experience as touch-
like may lead. Replacing detached contemplation with active ‘manipulation’ – with the 
temporally-extended physical contact, movement, and interaction that characterise our 
tactile engagement with the world – Krueger’s account illustrates how ascribing value to the 
body’s role within musical experience threatens the concept of an autonomous musical work. 
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Instead of presenting itself to perception as a self-sufficient object to be appreciated from a 
distance, the composer’s work, for touch-like musical experience, is an ‘open-ended, 
incomplete structure’ that solicits involved participation.  
 The ontological status of the musical work is fundamentally indeterminate. ‘What a 
Musical Work is’, pace Jerrold Levinson (Levinson 1980) and others who insist on its inherent 
ontological determinacy, is dependent upon the attitude of the perceiver. The work-concept 
suggests, or rather requires, that the perceiver adopts the attitude of music as thing, which, 
in its visual comportment, posits the work as a musical object in-itself. The work is the music: 
music is a thing. For touch-like musical experience, which shapes, enacts, its own content 
through skilful, physical (sensorimotor) activity, the work is not the music itself, nor even the 
artwork itself, but a framework – or, perhaps, a set of conditions – with which to interact. In 
the tactile perceptual attitude, both touching and touched, the perceiver perceives herself 
perceiving: the music is her experience. Expanded musical form is not a property of musical 
works, it is not something that a composer can create. It is, rather, a function of a perceptual 
attitude that assumes no distance from the perceived.  
 It is perfectly possible for expanded musical form to arise (and in a sense it always 
does as background) in one’s interactions with any musical work. But it is true that some 
musical works are better-equipped to support the attitude of music as experience than 
others. Robert Morris understood that in order to facilitate the becoming of expanded 
sculptural form it was necessary for the sculptural object to be devoid of internal, pre-
established detail that sets up relationships within itself. ‘Every internal relationship, whether 
set up by a structural division, a rich surface, or what have you … tends to eliminate the viewer 
to the degree that these details pull him in’ towards the thing-in-itself ‘and out of the 
[physical] space’ of the interactive, expanded situation (Morris 1993, 15). ‘The sensuous 
object, resplendent with compressed internal relations, has had to be rejected’ (ibid., 17), for 
‘what is to be had from [such] work is located strictly within the specific object’ itself (ibid., 
21). ‘The better new work takes relationships out of the work and makes them a function of 
space, light, and the viewer’s field of vision’:  
 
The object is but one of the terms in the newer aesthetic. It is in some way more reflexive, because 
one’s awareness of oneself existing in the same space as the work is stronger than in previous work, 
with its many internal relationships. One is more aware than before that he himself is establishing 
relationships as he apprehends the object from various positions and under varying conditions of 
light and spatial context. (ibid., 15) 
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The detail of the minimalist sculptural form is experienced “out there”, in the world, as ‘a 
function of space, light’ and bodily perspective, and not in the mind as a representation of 
pre-given ‘compressed internal relations’. The lack of self-sufficient detailed content to 
cognise makes it clear to the perceiver that she must enact the content of her experience 
through temporally-extended exploration and movement. ‘The experience of the work 
necessarily exists in time’ (ibid., 17): its content is not given, is not there, all at once. Sharing 
in its physical space, the perceiver is placed in contact with the object. She acts upon it, and 
it acts upon her. They become intertwined in a reflexive, reciprocal interaction through which 
the artwork, both subject and object, dynamically becomes. The experience of minimalist 
sculpture is bodily, touch-like experience. For the tactile perceptual attitude, supported by 
the “unitary form’s” lack of detail in-itself, the artwork is not an autonomous object, but an 
experiential event.  
 James Tenney’s work shares some of the characteristics of Morris’ sculpture. The 
Postal Pieces, written between 1965 and 1971, are, in themselves, unadorned “unitary” 
structures with minimal ‘internal relations’, which, in their paucity of pre-given detail, 
function as clear frameworks for an active, exploratory musical experience.  As Tenney has 
explained, with the Postal Pieces,  
 
The form of the piece is so simple … that it will become utterly predictable to the listener after a 
very short time. My feeling is that, as soon as that happens, the listener then becomes free to 
concentrate on more detailed aspects of the sound, because he knows that he is not going to be 
surprised by any formal or “dramatic” turns here or there … All there is to listen to [are] the 
microacoustical details. (Tenney and Zimmerman 1976) 
 
The unitary “swell” of Having Never Written a Note for Percussion (1971), or the continuous 
ascent of Koan (1971), for example, are quickly apprehensible as strong, simple gestalts that, 
once apprehended, serve, in much the same way as Morris’ geometric “known constant”, as 
a plain background against which “experienced variables” perspicuously stand out as dynamic 
foreground figure. In its lack of self-sufficient detail – its minimal ‘internal relations’ and pre-
established formal “drama” – the work does not draw the perceiver in towards contemplation 
of an autonomous aesthetic content, but rather solicits her involved participation. It 
encourages her to enact the content of her musical experience by directly engaging with, 
making contact with, physical ‘mircoacoustical’ phenomena. ‘What [the perceiver] can do is 
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begin to really listen to the sounds, get inside them, notice the details’, Tenney remarked. ‘It’s 
often interesting how within a simple shape there can be relationships that are surprising’ 
(Tenney, Young 1978; original emphasis), relationships that are contingent upon the 
perceiver’s perceptual interactivity. The structural simplicity of the Postal Pieces supports the 
perceiver’s awareness that she establishes (“determines”) relations, her awareness that what 
she experiences – details that are “out there” and that are revealed through her temporally-
extended ‘skilful probing’ (Noë 2006, 1) – is determined by what she does. The Postal Pieces 
support an exploratory, interactive, tactile attitude in which the perceiver perceives herself 
perceiving. As Tenney famously commented, his work is not sound in-itself (‘sound for the 
sake of sound’), but ‘sound for the sake of perceptual insight’ (Tenney, Young 1978). The 
Postal Pieces call for a touch-like musical experience which does not posit the work as 
autonomous musical object, but rather beholds an ‘open-ended or incomplete’ (Krueger 
2009, 115) framework with which to interactively generate a unique, dynamic expanded 
musical form. They solicit a tactile attitude which recognises that ‘this is not drama, this is just 
“change”’ (Tenney, Young 1978; original emphasis), that the music is not a representational 
content (a being), but a worldly, physical experiential event (a becoming).  
 More recently, the composer Richard Glover – who, like Krueger, draws upon Noë’s 
theory – has expressly articulated the aim of supporting touch-like musical experience by 
minimising detail, ‘internal relations’, within the work itself. ‘A [work] that creates little sense 
of variation or development in construction, where homogeneity overrides contrast, is a 
[work] that … can lead the listener to focus on various aspects of the music that often go 
unnoticed when there are a number of parts [i.e., pre-given details, autonomous (ideal) 
aesthetic content, internal relations]’ (Glover and Harrison 2013, 14-15). In the ensemble 
piece, Gradual Music (2009), ‘convergence-divergence [pitch] shapes’ gradually expand to ‘a 
semitone cluster width’, after which the shapes gradually contract in reverse (ibid., 17). In the 
trio, Beatings in a Linear Process (2012), the clarinet voices – over the continuous (octave 
unison) pedal of the violin and ‘cello’s open A strings – a gradual microtonally-descending 
sequence of five discrete, sustained pitches that the string players slowly glissando towards 
in turn (each clarinet tone “fades out” once both string players have matched its pitch 
exactly). These and other works consist of a simple, unitary structural process that is quickly 
apprehensible as a strong gestalt. Once apprehended, this structure functions as a clear 
background against which contingent ‘surface layer articulations’ (ibid.), physical 
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“mircoacoustical” detail revealed through bodily engagement, can stand out perspicuously as 
dynamic foreground figure. In their structural simplicity, Glover’s works, like Tenney’s, invite 
an exploratory, interactive, tactile perceptual attitude for which the work presents itself as a 
framework that motivates a creative process of “active listening” (ibid., 11): an experiential 
event that Glover describes as a ‘reaching-out to touch the auditory environment and pull 
apart the separate strands’ (ibid.), ‘a “handling” of auditory material’ (ibid, 9), an act of 
making ‘continuous discoveries’ through ‘physical movement’ (ibid., 31). It is in and through 
this bodily, touch-like “active listening”, in and through dynamic, physical, interactive 
engagement, that the music becomes. The perceiver enacts the aesthetic content of her 
musical experience.  
Like Krueger, and less directly Tenney, Glover conceives of a musical experience that 
occurs “out there” and not in our minds. The perceiver “reaches out” to make contact with 
the ‘auditory environment’, revealing its ‘articulations’ through the temporally-extended, 
exploratory movements of her directed, intent listening focus.9 She palpates and 
manipulates, “handles”, these ‘articulations’ – these physical phenomenal details (‘transitory 
harmonics, beating patterns, combination tones’ (ibid., 16), textual grain, etc.) that are 
contingent upon sensorimotor engagement – determining relations between them, to 
fashion a living musical form. When musical experience is framed in this way, it becomes very 
difficult to construe the perceiver / artwork relationship in terms of a subject relating to an 
object. Rather, in touch with one another, perceiver and artwork are ‘dynamically coupled 
and reciprocally determining’ (Krueger 2009, 100), intertwined in the production of a unique 
musical event – an expanded musical form – that unfolds through physical contact, 
movement, and interaction.  
 The musical event thus produced is bound to the body – or, as Krueger puts it, ‘the 
sensorimotor contingencies’ (ibid., 114) – of the perceiver. The composer’s “open-ended” 
framework gives rise to an indefinite number of “musics” as every perceiver engages with, 
and responds to it from a unique perspective. The work-concept is predicated upon an illusion 
of “visualist” objective thought that, to paraphrase Merleau-Ponty, substitutes for this unique 
bodily perspective the clear idea of the composer’s work as a musical object in-itself.10 But 
such a process, which cuts the ties that unite the artwork and embodied perceiver, is foreign 
to touch-like musical experience where the perceiver ‘cannot forget’ that it is through her 
bodily actions and interactions (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 330) that the musical event becomes. 
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Subject and object are united within her body as the same flesh. In touch with the composer’s 
framework – actively probing, handling, palpating, manipulating a dynamic of phenomena in 
her physical space (revealed through her exploratory movement) – she perceives herself 
perceiving, and this contingent intertwining, this simultaneity of the perceiver and the 
perceived, affirms for her that music is not a thing to be appreciated from a detached position, 
but rather a lived experience.  
 
 
Music in the expanded field 
 
Mondrian, to recall, provided the formula for expanded artistic practice when he declared in 
1937: ‘The culture of particular form is approaching its end. The culture of determined 
relations has begun’ (Mondrian 1937 / 1964, 121). The separability principle describes the 
basic structure of the “culture of particular form”, and the structure of separability breaks 
down in the “culture of determined relations”. The latter is not so much a progression from 
the former, but a return to its always presupposed ground. The notion of determined 
relations does not exclude the idea of particular form; rather, it negates the assumption that 
particular form is all that there is. Particular form is but one possibility within its expanded 
field of possibilities. For music, Mondrian’s formula can be seen to describe an 
acknowledgement that the work-concept does not, in Goehr’s words, have ‘universal and 
absolute validity’ (Goehr 2007, 273). Once we recognise that the idea of particular form, of 
subjects relating to autonomous musical objects, does not inhere within music per se (but 
rather within a specific domain of practice), we are in a position to question why our unique 
perspectives should not entitle us to our own unique musics. Beyond the sway of the work-
concept, we encounter a different understanding of musical form that opens up music’s 
expanded field. Expanded musical form is music as experience: the unique, contingent system 
of relations determined by the perceiver as she interacts with the physical phenomena of her 
environment. Whilst the work-concept, structured by separability, is delimiting – regulating 
beliefs and behaviours, and centring upon efforts to ‘assign mind to a specific locus’ (Dunn 
1998), to a single object of attention – expanded musical form is an open potential. As 
experience, rather than thing, its scope is only limited by the perceiver. Under the attitude of 
music as experience, music exists wherever we find it – whether within the structures of an 
artwork, or elsewhere within our dynamic involvement with the world around us. 
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If music is experience, then it need not be confined to sound and listening. Clifton’s 
phenomenological analysis of pre-objective musical experience revealed an always 
presupposed ground of “synaesthetic” bodily activity and meaning in which, congruent with 
our enquiry, touch plays a critical role. The synaesthetic activity of generating musical 
meaning centrally ‘involves the experience of tactile qualities’:  
 
The admission of such qualities might even be recognised in the German terms for major and minor: 
dur and moll. These words have as much to do with texture as with tone colour. In the absence of 
pre-defined conditions for consonance and dissonance, a great deal of the tension of a composition 
can come from the experience of "hard," "rough," or "gritty" sounds. (Clifton 1976, 87) 
 
Understanding musical experience as touch-like, as discussed, helps to frame listening as a 
physical activity – a reaching-out, a pulling-apart of separate strands, a palpation and handling 
of acoustic phenomena – that happens “out there” and not in the mind. Tactility blurs 
boundaries between the flux of our surroundings and proprioception,11 and between 
proprioception and listening, and moreover, as Merleau-Ponty stressed, breaks down the 
“crude” ‘delimitation of the senses’ generally (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 133).12 If Clifton located 
touch at the core of music’s “synaesthetic act”, this is because ‘the sense of touch is diffused 
into the body’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964 / 2004, 183). As a perceiving-thing, a subject-object, the 
touching / touched body is a holistic, interconnected system. ‘I can communicate with the 
synaesthetic meaning of music’ in touch-like musical experience ‘because my body is in 
communication [in touch] with itself’ (Clifton 1976, 87).  
 ‘Touch’, Ashley Montagu tells us, ‘is the parent of our eyes, ears, nose and mouth. It 
is the sense which became differentiated into them, a fact that seems to be recognised in the 
age-old evaluation of touch as “the mother of the senses”’ (Montagu 1986, 3). The sense of 
touch, of making dynamic contact, is the common ground of our perceptual faculties, of our 
bodily grip on our surroundings, that describes our very way of being-in-the-world. Touch-like 
musical experience is bodily experience. It is aesthetic attendance to one’s bodily ‘implication 
with the events of the world-as-lived-in’ (Clifton 1976, 84; my emphasis), and although, given 
the acuity of the ears as receptors of the world’s dynamics it makes sense for music to centre 
upon the powers of listening, it is perfectly possible, under the tactile perceptual attitude, to 
experience music in and through any / all of the body’s sensory modalities. One can look 
musically – as I move my gaze about the ever-changing forms, patterns, textures, and colours 
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of the vast, billowing crowns of the trees on the other side of the river, I find myself implicated 
in a musical event; one can literally touch musically – I run my hands and fingers over the 
surface of my desk at varying speeds, in varying motions, (simultaneously) applying varying 
degrees of pressure, and I co-generate a polyphony of musical articulations; one can smell 
and taste musically – Jason Noghani’s 2015 piece, Offering, “for smell, touch, and taste” 
makes this clear, as is explained below; one can allow any of these modalities to come to fore 
as focal against the background of the others, or focus upon their intertwining in one another 
– I step outside and once again explore the undulating movements of trees with my probing 
gaze, but now I feel the wind’s mercurial touch on my skin, trace the fluctuating intensities of 
pollen scent in the air, and reach out to make contact with the distant susurrations of millions 
of fluttering leaves (moving my directed listening focus in and out and up and down and side 
to side, discovering the details within a complex, dynamic mass of billowing sonic 
phenomena), and I am immersed in the co-production of a physical, living musical form that 
consists of relations that I determine through time between my various, interconnected ways 
of interacting with the world. In the tactile perceptual attitude, the perceiver can pass music 
freely around, over, and through the body because, as Montagu claimed, touch is the shared 
background of the senses. Touch-like musical experience is background bodily being-in-the-
world – the background of holistic (“synaesthetic”) bodily meaning and activity that Clifton 
identified as music’s always presupposed, pre-objective basis – made focal. The tactile frame 
unifies the senses in the richly corporeal activity of world-directed, temporally-extended, 
exploratory contact and movement that neutralises the dualisms which underpin the idea of 
particular form inherent to work-concept and the attitude of music as thing. With no respect 
for boundaries, and refusing to become an autonomous object, touch-like musical experience 
collapses the separability principle and opens up music’s expanded field. For the tactile 
attitude, music is an open potential. The perceiver can find music anywhere in her dynamic 
involvement with the world because it is not a thing that she appreciates from a detached 
position, but an experience that she enacts.  
 Noghani’s Offering (2015) is an intimate performance situation in which a small 
number of performers gradually “release” a range of odours into the performance 
environment (by setting light to candles, incense, and organic materials, spraying fragrances, 
and holding scented objects in proximity to the nose), feed various pieces of fruit to, hand an 
assortment of objects to, and make physical contact with a small number of blindfolded 
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audience members. Suspending vision, and directly activating touch, Offering collapses the 
distance between the perceiver and the perceived. The performers – in accordance with a 
process that determines a system of durational proportions – act upon the perceivers, and 
the perceivers act upon the performance, determining relations between a dynamic of multi-
sensory phenomena (including entirely contingent, ambient acoustic phenomena) to shape 
the aesthetic content of their experience.  
Noghani states in his performance notes that although he ‘conceived [of Offering] as 
a piece of music’, ultimately it is ‘the way it is’ as experienced (Noghani 2015). Offering 
becomes as a unique, interactive, lived event which might be apprehended as music, or as 
something else. It confronts the perceiver head-on with the question of whether her dynamic 
interaction with durational, extra-aural phenomena constitutes a musical experience. If it 
does, this is because she realises that it is possible for her to touch, smell, and taste musically, 
that music is not confined to sound and listening. It is because she realises that music is not 
necessarily a pre-given, sonically-mediated aesthetic meaning content, but an aesthetic 
attendance to one’s bodily implication with the events of the world-as-lived-in. Offering has 
the potential to heighten the perceiver’s awareness that she enacts music through her 
physical engagement with her surroundings, that music is her determination, her experience, 
and music is an open potential.  
 In her 1978 essay, ‘Sculpture in the Expanded Field’, Rosalind Krauss famously situated 
the work of artists such as Robert Morris, Robert Irwin, Robert Smithson, Richard Serra, and 
Bruce Nauman within an “expanded field” where ‘practice is no longer organised around the 
definition of a medium on the grounds of material, or, for that matter, the perception of 
material’ (Krauss 1986, 289), but rather around ‘operations on a set of cultural terms, for 
which any medium – photography, books, lines on walls, mirrors, or sculpture itself – might 
be used’ (ibid., 288). Expanded practice is critical practice that interrogates, exposes, 
challenges, and reworks – operates on – conceptual, ideological, and institutional structures 
– terms – of art and art experience. Central to its endeavour, Krauss maintained, is critique of 
the modernist / formalist principle of the artwork functioning as a “natural sign”. I’ll return to 
discuss how Noghani’s Offering and other recent composition might fall within this category, 
but first it is important to clarify what it is that Krauss means by the “natural sign”.  
According to Krauss, modernist practice and theory – which she characterised as a 
continuation of earlier formalist convictions (see Krauss 1990) – stems from a belief in the 
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possibility of pure equivalence between the self-contained properties of the art object 
(material) and how the object is registered in perception and consequently represented in 
consciousness (perception of material). Around the beginning of the twentieth century, she 
tells us, artists ‘exploited the data of physiological optics’ (ibid., 290) to establish ‘a natural, 
positivistic [non-arbitrary] basis for representation’ (Kane 2013) that targeted ‘sensory impact 
at the level of the eye’ envisaged as separate ‘from other parts of the seer’s body’ (Krauss 
1990, 290).  
 
Armed, for example, with the laws of retinal colour registration as formulated by Young and 
Helmholtz, one could imagine that one possessed the algorithm of vision, and that this algorithm, 
this mathematical expression of relations, could serve as an abstract generator for another field – 
that of the canvas – underwriting and rationalising the relations occurring on the plane of painting. 
Two surfaces, the retinal and the pictorial, would then share a single set of laws and both, 
participating in the abstract language of positive science, would become independent, axiomatic, 
autonomous … This mapping of the retinal field onto the modernist pictorial plane with the 
positivist expectation that the laws of one would legislate and underwrite the autonomy of the 
operations of the other … is typical of the form in which high modernism established and then 
fetishised an autonomous realm of the visual. It was the idea of the self-sufficiency and the closed 
logic of this newly conceived retino-pictorial surface that gave a program to early abstract painting 
… and a coherence to much of modernist theory. (ibid., 290-1) 
 
This notion of perfect correspondence between the pictorial and retinal surfaces reveals the 
desire to preclude the dynamic involvement of the perceiver, to predetermine – by dint of its 
positivistic basis, its “natural” signifying power – how the artwork will be received. Directed 
at the retina, at the level of immediate ‘sensory impact’, such artwork – which, after 
Duchamp, Krauss calls “retinal painting” – appeals to an autonomous eye that meets its object 
‘with such amazing rapidity’ that it no longer seems ‘to be attached to its merely carnal 
support’ (ibid., 284). It describes ‘the condition of an abstracted and heightened visuality’ 
where, as in the “photographic” or “pictures in the mind” perceptual model that Noë reacted 
against, all the detail of a pre-given object – its ‘independent, axiomatic, autonomous’ 
content – is imparted to a pre-given mind all at once, in ‘a moment of … pure transparency’, 
an ‘explosion of pure presentness’ (ibid., 284). It posits a ‘disembodied, mathematised’ (Kane 
2013) vision that, in compliance with determinate “natural” laws, passively registers external 
qualities like a ‘tabula rasa, or virgin photographic plate’ (ibid.). It invokes ‘the transcendental 
ego’s relation to its sensory field’ (Krauss 1990, 291); it casts the perceiver as detached 
spectator.  
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 The gist of Krauss’ argument, in Seth Kim-Cohen’s words, is that ‘the acceptance of 
the [artwork] as a “natural sign” … grants [it] a primordial status as an object endowed with 
all the truth and specificity of a natural object’; it is the ‘traditional’ formalist conception (Kim-
Cohen 2009, 79). The modernist insistence on the ‘withdrawal of each discipline into that 
sphere of sensory experience unique to it’, on the ‘need to abstract and reify each of the 
senses … as discrete, as self-sufficient, as autonomous’ (Krauss 1990, 284-5) is a distillation of 
this old belief. Abstracted and isolated, the atomised (“stratified” (ibid., 285)) senses of 
modernist art experience offer consciousness a pure impression of an external being 
seemingly uncorrupted by the body. As Don Ihde has noted, ‘the ease with which we assume 
a “reduction” to a sense’, ‘”believe” that we can isolate one sense from the others’, ‘that we 
“build up”’ an impression of independently existing, determinate objects ‘out of “sense data” 
or some other form of “sensory atom”’ is bound up with the long tradition of the metaphysics 
of objects (Ihde 2007, 43). The culture of the natural sign is the culture of particular form,13 
and modernist painting’s ‘reified and fetishised “autonomous” vision’ (Krauss 1990, 295) is 
one expression of its basic structure: the structure of “separability”.  
From the late nineteenth century onwards,14 musical thought has similarly abounded 
with notions of modelling compositional practice upon “natural” acoustical laws. The writings 
of Hugo Reimann, which ardently advocate efforts ‘to coordinate the advances in musical 
composition with the most recent advances in acoustics and the physiology of the ear’ 
(Reimann, quoted in Wright 2007, 27), are a clear example. Another is Schoeberg’s Theory of 
Harmony,15 rooted in the ear’s grasp of the overtone series (see Schoenberg 1983, 19-22).16 
Schaeffer’s Treatise on Musical Objects17 and the precepts of spectralism are two of countless 
other examples that could be instanced. In music, as in painting, we find myriad expressions 
and manifestations of the ‘positivist expectation’ that mapping the “natural” laws of acoustics 
and the physiology of the ear onto the “plane” of the musical work ‘would legislate and 
underwrite the autonomy of the operations’ of an ‘abstracted and heightened’ aurality and 
an ‘independent, axiomatic’ musical content. Imagining themselves to be in possession of the 
algorithm of listening, composers can use this algorithm to ‘serve as an abstract generator’ 
for rationalising the internal relations of a work intended to function as a natural sign: to be 
received ‘as an object endowed with all the truth and specificity of a natural object’.18 
Divorced from the body, the ‘reified and fetishised “autonomous”’ listening called for by such 
work is a passive ‘mathematised’ listening that, in compliance with determinate “natural” 
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laws, registers external qualities for transference to consciousness’ internal representation. 
In Schaeffer’s words, ‘as an inert sound body, the ear is an acoustic link just as the eye is an 
optical intermediary’ (Schaeffer 2017, 154). Like the modernist “retinal” painting, such 
compositional approaches can be seen as a distillation of the formalist terms of the work-
concept: an expression of the separability structure of the culture of particular form. The 
musical work as natural sign, granted ‘primordial status as an object’, invokes ‘a disembodied 
faculty of cognition and reflection’ (Krauss 1990, 291). It describes ‘the transcendental ego’s 
relation to its sensory field’. It posits the perceiver as a detached spectator whose experience 
occurs in the mind and not in the world. The structure of separability is the structure of the 
abstracted mind.  
 The belief in the artwork as a natural sign, the idea of particular form, rests upon a 
belief in the primacy of the self-sufficient properties of an art object and their transmission 
(via passively registered “sense data”) to consciousness. It is the belief that, according to 
Krauss, underpins practices ‘organised around the definition of a medium on the grounds of 
material [and] the perception of material’ (Krauss 1986, 289). In other words, practices of 
presenting and receiving an autonomous aesthetic content within institutionally normalised 
systems, i.e., defined medial conventions. Contesting this belief, expanded practice shatters 
its ultimately visualist and dualistic assumption of a unidirectional relationship between the 
perceiver and the perceived, of a mind directed towards the singular, determinate locus of 
the pure impression. ‘To get inside the systems of this work’, Krauss tells us, ‘whether LeWitt’s 
or Judd’s or Morris’, is precisely to enter a world without a centre, a world of substitutions 
and transpositions nowhere legitimated by the revelations of a transcendental subject’ 
(Krauss 1986, 258). The structure of the expanded field is not that of the field of the 
abstracted mind. Expanded practice ‘challenges the security of the natural sign’ (Kane 2013) 
through its ‘substitutions and transpositions’; rooted in operations upon “cultural terms” ‘for 
which any medium … might be used’ (Krauss 1986, 288), it collapses the abstracted and 
stratified order of “autonomous” and atomised sensory faculties. Expanded practice 
dismantles the culture of particular form’s structure of separability and opens up the 
continuous, pluralistic, indeterminate, and open-ended field of the engaged and interactive 
body that contingently determines relations in the world. 
Noghani’s Offering operates on “music” as a cultural term, on its conceptual, 
ideological, and institutional structures. It operates on “music’s” conventions of presentation 
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– on the performance situation – on its temporal basis, on its entrenched (and “fetishised”) 
commitment to sound and listening, and its concomitant belief in particular form. It poses the 
idea that medium of music is substitutable because music is not an aesthetic thing, but an 
aesthetic experience, an aesthetic attendance to one’s bodily implication with the events of 
the world-as-in-lived. Noghani’s work is, in itself, fundamentally indeterminate, ambiguous, 
and open-ended. It is music if the perceiver experiences her dynamic interaction with extra-
aural phenomena musically, and not because its material – or the perceiver it describes – 
accords with pre-defined conditions of what constitutes “music”. It is not endowed with 
‘primordial status’ as a musical object; it is not a natural sign. And as Brian Kane writes, 
 
When the artwork can no longer be understood in terms of the natural sign, the consequence is not 
only that it opens up possibilities for endless substitutions of signification, but that it specifically 
allows for the [perceiver] to become aware of their productivity as a [perceiver]. (ibid.; original 
emphasis)  
 
The musical content of Offering’s unique, lived, physical event is explicitly generated by the 
perceiver. Realising that she can touch, smell, and taste musically, that musical meaning is 
not something that she passively receives, but something that she actively determines, she 
produces expanded musical form.  
 Based on critique of the natural sign, art in the expanded field is art as experience: art 
of determined relations, and not of particular form, whose aesthetic content is produced, or 
rather co-produced, by the perceiver in and through her dynamic, physical interactivity. There 
are traces of this core aspect of Krauss’ conception in Marko Ciciliani’s recent account of 
‘Music in the Expanded Field’ (Ciciliani 2017), but it is largely hinted at only by implication of 
the contemporary transmedial and interdisciplinary compositional practices that he 
considers; indeed, Ciciliani indicates that it is beyond the purview of his essay ‘to attempt a 
new ontological definition of music’ in the expanded field (ibid., 24).  
Taking his cues from Krauss’ ‘seminal article’ of 1978, Ciciliani argues ‘that today – 
almost forty years later – we have a similar situation in the field of music’, namely that a large 
number of current compositional practices ‘are not associated with any particular media but 
that their relationship to a particular cultural situation allows a plurality of materials’ (ibid., 
23). Artists such as Jennifer Walshe, Yannis Kyriakides, and Jagoda Szmytka, Ciciliani tells us, 
‘are expanding into different practices without abandoning the idea that they are actually 
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composing music’. They are ‘not attempting to turn themselves deliberately into artists of 
another additional discipline; rather, they are working from the understanding that sound 
alone is no longer sufficient to express their musical ideas’ (ibid., 24). Clearly, ‘this entails that, 
at least to some extent, musical elements exist independently of sound’ (ibid.).  
 The “transdisciplinary” practices that Ciciliani cites – Walshe’s work with video, for 
example, or Szmytka’s “transmedia music theatre” – can be seen as expanded practices 
insofar as they operate on the cultural terms of music’s conceptual, ideological, and 
institutional structures. Like Noghani’s Offering, their equivocal appeal to multiple sensory 
faculties – their openness to pluralistic modalities of musical experience – has the power to 
shatter the illusion of the musical work as a natural sign and the ‘reified and fetishised’ 
autonomous realm of abstract listening. Recognising this, Ciciliani characterises these 
practices as opening up possibilities beyond the ‘structural listening’ that ‘for a long time … 
was unquestioned as the only appropriate mode of musical perception’, a passive ‘process 
wherein the listener follows and comprehends the unfolding realisation, with all its detailed 
inner [self-contained] relationships’ (ibid., 31). At his closest to Krauss’ critical motif of 
perceiver-as-producer, Ciciliani tells that expanded musical practices, 
 
Describe how our attention focusses on different stimuli. While taking structural listening for 
granted, the question of directing one’s attention was hardly ever an issue. Rather, the listener’s 
attention was treated like a blank canvas onto which the music heard would be imprinted. (ibid., 32; 
my emphasis) 
 
The culture of particular form – of structural (abstract) listening – posits the ear as a passive 
site of registration, an ‘acoustic link’ or ‘intermediary’ (Schaeffer 2017, 154) via which 
consciousness “builds up” (Ihde 2007, 43) the impression of a determinate, autonomous, 
detailed musical object out of “sensory atoms” (ibid.) received at every (musical) moment. 
On the other hand, expanded practice describes the ear as a dynamic and exploratory agent, 
in touch and co-operative with the other parts of the active body, which directs its attention 
about the diverse physical phenomena in its space to form a contingent system of determined 
relations: a living aesthetic content.  
In its critique of the natural sign, in its ‘plurality of materials’ that ‘opens up 
possibilities for endless substitutions of signification’ and allows for the perceiver to become 
aware of her own productivity (Kane 2013), the “transdisciplinary” practice that Ciciliani 
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recounts fosters an understanding that the idea of particular form, the idea of detached 
subjects relating to autonomous musical objects, does not inhere within music per se, but 
rather within a specific domain of practice. It is this understanding, and not the properties of 
the composer’s work in itself, that opens up music’s expanded field. Expanded musical form 
is not a thing created by the composer, but an experience generated by the perceiver. 
Primarily focussing upon questions of compositional approach, Ciciliani’s essay somewhat 
covers over this important point.  
 
 
The structure of the expanded field is the structure of the body  
 
Incorporating non-sonic elements into a musical work is not, in itself, enough for that work 
to qualify as expanded practice. Conversely, it is perfectly possible for a work to consist purely 
of sonic material and support expanded musical form. I can generate expanded musical form 
through my interactions with any musical work, provided that I make contact with it in a 
perceptual attitude that assumes no distance from the perceived, that I do not “forget” ‘the 
perspectivism of my experience’ and ‘treat my experience as an object’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 
73). The expanded field is not a distinct realm from work-based practice, but its always 
presupposed background. It is background contingent bodily meaning and activity that 
expanded practice makes focal.  
 Ciciliani recognises the importance of the body, positing “physicality” as one of three 
“criteria” ‘that have special relevance in the expanded field’ (Ciciliani 2017, 29). ‘A growing 
awareness of corporeal logic’, he writes, has ‘led to compositional approaches in which 
concepts such as physical affordance and constraint, and embodiment have triggered new 
notions not only of performance, but also of listening,’ (ibid., 30). Walshe’s “New Discipline”, 
according to Ciciliani, ‘draws strongly on this focus of physicality’ (ibid.). In Walshe’s words,  
 
“The New Discipline” is a term … that functions as a way for me to connect compositions which 
have a wide range of disparate interests but all share the common concern of being rooted in the 
physical, theatrical, and visual, as well as musical; pieces which often invoke the extra-musical, 
which activate the non-cochlear. In performance, these are works in which the ear, the eye, and 
the brain are expected to be active and engaged. Works which understand that there are people 
on stage, and that these people are / have bodies … Perhaps we are finally willing to accept that 
the bodies playing the music are part of the music, that they’re present, that they’re valid and they 
inform our listening whether subconsciously or consciously. (Walshe 2016)  
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It is certainly true that Walshe’s work stimulates modalities beyond the auditory, and that by 
placing the performer’s body ‘centre stage’ (Ciciliani 2017, 30), by incorporating ‘physical, 
theatrical, and visual’ elements – and by readily transposing musical materials, substituting 
one thing (medium, material) for another – it challenges the security of the “natural sign”. 
Where, in works such as Everything you own has been taken to a depot somewhere for ‘three 
performers’ (2013), idiosyncratic physical actions, registered visually, are integrally and 
explicitly entangled in the acoustic material – where ‘the bodies playing the music are part of 
the music’ – the possibility of an autonomous, mathematised “structural” listening is all but 
precluded, and that of a bodily musical experience – consisting, perhaps, in sympathetic 
sensorimotor responses to the on-stage actions – is opened up. Appealing to the body in this 
way, Walshe’s work has the clear potential to support expanded musical form, to focus the 
perceiver’s aesthetic attention on her bodily implication with the events of the world-as-lived-
in, to nurture her awareness that her unique, lived musical experience acquires content 
through her physical interactions.  
Yet, the extent to which the productivity of the perceiver is made perspicuous is put 
into question by the ways in which Walshe chooses to present her work. When, as is often 
the case, a performance is situated within proscenium conditions, or when, as with works like 
Total Mountain for ‘voice and film’ (2014), a performance is mediated through screen and 
speakers, a barrier is imposed that disrupts the relationship between perception and action 
and provides fertile ground for the visualist illusion of a spectacle spread out before the 
perceiver at a distance.19 The expressly visual nature of Walshe’s work, and its tendency to 
be ‘resplendent with compressed internal relations’ (Morris 1993, 17), compounds its plea to 
a visual perceptual attitude that assumes a specatorial posture. Distinguishing between 
externally directed perception and ‘internally directed proprioception or “body sense”’ 
(Ratcliffe 2008, 300), this is the attitude that understands its experience to be independent 
of what it experiences. The ‘bodies playing the music’ may be accepted as ‘part of the music’ 
– just as, incidentally, one “accepts” the performer’s body to be part of Lachenmann’s music, 
for example; this is certainly not a “new” idea – but the music is not felt to be part of the 
perceiver’s body. The perceiver’s experience ‘makes a difference’ to her, ‘but none to the 
thing’ perceived (Dewey 1984, 19). Here, the body is not an actively engaged agent, directly 
participating in the generation of musical meaning, but a passive site of registration of some 
determinate, external, autonomous aesthetic content – some “expressed” ‘musical idea’ 
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(Ciciliani 2017, 24). The work, despite its multi-sensory appeal, thus functions as a natural sign 
that invokes ‘the transcendental ego’s relation to its sensory field’ (Krauss 1990, 291). The 
perceiver’s bodily experience is projected into an object, and the work is ultimately 
apprehended in the mind, and not in the world, as thing, and not an experience. Similarly, 
Ciciliani’s work is often staged within demarcatory proscenium structures. Alias (2007) – for 
e-violin, electronics, light, and laser – for instance, opens up possibilities for ‘modes of musical 
perception’ beyond “structural listening” by interweaving performed, recorded, and 
appropriated acoustic material with ‘a composition of lighting and graphic laser projections’. 
(Ciciliani 2007). ‘Sound alone’ was clearly not ‘sufficient to express’ Ciciliani’s ‘musical ideas’ 
(Ciciliani 2017, 24), and in its explicit deployment of, and conceptual basis in ‘various 
techniques that are used by film’ (Ciciliani 2007), the work offers a degree of critique on the 
conventions of autonomous musical practice. But all of this does not necessarily mean that 
Alias will become as an event of expanded musical form. Happening on-stage, at a remove 
from the perceiver, and abounding with internal relations, it has every potential to inspire a 
visual perceptual attitude that would “look out upon” a self-sufficient spectacle, fully spread 
out in all its detail. Incorporating non-sonic elements into a musical work – by which I mean 
directly and integrally into the structures (content) of a musical work – is not, in itself, 
sufficient for that work to qualify as expanded practice. There are countless instances of 
multimedia musical works operating within the terms of the work-concept – Scriabin’s 
Prometheus of 1910, with obbligato colour organ, is an early twentieth-century example, not 
to mention opera, albeit a slightly different concern, or music’s time-honoured relationship 
with text. What a musical work is is dependent upon the attitude of the perceiver, and 
expanded practice pivots upon its ability to elicit a perceptual attitude that assumes no 
distance from the perceived. The boundaryless performance situation of Noghani’s Offering 
is well-equipped to facilitate the becoming of expanded musical form. So too are the intimate 
situations of some of Charlie Sdraulig’s recent work, which, unlike Offering, centres upon 
sound and listening. Bracketing off the detachment and objectivity of the visual attitude – in 
the case of Offering, explicitly – situations such as these make focal the perceiver’s bodily 
implication with the events of the world-as-lived, make perspicuous the productivity of her 
direct involvement and dynamic interactivity, by activating touch.  
There is an important and specific point of correspondence between Ciciliani’s 
description of ‘the phenomenon of the expanded field’ (Ciciliani 2017, 33), which is primarily 
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focussed on media, and the description put forward with this project, which primarily 
concerns perception. Ciciliani explains the ‘post-medium condition’ (ibid., 25) of the 
expanded field by drawing upon the new media theory of Lev Manovich:  
 
Most computer softwares use elements from traditional media as a graphic user interface: the 
design of word editing programmes is derived from typewriters, digital audio workstations from 
tape machines, video editors from analogue film editors, etc. Underneath this representational 
layer, however, all medium-specific elements which the interfaces still suggest exist have dissolved. 
From a technical point of view, all information looks the same and is interchangeable at the data 
level. With a few simple tricks I can import a sound file into a photo editing programme and look at 
it as a visual representation of the same data, or – vice versa – I can listen to the noise my favourite 
cat photos produce when I import them into a sound editor. Both conversions would have been 
impossible with the “same” media in their original format ... Len Manovich refers to the layer of the 
user interface as the “cultural layer” and the technical layer as the “computer layer”. He argues that 
… “the logic of a computer can be expected to significantly influence the logic of traditional media; 
that is, we may expect that the computer layer will affect the cultural layer” … [The current 
expanded field may] result from the fact that we have internalised the media convergence which 
results from the interchangeability of data. Or, in Manovich’s terms: the “computer layer” has 
inscribed itself deeply on the “cultural layer”. The boundaries between disciplines seem more fluid 
[and] the integration of non-musical tools into a composition, or the expansion from one medium 
to another, become a rather natural step to take. (ibid., 25-6) 
 
For Ciciliani, then, the structure of the “computer layer”, the background layer of 
‘convergence’ and ‘interchangeability’, describes the structure of the expanded field. And this 
background layer that underpins and becomes differentiated into various stratified “cultural 
layer” modalities, can be seen as the correlate of the touch-like sense of bodily being-in-the-
world: ‘the parent of our eyes, ears, nose and mouth’ that becomes ‘differentiated into them’ 
(Montagu 1986, 3), “the mother of the senses”, their common ground – the site where the 
abstracted and stratified order of autonomous sensory function breaks down (in the same 
way that, on the “computer layer”, ‘medium-specific elements’ “dissolve”). Just as an 
awareness of the ‘interchangeability’ and ‘convergence’ of information at the computer layer 
allows for Ciciliani’s fluid transpositions of data, his substitutions of one medium for another, 
so a tactile perceptual attitude allows for fluid transpositions of musical experience across 
the senses, for substitutions of one mode of musical perception for another. The substitutions 
and transpositions of the expanded field are a function of its condition as background made 
focal. From a media perspective, expanded practice foregrounds the boundaryless and 
pluralistic ground of the post-medial world. From a perceptual perspective, expanded 
practice foregrounds the open potential, the contingent ground, of the dynamically 
interactive body.  
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 Krauss poses Duchamp’s alternative interpretation of “physiological optics” as a 
pivotal moment in the emergence of expanded practice: 
 
It is [the closed of logic of the retino-pictorial surface] that refuses to “go beyond” the retina to the 
grey matter, and it is to this refusal that Duchamp objects … Duchamp’s grey matter, though it 
undoubtedly refers to the cerebral cortex, does not thereby invoke a disembodied faculty of 
cognition or reflection, does not propose a transcendental ego’s relation to its sensory field. The 
cerebral cortex is not above the body in an ideal or ideated remove; it is, instead, of the body, such 
that the reflex arc of which it is part connects it to a whole field of stimuli between which it cannot 
distinguish. These stimuli … [include] those sensations of vision which are generated entirely by the 
body of the viewer. The production of sensory stimulation from within the body’s own field, the 
optical system’s porousness to the operations of its internal organs, this fact forever undermines 
the idea of vision’s transparency to itself, substituting for that transparency a density and opacity 
of the viewing subject as the very precondition of his access to sight. It is this density that 
[Duchamp’s investigations of] physiological optics mainly explored, taking as [his] field the body in 
all its thickness and temporality, [and] as we have seen it is this aspect of physiological optics that 
modernist painting set aside … Duchamp’s view of the grey matter – that part that exists beyond 
the retina – thus cannot be separated from other kinds of organic activity within the corporeal 
continuum. (Krauss 1990, 291-2; my emphasis) 
 
… Duchamp’s Precision Optics … does not present a “legitimate construction” – a field set apart 
from the seer’s body and mastered by his independent viewpoint … [It] is associated with the 
viewer’s own body, with an exploration of its carnal core … Precision Optics is not only an attack on 
modernism’s reified and fetishised “autonomous” vision, but also a deconstruction of [the “classical 
model’s”] assumptions about the detachment and objectivity of “the viewer” it posits. (ibid., 294-
5) 
 
These passages express the crux of Krauss’ conception.  For Krauss, it is ultimately ‘the body 
in all its thickness and temporality’ that opens up the expanded field. This affirmed elsewhere. 
In her article on Richard Serra, for instance, whose practice she expressly identifies as 
expanded practice (see Krauss 1986, 287), she argues that his work ‘renders both the density 
of the body and that of the world, as well as the mutual, motile engagement that is at the 
heart of perception’ so that ‘the viewer is always described as in motion even if that motion 
is only the constant micromuscular adjustments that are the corporealised condition of 
bifocal vision’ (ibid., 270).  
Attacking the modernist “retinal” paradigm, and the classical “camera obscura” 
paradigm of which it is an extension (Krauss 1994, 128),20 Duchamp, according to Krauss, 
contested the whole notion of ‘a knowing subject independent of a body’. Duchamp’s “non-
retinal” aesthetic directly confronted the visualist subject who is ‘the observer of a projection 
that occurs within a field conceived as being exterior to “himself”, and for whom ‘the unified 
space of order he surveys is never thought of as something that could be affected by his own 
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sensory apparatus, never seen as dependent upon his bodily’ action (ibid.). With his 
“Precision Optics” the body was substituted for the camera obscura, or autonomous retina. 
‘In taking over from the camera obscura as conveyor of the image, the body, solid and dense, 
becomes instead producer of that image, a producer that must forge a perception of the real’ 
(ibid., 133; my emphasis). In Duchamp’s work, where ‘one encounters the body of 
physiological optics’ seeing fully enmeshed in the temporal dimension of nervous life’21 (ibid., 
137; original emphasis), the productivity of the perceiver’s body is exposed ‘so that the 
natural sign’s necessary connection to the visual field can no longer be maintained’ (ibid., 
133). 
 When the artwork is no longer understood to function as a natural sign, the perceptual 
experience ‘generated entirely by the body’ in its dynamic interactivity is foregrounded. And 
when the artwork is apprehended in this bodily perspective, which comprises both absence 
and presence – which is always fundamentally open-ended, indeterminate, and ambiguous – 
it no longer appears as a natural sign. Krauss’ account of Duchamp’s “Precision Optics” 
describes a reflexive intertwining of the perceiver and the perceived in which subject / object 
categories break down in and through the body, a relationship of connectedness, interaction, 
and reciprocity, rather than of confrontation, opposition, or detached contemplation. 
Replacing the notion of the eye ‘as a conveyer of the image’ with a notion of the body as 
‘producer of that image’, Duchamp, like Noë, rejected the “pictures in the mind” premise that 
perception “depicts” an external world – that the content of perceptual experience is ‘given 
all at once’ (Noë 2006, 73) to a detached and isolated mind – in favour of an understanding 
that perceptual experience acquires content through bodily action in the world. What Krauss 
casts as a pivotal moment in the emergence of expanded practice is definable in terms of an 
artist’s shift away from supporting a visualist perceptual attitude, and towards supporting an 
attitude in which the perceiver is aware that what she experiences is determined by what she 
does, aware that she enacts or produces her experience though her physical, temporally-
extended, exploratory movement, contact, and interaction.  
Expanded practice invokes our tactile relation with the world that implicates ‘the body 
in all its thickness and temporality’. It depends upon a touch-like perceptual attitude that 
assumes no distance from the perceived and repudiates ‘the eye that surveys the inner space 
of experience, analysing it into its rationally differentiated parts’ (Krauss 1994, 128). It calls 
upon a tactile attitude to negate the visualism which constructs an abstracted, stratified order 
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of autonomous, atomised “sense data”, describing ‘the [detached] transcendental ego’s 
relation to its sensory field’ (Krauss 1990, 291). As Krauss wrote of Serra’s work, the ‘bridging 
between the body’s horizon and that of the world … must be seen as the subject matter’ of 
expanded practice. ‘The mutual, motile engagement’ that it “renders” is that of the body in 
touch with the world. When Krauss tells us that expanded practice focusses ‘the mutual 
transitivity of the [perceiver] and the [perceived], their activity as they exchange positions … 
to affect one another – this chiasmatic trajectory’ (Krauss 1986, 270), she precisely relates 
the dynamic interactivity of the touching / touched body (i.e., background bodily being-in-
the-world made focal).  
 In summary, the field of expanded practice, of art which “goes beyond the retina” – 
beyond the abstracted and autonomous sense faculties of the transcendental ego – to the 
“grey matter”, is the ‘whole field’ (Krauss 1990, 291) of the embodied mind. With its critical 
operations on cultural terms, on conceptual, ideological, and institutional structures of art 
and art experience, it makes perspicuous the productivity of the perceiving body, whose 
contingent, open-ended, indeterminate perspective – as being-in-the-world, and having no 
vantage point outside of it – shatters the illusion of the artwork as a natural sign. In its place, 
a living form, a dynamic becoming, coextensive with the structures of its physical, 
sensorimotor action emerges. It is a vital aspect of Krauss’ account, as Brian Kane notes, that 
in the expanded field, ‘the conceptual and perceptual features of artworks [are] both 
necessary’ (Kane 2013). In their substitutions and transpositions, their material plurality and 
fluid expansions from one medium to another, the contemporary transdisciplinary practices 
that Ciciliani situates in music’s expanded field can be understood – on a conceptual level – 
to operate on, explore, the idea of music itself. And with these operations, they can be 
understood to open up new possibilities for different modes of musical perception, to focus 
the productivity of the perceiving body by thematising the question of how it directs attention 
to, contingently determines relations between, an equivocal expanse of ‘different stimuli’ 
(Ciciliani 2017, 32). Expanded musical form is an event of turning the idea of music on one’s 
bodily implication with the events of the world-as-lived-in, and vice versa – iteratively.22 It is 
both conceptual and perceptual (both “cultural” and “natural”, both “art” and “life”) – an 
“entanglement of matter and meaning” (Barad 2007). Its reflexive, reciprocal, circular 
unfolding is the product of an embodied mind in touch with itself and with the world.  
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 With no respect for boundaries, touch-like aesthetic experience connects to ‘a whole 
field of stimuli’, ‘stimuli that may come from outside the body’ but ‘may also erupt internally’; 
both touching and touched, ‘it cannot [clearly] distinguish’ between them (Krauss 1990, 291). 
The ‘crisscrossing’ (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 133) of the inner and the outer – of the mind and 
the body, of the subject and the object – the chiasm, that characterises tactile experience and 
the continuity that it engenders describes the ‘whole field’ of Duchamp’s grey matter – the 
field of the embodied mind, which is the field of expanded practice. The expanded field is ‘a 
world without a centre, a world of substitutions and transpositions nowhere legitimated by 
the revelations of a transcendental subject’ (Krauss 1986, 258). It is an open-ended world of 
blurred boundaries, of indeterminate contours, and unhindered exchanges in which no clear-
cut or inherent distinctions obtain, a world that allows for fluidity and plurality, a world where 
separability principles have no agency. The expanded field is a world that has the same 
structure as touch. 
 
 
Expanded sonic practice 
 
Seth Kim-Cohen articulates a different reading of Krauss’ theory. The argument of In the Blink 
of an Ear: Toward a Non-Cochlear Sound Art (2009) is explicitly predicated upon Krauss’ work, 
but, as Kane has effectively demonstrated, Kim-Cohen brackets off its basic concern with 
bodily perception: 
 
[Kim-Cohen] does not remain faithful to the full connotation of the “non-retinal” in Krauss’ usage. 
[He] understands “non-retinal” to be roughly synonymous with “conceptual,” to refer to the 
institutional, conventional and social parerga proscribed by the (Greenbergian) Modernist work. 
The one thing non-cochlear sound art is not is perceptual. Yet, when Krauss writes about Duchamp’s 
non-retinal art, perception is precisely her focus. (Kane 2013) 
 
Kim-Cohen’s “expanded sonic practice”, or “non-cochlear sound art”, is not perceived, but 
read. To apprehend this work, one ‘must approach sound as a reader’, ‘must understand what 
these sounds represent’ (Kim-Cohen 2009, 179). This is work that ‘appeals to our reading 
faculties, employing … ears as mere conveyance’; ‘the “work” of the work is non-retinal [non-
cochlear] and conceptual, appealing to considerations outside the territory usually 
designated as the work’ (ibid., 166). Experiencing expanded sonic practice is ‘an act of 
deciphering codes’ (Kane 2013), of ‘reading and thinking the text’ of a work (Kim-Cohen 2009, 
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113; original emphasis). It centres upon analysing sound’s inscribed ‘cultural, technical, social’ 
(ibid., 115), historical, and political marks, of grasping its ‘narrative’, of hearing its ‘story’ 
(ibid., 132), of encountering ‘sound as it functions in and as a complex of symbolic grids’ (ibid., 
128). ‘As far as the experience of art is concerned, the revelation of phenomena is never 
enough’ (ibid., 112); for Kim-Cohen, as Kane puts it, ‘it is never about the sound of the sign, 
but only its significance’ (Kane 2013). With his ardent rejection “perceptualism”, Kim-Cohen 
means to reject “essentialism” and install, at the heart of expanded sonic practice, an 
understanding that ‘value is not inherent … that meaning is always contingent and temporary, 
dependent on the constantly shifting overlap of symbolic grids’ (Kim-Cohen 2009, 261).  
 ‘An expanded sonic practice’, Kim-Cohen tells us, ‘would include the spectator, who 
always carries, as constituent parts of her or his subjectivity, a perspective shaped by social, 
political, gender, class, and racial experience’ (ibid., 107). The text of the non-cochlear work 
is likely to be “read” or “thought” differently by different individuals, and in that sense it 
“includes”, or is permeable to, contingencies of subjective interpretation / meaning. ‘The 
relation of the self to the other [i.e., things outside of the self] is determined by 
interconnected grids of social, gender, economic, and political positions’ (ibid., 119). The 
meaning of the non-cochlear work is pluralistic and unstable because it is mediated by 
symbolic networks that are in constant flux. For Kim-Cohen, this entails that such work cannot 
be understood as a natural sign. But his listener-as-reader is a world apart from Krauss’ 
perceiver-as-producer. Expanded form, for Kim-Cohen, is not something generated by the 
perceiver’s agency, but something to be interpreted, something mediated by the agency of 
overlapping, ‘interdependent semiotic matrices’ (ibid., 252). Whilst there is a sense in which 
Kim-Cohen’s listener-as-reader is implicated in the structures of the expanded artwork, it is 
not as a perceiving body in touch with the artwork, co-producing its aesthetic content through 
dynamic, physical interaction, but as subject, as a contemplating mind cognising the artwork’s 
contingent significance.  
 As indicated above, Kim-Cohen designates the listener-as-reader as a “subjective 
spectator”, who employs the body ‘as mere conveyance’. Although it is clear enough that 
Kim-Cohen expects his “spectator” to be aware of the expanded situation’s inclusion of ‘her 
or his subjectivity’, this relegation, more banishment, of the body marks a profound 
difference between his account and that of Krauss and that of this project. For in Krauss’ 
conception and the conception developed here it is the direct involvement of the body that 
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dismantles the edifice of modernist aesthetic autonomy. The body, in its indeterminate and 
open-ended perspective, shatters the illusion of the natural sign, collapses the stratified order 
of abstracted and atomised senses, negates the entire premise of the autonomous work of 
art and makes the perceiver aware of her productivity, aware that what she experiences is 
determined by what she does. The awareness of the body as producer of the image, and not 
as conveyor of the image is, to recall, precisely what opens up Krauss’ expanded field. The 
aesthetic content of expanded form, in Krauss’ conception, is generated in and through the 
perceiver’s physical action. Kim-Cohen’s anti-“perceptualist”, purely conceptual account, 
describes a far more detached, isolated, passive experience, an experience of interpreting 
something, of reading something, of thinking something external to oneself, from the 
perspective of the self: something ‘never thought of as something that could be affected by 
[one’s] own sensory apparatus, never seen as dependent upon [one’s] bodily’ action (Krauss 
1994, 128). Kim-Cohen invokes a ‘disembodied faculty of cognition or reflection’, fetishises a 
mind ‘above the body in an ideal or ideated remove’ (Krauss 1990, 291). He has no concern 
for the perceiver-as-producer:23 divorcing conception from perception, Kim-Cohen makes the 
perceiver subject.   
 The structure of the expanded field, for Kim-Cohen, is emphatically not the structure 
of bodily being-in-the-world (the field of the ‘bridging between the body’s horizon and that 
of the world’ (Krauss 1986, 270), but the structure of the “symbolic field” – which is the 
structure of the abstracted mind. Rooted in the textualist paradigm of poststructuralism, Kim-
Cohen’s conception is fundamentally dualistic. As Christoph Cox has explained,  
Theories of textuality or discursivity implicitly support a separation between culture (the domain of 
signification, representation, and meaning) and nature (the domain of inert, dumb matter). Nature 
is either cast aside as in-significant or deemed a cultural projection, a social construction. 
Contemporary cultural theory often falls prey to a provincial and chauvinistic anthropocentrism as 
well, for it treats human symbolic interaction as a unique and privileged endowment from which 
the rest of nature is excluded. It thus accords with the deep-seated metaphysics and theology it 
aims to challenge, joining Platonism, Christianity, and Kantianism in maintaining that, by virtue of 
some special endowment (soul, spirit, mind, reason, language, etc.), human beings inhabit a 
privileged ontological position elevated above the natural world. Contemporary cultural theory 
thus manifests a problematic Kantian epistemology and ontology, a dualistic program that divides 
the world into two domains, a phenomenal domain of symbolic discourse that marks the limits of 
the knowable, and a noumenal domain of nature and materiality that excludes knowledge and 
intelligible discourse … Attempting to bring sound art discourse within the neo-Kantian conceptual 
purview of contemporary cultural theory, Kim-Cohen accepts the presuppositions of textualism and 
discursivity, affirming a distinction between phenomena and noumena rendered as the distinction 
between language and extra-linguistic, culture and nature, text and matter. (Cox 2011, 147-8) 
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Kane’s characterisation of Kim-Cohen’s notion as “sonic idealism” (Kane 2013) is of the same 
tenor.  
To recall, Krauss proposed that expanded practice ‘is no longer organised around’ 
“material” or “perception of material” (Krauss 1986, 289), but around “cultural terms”. Taking 
her wider argument into account, expanded practice, for Krauss, is art that is no longer 
organised around the presentation and reception of an autonomous aesthetic content via 
institutionally prescribed medial means, but around critical operations on the terms of art 
and art experience that make the productivity of the perceiver perspicuous. Kim-Cohen reads 
this differently. Taking Krauss’ words very literally, expanded sonic practice consists of all of 
the discursive (i.e., cultural) significance which Kim-Cohen feels is excluded by music’s (and 
some “sound art’s”) fixation upon the materiality of sound, upon his bête noire of “sound-in-
itself”, which he equates to the formalist commitments of Greenbergian / Friedian 
modernism:  
 
Music has always functioned according to Greenbergian precepts. As a practice, music is positively 
obsessed with its media specificity … In music … there is a perceived need to identify – often to 
eliminate – aspects of production, reception, or discussion that are not specifically manifest in 
material form. The intramusical … is captured either in the inscription of notation, or in specifically 
quantifiable, audible phenomena … All else is extramusical. (Kim-Cohen 2009, 40) 
 
Beethoven’s notion of the “poetic idea”, of a mind ‘directed toward something higher than 
mere acoustic phenomenon [sic]’ (Dahlhaus 1989, 91) is one of innumerable premises that 
might be adduced to demonstrate the sheer inaccuracy of Kim-Cohen’s understanding of ‘the 
history of music [as] a history of the sound-in-itself’ (Kane 2013). On the back of Kim-Cohen’s 
literal, reductionist reading of Krauss’ dictum, and his concomitant interpretation of 
Duchamp’s non-retinal critique of modernism’s formalist essentialism as a critique of 
perception wholesale, non-cochlear sound art is everything but the material substance of 
sound (i.e., that which is perceived). The domain of expanded sonic practice is the domain of 
the “extra-musical”. To apprehend the non-cochlear work, to interpret its cultural, social, 
historical, political, etc. significance, the listener-as-reader must bracket off perception of 
material, must suspend (suppress) bodily engagement with physical phenomena, and focus 
entirely upon the work’s purely conceptual, purely discursive content. ‘I take flight from my 
experience and pass over to the idea’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 73). Kim-Cohen thus inverts 
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Schaeffer’s acousmatic reduction, which he sees as the “essence” of music (see, for example, 
Kim-Cohen 2009, 15),24 but does not cancel out its terms. As Kane writes,  
 
To hold to the dichotomy between sounds and society is to concede too much to the theories of 
Pierre Schaeffer. Why should someone as critical of Schaeffer as Kim-Cohen simply invert the value 
that he places on reduced listening …? The Schaefferian position is not overcome by inverting its 
values; it is overcome by arguing against its premises. (Kane 2013)   
 
Schaeffer’s reduction is a particular, perhaps extreme, manifestation of the separability 
principle, and whilst Kim-Cohen may have inverted some of its values – reversed some of 
what it includes / excludes – the separability principle still remains in place. Ultimately, as 
with Schaeffer’s reduced listening, and with the experiential structures of the work-concept 
– with the attitude of music as thing – with Kim-Cohen’s non-cochlear sound art, we are left 
with a mind devoid of body, separated from the material world (by the “symbolic field”, in 
this case), purely contemplating ideal, representational content. 
 Kim-Cohen’s problematic conception of the expanded field, which fails to overcome 
the basic separability stucture of the work-concept, the basic structure of the culture of 
particular form, appears to derive from an erroneous understanding of phenomenology as an 
inherently essentialist enterprise. For Kim-Cohen, though he does credit Merleau-Ponty as 
being ‘less committed … to an essentialist position’ (Kim-Cohen 2009, 78), phenomenology = 
essentialism = perception. On this understanding, Kim-Cohen tells us that art history, theory, 
and practice faces ‘the critical question’ of whether to focus attention ‘on the primordiality 
of perceptual experience [that is, accept the ‘phenomenological art-historical method’ (ibid., 
79)], or on the “problem which culture attempts to resolve”’ (ibid., 75; my emphasis). From 
this forced choice, a whole network of dichotomies emerge: phenomenology vs. 
poststructuralism (Krauss uses both), percept vs. concept, matter vs. discourse, nature vs. 
culture,25 etc., all the way through to musical vs. extra-musical – that is, “cochlear” music vs. 
“non-cochlear sound art” – pivoting on the dualism of “sound-in-itself” (i.e., materiality, 
perception) vs. “sound-out-of-itself” (i.e., sociality, conception). Music, in Kim-Cohen’s 
account, is fundamentally excluded from the expanded field, which is the domain of “sound 
art”, i.e., all that music is not:  
 
Sound art, as a discrete practice, is merely the remainder created by music closing off its borders to 
the extra-musical … Sound art is art that posits meaning and value in registers not accounted for by 
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Western musical systems. Unlike sculpture, and to a lesser extent, cinema, music failed to recognise 
itself in its expanded situation. (ibid., 107) 
 
Kim-Cohen’s separability principle, his network of dualisms, precipitates an ‘ontology of 
sound art [that] is necessarily in opposition’ to music. Occupying the “extra-musical”, ‘sound 
art is music’s Other’ (Kane 2013).  
 
 
On “sound art” 
 
What Kim-Cohen refers to as “music”, or slightly more accurately “Western music”, we can in 
fact take to mean the work-concept. Just as Neuhaus’ need to demarcate his practice from 
music evinces a belief in the ‘universal and absolute validity’ of the work-concept (Goehr 
2007, 273), a belief that it inheres within all music, so Kim-Cohen’s resolve to posit an entirely 
distinct category of “sound art” would suggest that he cannot conceive of music as anything 
else. Indeed, he even goes as far as to say that ‘instances of non-Western music would not be 
sound art’ because its ‘features can still be understood and, to some extent, represented in a 
way that is legible to Western musical methods’ (Kim-Cohen 2009, 107) – in other words, 
‘packaged in terms of works’ (Goehr 2007, 249). The dichotomous conceptions of Neuhaus 
and Kim-Cohen reflect the prevailing method of defining “sound art” in opposition to “music”. 
Brandon LaBelle (see LaBelle 2015), Christoph Cox (see Cox 2006 / 2011), Salomé Voegelin 
(see Voegelin 2010), Alan Licht (see Licht 2007), Steven Vitiello (see Vitiello and Rosenfeld 
2004), Scott Arford and Randy Yau (Arford and Yau 2011, 196), Carrie Brodie (Brodie 2011, 
180) all do it, and the list could go on and on. Specifically, although it is never framed in this 
way, but often as a rejection of ‘the ontology of objects’ (Cox 2013), “sound art” is defined in 
opposition to the work-concept.  
The “sound art” concept is legitimated and underwritten by the work-concept: it 
depends on it. If it wasn’t for the assumption that the work-concept inheres within music per 
se – that belief that ‘music constitutes a domain of beings, time-objects that spatialise sound 
and that mark a pulsed time, the tempo of narrative and the subject, forms with beginnings, 
middles and ends’ (Cox 2006 / 2011, 85) – what would be the need for a wholly distinct 
category of “sound art” in which to place anything that, for one reason or another, is not 
considered to be a musical work? Putting aside the unlikelihood that any musicologist would 
agree with his absolute conception of the “extra-musical”, Kim-Cohen’s “borders” – beyond 
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which only “sound art” (the “extra-musical”) obtains – are not the borders of music, but the 
borders of the concept of the autonomous musical work. Going beyond the retina is not going 
beyond perception, but going beyond the particular form, going beyond the self-sufficient 
“work” – going beyond the pure impression to the ‘carnal core’ (Krauss 1990, 294). If “sound 
art” is always and necessarily the musical work’s other, if it is definable only in its difference 
/ opposition to the musical work, then it has not “gone beyond” the work-concept. It will 
always carry within it the trace of the musical work.  
 The divide between “music” and “sound art” is not drawn by ‘music closing off its 
borders’, but by “sound art” practitioners and theorists, like Kim-Cohen, who fail to see past 
the work-concept. Despite the insistences of “sound art” discourse that music ‘excluded 
[sound art] tout de suite’ (Kim-Cohen 2009, 107), for all its countless proclamations of “sound 
art’s” distinction from “music”, for every instance of a “sound art” work categorically deemed 
“not music”, how many times do we hear “music” theorists demanding the same 
demarcation, how many times do we hear a composer categorically proclaiming her work to 
be “not sound art”? The notion that music has somehow excluded or ejected “sound art” 
from its ambit is, to borrow Kane’s term, a “musicophobic” (Kane 2013) conceit employed to 
give definition to a ‘discrete practice’ that in reality is no such thing.26 It is not so much that 
‘music' has ‘failed to recognise itself in its expanded situation’, but that “sound art” theorists 
and practitioners have –  often, but not always – failed, or better refused to recognise “sound 
art” as an expanded form of musical practice.27  
 This is not to suggest that all “sound art” is necessarily music – it can manifest in all 
manner of forms, and often multiple forms simultaneously: the following chapter will 
consider the pluralistic, indeterminate, open-ended (multi-stable) nature of sound 
installation, which lies in the overlap of music, sculpture, and various other previously 
disparate fields. Nor is it to suggest that “sound art” might be considered music purely on the 
basis of its sonic footing. Unlike Kim-Cohen’s account, the model of expanded musical form 
put forward with this project does not maintain that ‘sound is an irreducible given of music’ 
(Jean-Jacques Nattiez, quoted in Kim-Cohen 2009, 15); rather, it holds time to be its elemental 
concern. Thus, the difference, in this conception, between non-expanded and expanded form 
does not pivot upon an absolute dualism of sound-in-itself vs. everything but the sound-in-
itself, but on the difference between the attitude of music as thing’s imagined 
“supratemporal” object and the attitude of music as experience’s bodily implication with the 
 99 
events of the world-as-lived-in. The former as we saw in the previous chapter, is a projection 
and continuation of the latter: a difference of degree, not a difference of kind. Kim-Cohen 
never fully explains why it is that if ‘a non-cochlear sonic art [can] present itself in any 
medium: photography, books, lines on walls, mirrors, sculpture’, etc. (ibid., 157), why it is that 
if expanded sonic practice consists of everything but the sound itself, the sonic component 
matters at all. If we are not listening to sounds, but reading ‘symbolic grids’, and if the 
experience of non-cochlear sound art might be interpreting ‘philosophical texts’ or construing 
‘social roles’ (ibid., 156), why is this expanded practice sonic?  
The argument for music’s expansion out of the delimited realm of abstract and 
autonomous listening and into an open field of possibilities for other modes of musical 
experience is more plausible. For certain composers, ‘sound alone is no longer sufficient to 
express musical ideas’ (Ciciliani 2017, 24) because “sound-in-itself” does not describe music. 
And, although it does touch upon its formalist values, “sound-in-itself” does not describe the 
work-concept either. Music is temporal – the musical object is a supratemporal projection 
(presentness) of musical experience’s lived, physical event (presence) – and, as Kane puts it, 
‘even at its most severe claim to autonomy, [music] is always already social’ (Kane 2013). 
“Sound art” might support expanded musical form insofar as, under the attitude of music as 
experience, the perceiver may interact with it in a musical way: may turn the social idea of 
music on her engagement with it. In its sonic materiality “sound art” is well-equipped to foster 
expanded musical form, not because music is necessarily sonic, but because the ear is an 
acute receptor of the material-discursive dynamics of the world. It is perfectly possible for 
‘any medium: photography, books, lines on walls, mirrors, sculpture’, etc. to support 
expanded musical form provided that, under the attitude of music as experience, the 
perceiver turns the idea of music on her durational engagement with it. In music’s expanded 
field, the perceptual features of artworks – or whatever is interacted with – matter because 
it is in and through the perceiver’s dynamic involvement with the artwork – or whatever is 
interacted with – that expanded musical form becomes. These perceptual features are not 
necessarily sonic, but they must somehow inspire the attitude of music as experience that 
produces its aesthetic content. Equally, conceptual features matter because it is by engaging 
musically with something other than a “natural” musical sign, something that does not accord 
with institutionally pre-defined conditions of what constitutes a “musical” object, that the 
perceiver becomes aware of her productivity. This is how the transdisciplinary practices that 
 100
Ciciliani describes, which critically operate upon the terms of musical experience, upon the 
idea of music, support expanded musical form. And this is how, if I discover music in my 
interactions with sculpture, I know that the content of my musical experience is something 
that I enact, and not some thing that I have received. Expanded musical form unfolds through 
a dynamic intertwining of concept and percept, of the idea of music and the active perception 
of music, of engagement with the discursive features of the artworks and their materiality. 
Furthermore, as discussed in the previous chapter, expanded musical form – as an event of 
presence – consists in an iterative process wherein physical phenomena intermingle with 
contingent ‘associations, ideas, thoughts, memories, and emotions’ (Fischer-Lichte 2008, 
140). Cultural, social, political, etc. significance is dynamically folded into the becoming of its 
specific materiality. Expanded musical form is an “entanglement of matter and meaning” – 
the product of an embodied mind.  
In music’s expanded field is there is no inherent “extra-musical” – even an experience 
of timelessness (which is still temporal experience, of course) is appropriate to musical 
aesthetic attendance, as Beethoven, for one, has demonstrated. As an experience, and not a 
thing, the scope of expanded musical form is determined only by the perceiver. And critically, 
there is no “intra-musical” either. Expanded musical form is not defined in opposition to the 
musical work; rather, as bodily perspective that includes both absence and presence, it is 
defined as a figure against the background of other possible perspectives. The expanded 
musical field is not the stratified, divided, oppositional, separated field of the transcendental 
ego, of the abstracted mind: it is the continuous field of touch. The expanded musical field is 
not the work-concept’s other, but its always presupposed foundation.  
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Notes 
 
1 Bowman 1998, 268. 
2 It is a common view that an emphasis on bodily aesthetic experience is a particularly distinguishing feature of 
“sound art” – that is, of “sound art” as a distinct category from “music”. There could hardly be a clearer 
expression of this than the first two sentences of sound artists Scott Arford and Randy Yau’s “Infrasound 
manifesto”: ‘Hear with your body. This is not about music.’ (Arford and Yau 2011, 196). Brandon LaBelle, an 
arch-proponent of “sound art’s” demarcation, articulates this view on somewhat subtler terms, consistently 
defining the discrete sphere of “sound art” on the basis of its appeal to the body: ‘corporeal intensities … 
underscore sound art in general and may contribute to its fixation upon phenomenology’ (LaBelle 2015, 179). 
Clifton’s work, and the work of subsequent theorists – including those involved in the “enactive” approach to 
music cognition, which is an important focus of this chapter – undermines this: on the question of the body’s 
active role in the generation of aesthetic content, as on so many other points, no clear-cut distinction between 
“music” and “sound art” obtains. Clifton was by no means the first to stress the centrality of the body within 
musical experience, but in its timing (published around the moment when “sound art” was gaining momentum 
and finding definition as a distinct category), and in its phenomenological basis, his work is indicative of how 
“musical” thought and “sound art” thought have evolved in parallel and in accordance with a wealth of shared 
concerns. Fundamentally – and this is the central theme of this chapter – in Clifton’s conception of music as 
bodily experience, in his collapse of the mind/body dualism that results in the formulation of the musical 
“object” as embodied – as a projection of physical, lived experience that occurs in the world and not in the mind 
– we see signs of the work-concept being challenged on the same terms that motivate the ‘corporeal intensities’ 
of “sound art”, and that account for physicality’s significance as one of three pillars of expanded musical form.  
3 I.e., that which is covered over in the ‘hierarchical ordering’ (Irwin 2011, 294) of object-making and appreciating 
practices, and that which, by dispensing with (dismantling) subject / object relations – by substituting the 
dynamically interactive perceiver for the detached spectator – expanded artistic practice makes focal. 
4 To recall Cage, ‘most people think that when they hear a piece of music, they’re not doing anything but that 
something is being done to them’ (Cage, quoted in Nyman 1999, 24).  
5 McLuhan maintained that Western culture has been a visual culture since the invention of Greek phonetic 
literacy – which ‘promotes the illusion of removing oneself from the object’ (McLuhan 1989 / 2004, 69) – and 
that the supremacy of vision accounts for Western civilisation’s objective understanding / ordering of the world. 
‘The eye’, he wrote, ‘creates a space where there can only be one thing at a time. The eye acts as a machine – 
like a camera. Light focussed on the back of the eye ensures that two objects will not occupy the same place at 
the same time’, thus ‘the eye promotes the idea that everything is in sequence – that is, in its proper place, at 
the proper time, and in linear relationship’ (ibid., 69-70). ‘Visual space structure is an artefact of Western 
civilisation created by Greek phonetic literacy. As a construct of the mind …  it is connected (abstract figures 
within fixed boundaries, linked logically and sequentially but having no visible grounds), homogenous (uniform 
everywhere), and static (qualitatively unchangeable)’ (ibid., 71).  
6 The first concert hall, that is, the first building to be devoted exclusively to the presentation and appreciation 
of concert music, was, according to E. W. Galkin, built in 1781 (Goehr 2007, 236 70n.). See ibid., 236-242 for a 
detailed discussion of how the model for the concert-hall environment (and behavioural protocols) developed 
alongside the emergence of the work-concept.  
7 The attitude of music as thing is by no means exclusive to the concert hall, but it was – as Goehr similarly argues 
– within these newly erected ‘monuments and establishments devoted to the performance of musical works’ 
(ibid., 236) that the attitude of music as thing came to maturity: ‘the erection of concert halls helped change 
expectations of how an audience should behave’ (ibid., 239). Once established, nurtured and supported in the 
(visually-modelled) concert-hall environment, the attitude of music as thing could be extended to other 
contexts. It is worth noting, however, that many (perhaps most) “non-concert hall” musical contexts feature at 
least some trace of the essential demarcating function of the proscenium concert-hall structure. Whether in 
listening to music mediated through technology, or, perhaps, experiencing a band or DJ performing in an 
informal environment, the attitude of music as thing feeds upon barriers and boundaries that keep the perceived 
music at a remove from perception.  
8 ‘Music is as direct an objectification and copy of the whole will as is the world itself’ (Schopenhauer 1995, 164) 
9 As, in touch, one reveals the articulations of the “bottle” through ‘a temporally extended process of directed 
finger and hand movements’ (Noë 2006, 73). Merleau-Ponty also understood (exploratory) movement through 
time as essential to the structures of touch: ‘just like the exploratory gaze of genuine vision, “knowing touch” 
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throws us beyond our body through movement … Movement and time are not merely an objective condition of 
knowing touch, but rather a phenomenal component of tactile givens. They actualise the articulation of tactile 
phenomena, just as light sketches out the configuration of a visible’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 329). 
10 ’The consistent function of objective thought is to reduce all of phenomena that attest to the union of the 
subject and the world, and to substitute for them the clear idea of the object as an in-itself and of the subject as 
pure consciousness. Thus, objective thought cuts the ties that unite the thing and the embodied subject.’ 
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 334) 
11 Matthew Ratcliffe explores this in depth (see Ratcliffe 2008).  
12 Merleau-Ponty extended the tactile intertwining of the self and things, of subject and object, to the 
intertwining of the senses: ‘we must habituate ourselves to think that every visible is cut out in the tangible, 
every tactile being in some manner promised to visibility, and that there is encroachment, infringement, not 
only between the touched and the touching, but also between the tangible and the visible, which is encrusted 
in it, as, conversely, the tangible itself is not a nothingness of visibility, is not without visual existence. Since the 
same body sees and touches, visible and tangible belong to the same world. It is a marvel too little noticed that 
every movement of my eyes – even more, every displacement of my body – has its place in the same visible 
universe that I itemize and explore with them, as, conversely, every vision takes place somewhere in the tactile 
space. There is a double and crossed situating of the visible in the tangible and of the tangible in the visible’ 
(Merleau-Ponty 1968, 134).  
13 It is worth noting that Duchamp expressly stated that ‘some men … like Mondrian were not retinalists’ 
(Duchamp, quoted in Krauss 1990, 288).  
14 I’m keeping here with the general historical trajectory of Krauss’ investigation, but there are numerous 
instances of earlier theories of (positivist) equivalence between compositional materials and “natural” acoustical 
laws. Rameau’s 1722 Treatise on Harmony is a particularly influential example.   
15 Schoenberg was the more or less exact contemporary of Robert Delaunay who, for Krauss, exemplifies the 
‘early twentieth-century expectation … that the laws of simultaneous contrast and the laws of painting are one 
and the same’ (ibid., 291) 
16 Atonality ‘simply depends on the growing ability of the analysing ear to familiarise itself with the remote 
overtones, thereby expanding the conception of what is euphonious, suitable for art, so that it embraces the 
whole natural phenomenon’ (Schoenberg 1983, 21). On another note, Carl Dahlhaus proposes an 
unacknowledged connection between the concept of Klangfarbenmelodie and Helmholtz’ theories (just as 
Krauss proposes a connection between Helmholtz’ theories and those of the “retinal” painters): ‘if one assumes 
that Schoenberg had at least a cursory acquaintance with Die Lehre von dem Tonempfindungen, it is clear that 
he could have deduced the “logic” of Klangfarbenmelodie from what Helmholtz says about the “logic” of the 
melody of pitches. According to Helmholtz, the “feeling for the melodic relationship between consecutive notes” 
is based on the unconscious “sensation of similar overtones in the sounds in question”. A corresponding “logic” 
of Klangfarbenmelodie … is not inconceivable. Schoenberg … thought simply of a ‘feeling’ for tone-colour 
relationships, a feeling rooted in an unconscious “sensation of similar overtones”. The feeling for a systematic 
connection of tone colours analogous to that of pitches is still undeveloped; but again it was Helmholtz who was 
convinced that the capacity for hearing tone colours could be increased, thus enabling Schoenberg to derive 
support from him for his “fantasies of the future”’ (Dahlhaus 1987, 143).  
17 For example, ‘present-day electroacoustic techniques have unmasked the limitations of musical hearing: 
suddenly, our ear appeared as the first cause of all musical appreciation and at the same time as a listening 
device subject to precise physical norms. So now our understanding of the musical in general cannot do without 
knowledge of the ear as a device … When studied, it gives perceptions that are described in relation to the 
stimuli, the complex objects, or the particular types of attention it is given … [we can] locate characteristic 
perceptions physically, thereby clarifying useful norms for [compositionally] manipulating sounds for specific 
perceptual [musical] effects’ (Schaeffer 2017, 154-5). 
18 Grisey’s contentions, for instance, that his (and other spectral) work ‘offered a formal organisation and sonic 
material that came directly from the physics of sound’, that his was a ‘musical language articulated on scientific 
facts’ that consisted in an ‘organic approach to form’ and an ‘attentive attitude’ to the laws of acoustics (Grisey 
2000, 1-3) might easily be interpreted as indicating such an intent; indeed, Justyna Humięcka-Jakubowska has 
argued explicitly that Grisey’s music is ‘not only a cultural product, but … an entity derived from the order of 
nature’ (Humięcka-Jakubowska 2009, 227), an entity perfectly explicit in itself, independent, axiomatic, 
autonomous.  
19 This distancing, particularly in the case of Total Mountain which has an explicitly cultural, social, political 
content, is quite possibly deliberate. Walshe’s references to the “extra-musical” and the “non-cochlear” allude 
to Seth Kim-Cohen’s theory of “expanded sonic practice”, which, as will be discussed in due course, promotes 
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the notion of bracketing off bodily perception to focus on the purely conceptual and the discursive. Walshe’s 
concern with physicality, however, is not consistent with Kim-Cohen’s argument.  
20 ‘Beaming light through a pinhole into a darkened room and focusing that light on the wall opposite, the camera 
obscura allowed the observer—whether it was Newton for his Optics or Descartes for his Dioptrique—to view 
that plane as something independent of his own powers of synthesis, something that he, as a detached subject, 
could therefore observe. It was due to this structural disconnection between plane of focus and observing 
subject that the camera obscura came to function as a model for the “classical” subject of knowledge’ (Krauss 
1994, 128). 
21 ‘And now, fully embedded within the nervous weft of the body’s tissues, [the visual phenomenon, i.e., colour] 
comes to be understood … as something subject to the temporality of the nervous system itself, to its access to 
fatigue, to its necessary rhythm of innervation, to that which causes [the phenomenon, i.e. colour] to ebb and 
flow within experience in an infinitely mutable evanescence’ (Krauss 1994, 133).  
22 I turn the idea of music on the movements of my gaze about the dynamic forms, patterns, textures, and 
colours of the billowing trees, and this scene turns back to me imbued with musical meaning that feeds my ever-
evolving, open-ended idea of music, and so on …  
23 Kane, critical comparing Kim-Cohen and Salomé Voegelin’s arguments, makes the same point: ‘if we accept 
Krauss’ reading of “non-retinal” art as a defence of artworks where the viewer is not simply the receiver but a 
producer … then analogously, a “non-cochlear” sound art begins to look much more like a defence of Voegelin’s 
project than Kim-Cohen’s. This is because, unlike Kim-Cohen, Voegelin is explicitly interested in moments where, 
as she puts it, “the listener becomes producer”’ (Kane 2013). 
24 To the extent that Schaeffer’s reduction encapsulates the presentness of the attitude of music as thing, 
encapsulates the object-positing operations of work-concept, I am somewhat sympathetic with this position. 
Yet, the projection of musical objects is not the “essence” of music per se, but the guiding principle of a certain 
domain of musical practice.  
25 Karan Barad’s “agential realist” philosophy powerfully dismantles matter / discourse, nature / culture dualisms 
(see Barad 2007).  
26 William Furlong agrees: ‘sound has never become a distinct or discrete area of art practice … [due to] the 
diversity of functions and roles that sound has occupied with various artists’ work’ (Furlong 1994 / 2011, 67). 
27 Some thirty years after he seceded his sound installation practice from music, Neuhaus vehemently rejected 
the concept of “sound art”, labelling it (in 2000) ‘cowardly’: we cannot ‘put our heads in the sand and call what 
is essentially new music something else – “Sound Art”’ (Neuhaus 2000 / 2011, 72). Whilst I object to Neuhaus’ 
categorical distinction of sound installation and music, and believe that at least some of the blame for the “sound 
art” / “music” dichotomy must be apportioned to it, I do not object to term “sound installation” itself, for it 
describes a specific aesthetic, a specific area of practice, and should be taken in the same way as we might take, 
say, “impressionism” (particularly with respect to its multidisciplinary span). “Sound art” on the other hand is 
loose umbrella-term for any sonic or sound-based artwork that, for whatever reason, is not considered to be a 
musical work. It is inherently “musicophobic” (as though “music” is a dirty word), which Neuhaus clearly 
acknowledged, and (purposefully) hinders possibilities for perceivers to engage musically with expanded 
practice – more on this is the next chapter.  
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Place – Performance  
 
To simply take the thing alone without raising the wider question of 
how things present themselves in terms of a situated context is to 
allow the illusion of a thing-in-itself to occur.  
 
 – Don Ihde1 
 
 
This consequence brings us, in a future perhaps remote, toward the 
end of art as a thing separated from our surrounding environment, 
which is the actual plastic reality. But this end is at the same time a 
new beginning. Art will not only continue but will realise itself more 
and more. By the unification of architecture, sculpture and painting, a 
new plastic reality will be created. Painting and sculpture will not 
manifest themselves as separate objects, nor as “mural art” which 
destroys architecture itself, nor as “applied art”, but being purely 
constructive will aid the creation of a surrounding not merely 
utilitarian or rational but also pure and complete in its beauty. 
 
– Piet Mondrian2 
 
 
 
Sound installation expands the terms of musical experience, as it expands the terms of 
sculptural experience. Realising Mondrian’s prediction of a “unified” artistic field, sound 
installation bridges these and other previously disparate practices in a touch-like way that 
engenders a continuity between them. It is perfectly possible, if not necessarily so, for sound 
installation to be music, and it fosters the potential for expanded musical form to be both 
music and sculpture – the crisscrossing of these two fields in place is a central theme of this 
chapter. Sound installation negates the separability principle and, in further fulfilment of 
Mondrian’s prophecy, consists of the direct, dynamic, reciprocal relationship between the 
perceiver and her environment. Rejecting the proscenium conditions of the concert hall, it 
emphatically affirms the primacy of the body and its touch-like engagement with its 
surroundings: sound installation becomes as a living form produced through temporally-
extended physical contact, movement, and interaction. It has no respect for boundaries 
between the body and its space; as Bernhard Leitner explained, ‘it became clear to me ... that 
I hear a sound that goes under me with the soles of my feet, that I hear with the top of my 
skull … that the boundaries of sound spaces can also go through the body ... Space can extend 
into the body’ (Leitner and Schulz 2002). 
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Sound-space sculpture 
 
Leitner is concerned with how ‘entirely new concepts of space open up through extended 
hearing, bodily hearing’ (Leitner and Schulz 2002). He is clear that his “sound-space sculpture” 
is ‘in its very essence an event of time’, with ‘a beginning and an end’ (Leitner 1977), in which 
the perceiving body dynamically manipulates space through its interactions with sound. The 
world of Leitner’s work ‘is a haptic world’, where one ‘hears with skin, with the bones, with 
bone innards, the hard plates of the skeletal structure, with the membranes, hollows and 
channels’. ‘Being bodily touched by the physical pressure of sound waves and their 
reverberations through the body’ (Leitner and Fricke 2008), the perceiver is physically 
intertwined with the work: subject and object, inner and outer are the same flesh. Sound-
space sculptures such as Spiral-Raum (1973 / 2008) operate on similar terms to Morris’ 
sculpture, employing a unitary, geometric “constant” against which the “experienced 
variables” are related. Consisting, quite literally, of a framework that recalls the simple, 
singular gestalt structures of Tenney and Glover, Spiral-Raum is a cylindrical “sound tube” 
that comprises a self-same series of evenly spaced, virtual circular arrangements of 
loudspeakers affixed to long wooden slats.  
A single drone with a granular texture that helps to articulate motion is simultaneously 
passed around all of self-same loudspeaker circles at the same, regular rate. As the perceiver 
enters the sound tube, a spiralling space emerges which is determined by her movement. If 
the perceiver is stationary, sound travels in circles around her with no forward motion. If the 
perceiver moves slowly, the acoustic space rotates in a narrow spiral, with a slow forward 
direction. If the perceiver moves at a faster pace, the circular motion of the sound stretches 
out and curved lines materialise around her, through her, that spiral at a greater speed. What 
the perceiver experiences is determined by what she does. There is no distance between the 
perceiver and the perceived: the dynamic, spiralling energies of the sound tube which invade 
the body are bound to its sensorimotor structures. Spiral-Raum implicates the perceiver in a 
‘mutual, motile engagement’ (Krauss 1986, 270), a touch-like engagement in which the 
perceiving body and its physical space are ‘dynamically coupled and reciprocally determining’ 
(Krueger 2009, 100). Activated by the perceiver’s presence, produced in and through her 
dynamic bodily interactivity, Spiral-Raum, as ‘an event of time’, is not a thing, but an 
experience.  
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Leitner’s work is an expressly physical manifestation of ideas that lie behind the work 
of composers such as Tenney and Glover. Like these composers, Leitner does not create 
autonomous aesthetic objects, but provides frameworks with which to interactively generate 
a unique, living form. As with their work, Leitner’s becomes as durational event of aesthetic 
attendance to one’s bodily implication with a physical sonic flux. Transposing these ideas into 
the spatial domains of sculpture and architecture, Leitner’s work does not break with music, 
but expands its terms, powerfully emphasising the productivity of the perceiver and the 
background presence of bodily being-in-the-world. It offers a critique of conceptual, 
ideological, and institutional structures that encourages perceivers to reimagine the 
possibilities of musical experience: emphatically rejecting the structures of concert-hall 
listening, it unleashes the open potential of expanded musical form.  
Leitner himself stresses the continuity between his work and music, frequently citing 
the influence of, and expressing an affinity with the work of Stockhausen, Nono, Xenakis, 
Kagel, Cage, Varèse, and others (Leitner and Schulz 2002, Leitner and Blume 2008, Leitner and 
Fricke 2008). Furthermore, he often works directly with instrumental performers to construct 
his sonic material:  
 
As regards the acquisition of sound material, the use of recordings with classical instruments was 
actually the most appropriate. There’s a great advantage in being able to work with instrumentalists 
who are open to experimenting and playing with sound. In recent years several musicians from the 
Vienna Klangforum have been ideal partners in material production, whether trombone, bass 
clarinet, double bass, flute, cello, or percussion. This raw material, as I call it, is in itself already very 
complex and sensuously fitting; here, however, it is processed and formed by me with a view to the 
sonic-spatial demands of a specific way of working with it. (Leitner and Fricke 2008) 
 
Leitner does not, however, consider himself to be a “composer”. And neither does he consider 
himself a “sound artist”. Leitner rejects labels altogether: ‘linguistic terms simply confine the 
frame of reference … sculptor, graphic artist, musician, choreographer, etc.’, he remarked, 
‘the interesting thing here is that since today’s media are networked together, overlap, this 
categorisation will simply disappear’ (ibid.). Exemplifying the tactile nature of his practice, 
Leitner has no respect for boundaries. Sound-space sculpture is not music’s other, but a 
unification of music, sculpture, and architecture – titles such as Tuba-Architektur (1999) 
clearly reflect this. Leitner’s work is pluralistic, indeterminate, open-ended, and multi-stable. 
It centres upon the contingent perspective of the perceiving body.  
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Being in space 
 
Leitner’s conception differs considerably from that of Max Neuhaus. Neuhaus emphasises the 
‘permanence’ of his work (Neuhaus 1994, 44), insists that his work ‘doesn’t exist in time’ 
(Neuhaus, quoted in Cox 2006 / 2011, 84). ‘I don’t make sound events in time’, he asserted, 
‘you don’t come to a sound work of mine at the beginning and leave at the end’ (Neuhaus 
1994, 130). Leitner, to the contrary, describes his work ‘as an event of time’ ‘which has a 
beginning and an end’, as a ‘sequence of spatial sensations’ that ‘unfolds in time’, ‘is 
developed … and transformed in time’ (Leitner 1977). Whilst Neuhaus categorically states 
‘that the important idea about this kind of work is that it’s not music’ (Neuhaus, quoted in 
Cox 2006 / 2011, 84), Leitner lets the perceiver decide: ‘this doesn’t have to be music’ (Leitner 
and Fricke 2008) … but it can be. Placing special weight on the presentness of the sound 
installation object in an effort to distance his practice from the duration of music, Neuhaus 
posited an aesthetic structured around separability. On the other hand, Leitner’s project of 
collapsing separations / oppositions / divisions is evident in the prominence of presence in 
his aesthetic descriptions, of the touch-like dynamic interactivity, reciprocity, and 
connectedness between the perceiver and the perceived which extends to the way in which 
he situates his practice in the ‘overlap’ between music, sculpture, and architecture. Neuhaus 
and Leitner converge, however, on the critical question of space and the use of sound to focus 
the dynamics of being in space. ‘I create, transform, and change spaces by adding sound’, 
Neuhaus tells us (Neuhaus 1994, 42); ‘my work deals with the audio-physical experience of 
spaces … which are determined in content and form by the movement of sound’, Leiter writes 
(Leitner 1977). What for Leitner is establishing the ‘interconnection between man and space 
… with sounds’ (Leiter and Conrads 1985), is for Neuhaus the use of sound as a ‘means of 
transforming space into place’ (Neuhaus 1994, 130). This point at which the very different 
aesthetic conceptions of these two artists meet is the kernel of the diverse field of sound 
installation practice. Sound installation, at bottom, ‘requires the experience of an on-site 
location’ (Leitner and Fricke 2008). It is a sonically-articulated aesthetic experience of place: 
a dynamic interaction between the perceiver, her environment, and sound. 
 Christoph Cox does not accept Neuhaus’ characterisation of sound installation as an 
‘out of time’ ‘entity’. ‘Times Square’, he writes, ‘is experienced in temporal slices that serve 
as openings onto a flow of duration of which we are a part’ (Cox 2006 / 2011, 84). Brandon 
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LaBelle also disputes Neuhaus’ temporal conceptions, arguing that time is integral to sound 
installation, which functions by ‘temporalising space’ (LaBelle 2015, 162; original emphasis): 
 
Neuhaus’ [sound installation works] cast a sonic net across a given space or environment … so as to 
activate how one moves, occupies, and engages in space: here, the possibility of different forms of 
inhabitation occurs through placing the ear at the centre through which listening steps out of line 
to find its place within a different temporal zone, that of performative presence: I move through a 
listening space and am made aware through time’s physical event … Space is a potential awaiting 
activation through durational insertion … While the aesthetic of sound installation, as Neuhaus 
himself articulates, aims for the “space of sound” by attending to perception, it is through time that 
such attendance is made possible. (ibid., 163-4) 
 
Sound installation, on LaBelle’s view, articulates ‘time’s physical event’, opens on to ‘the flow 
of duration’, by binding the ear to the process by which space becomes inhabited. In Leitner’s 
terminology, this is the process through which the ‘interconnection between man and space 
… is achieved’; In Neuhaus’, this is the transformation of space into place.  
 From a comparative analysis of Henri Lefebvre and Edward Casey’s ideas, the 
performance studies theorist John Lutterbie arrives at the following definition of space and 
place:  
 
Space is an objectification, a distancing and a standing outside of place; while place is the 
inhabitation of space, a being-in-space. To think about space then is to think abstractly, to assume 
an objective position and to frame our experience in terms of the relationship between objects, 
whether stationary or in motion. To think about our place in the world is to describe our [pre-
objective] experiences. (Lutterbie 2001, 128) 
 
Space, Lutterbie tells us, after Lefebvre, is a construct, a conceptualisation of the product of 
relations between objects and ourselves that derives from our experiences of place. Place, as 
Casey argues, describes our bodily being-in-the-world:  
 
[Place] arises within the withness essential to the body’s primitive prehensions and repetitions of 
its environing world. Just as we are always with a body, so, being bodily, we are always within a 
place as well. Thanks to our body, we are in that place and part of it. (Casey 2013, 214; original 
emphasis) 
 
Place is the body’s contact with the world, the phenomenon that comes forth in and through 
its exploratory movements and interactions. To experience place is to experience the 
continuous flux that marks the intertwining, the chiasm, the touch-like reciprocity of the body 
and its environment. In Lutterbie’s words,  
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Place is not experienced simply through our actions, but through the actions of the world on our 
bodies. Whether it be wind, rain or the actions of other animate beings, our perceptions of the 
world, therefore our knowledge of the world, arises through interaction: we are always already 
engaged in the world and are acted upon, even as we act. (Lutterbie 2001, 127) 
 
Place is dynamic, evolving, becoming: our situation in place is one with our situation in 
duration. Carved out of place, ‘space’, as Manuel Castells puts it, ‘is crystallized time’ 
(Castells, quoted in Ouzounian 2006, 71; original emphasis), a frozen frame of the ceaseless 
rhythm of change that underpins our inhabitation of the world. Space pertains to the 
ontological category of presentness; place is the performance of presence.  
Lutterbie’s definitions of space and place, formulated with a view to theatre, 
correspond to those of Gascia Ouzounian, which are set out as analytical tools for dealing 
with sound installation specifically. Similarly drawing upon Lefebvre, Ouzounian describes 
space as the ‘multiple and hybrid settings … of production’ and place as ‘the moment-to-
moment relationships between different elements of a network’ (ibid., 72; original emphasis). 
 
Place focuses the particular, the situational and the momentary, and is therefore always in flux and 
subject to change. Space, on the other hand, is used to describe more general and sedentary forms 
of organisation. (ibid.) 
 
Echoing Lutterbie’s conclusions, Ouzounian casts space as an organisational construct, as the 
“setting” of production (‘whether physical, cultural, social, personal or political’ (ibid.)) – the 
conceived, abstract framework for production – and place as the lived experience of space, 
the being in space that is production. Her account of space and place highlights their status 
as ‘provisional and contested fields of relations’ (ibid.), and it is their ongoing interplay, she 
suggests, their ‘complex, reflexive dynamics’ (ibid.), that sound installation targets as the crux 
of its aesthetic. 
 There are clear parallels between LaBelle’s understanding of space as the ‘possibility 
of different forms of inhabitation’, as a ‘potential awaiting activation’, and Ouzounian’s as the 
“setting of production”. Both LaBelle and Ouzounian envisage space as a field that we project 
before us as a context for our actions and relations. And this is confirmed by Lutterbie, who 
tells us that to conceive space is to ‘assume an objective’ stance on the world: to distance 
oneself from the dynamic experience of place, from the domain of being-in-the-world that 
recedes into the background behind objective thought as it stabilises and quantifies the 
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world. By ‘temporalising space’, as LaBelle puts it, sound installation subverts this stability, 
bringing ‘the particular, the situational, and the momentary’ to the fore to contest the 
‘general’ and the ‘sedentary’. Emanating from the depths of an underground vent in an 
environment dominated by towering buildings, and confronting the frenetic mutability of the 
city with its obdurate constancy, Times Square – the title of which (intentionally or not) 
alludes to temporalised space – challenges the spatial order of its urban context to highlight 
the ongoing flux that flows through it. And we’ve discussed how Leitner provides simple, 
geometric spatial structures, often housed within pure, cuboid architectural volumes – of 
gallery spaces, for example – as the settings for what Boris Groys describes as ‘an artful play 
with movement and of contemplatively dwelling in space – a unique choreography’ (Leitner 
2008, 10) where bodily listening reveals a dynamic world of shifting energies, densities, and 
pressures. The drone of Times Square and the cylindrical structure of Spiral-Raum function as 
spatial frameworks for the productivity of place. They foreground presence in their 
presentness. 
Sound installation’s play on the relation between space and place, LaBelle similarly 
remarks, prompts perception to ‘[step] out of line to find its place within a different temporal 
zone, that of performative presence’ (LaBelle 2015, 163). The “temporalisation of space” pulls 
experience back from the presentness of the objective world and into the dynamics, the 
presence, of the place-world. ‘[Activating] how one moves, occupies, and engages in space’ 
(ibid.), sound installation focusses the perceiver’s productivity, marking the experience of 
inhabitation with a unique ‘acoustical unfolding wedded to movement and duration’ (ibid., 
162). The interactivity of place, the temporally-extended reciprocal activity and contact of the 
touching / touched body intertwined with its environment, comes into relief as a performance 
that articulates ‘time’s physical event’. Targeting place, sound installation practice indicates 
a temporal phenomenon and situates listening at the threshold of its unfolding. It has every 
potential to support the real-world, interactive becoming of expanded musical form, the 
durational performance of aesthetic attendance to one’s bodily implication with the events 
of the world-as-lived-in. It makes music’s always presupposed background of presence, 
physicality, and place focal.  
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The time of sculpture 
 
Installation art, as Nicholas de Oliviera, Michael Petty, and Nicola Oxley define it, ‘rejects 
concentration on one object in favour of a consideration of the relationships between a 
number of elements or of the interaction between things and their contexts’ (de Oliveira et 
al., 8). An expanded form of sculpture, it is an art of ‘determined relations’, not ‘particular 
form’ (Mondrian 1937 / 1964, 121), that renounces the idea of ‘art as a thing separated from 
our surrounding environment’ (ibid., 130). It is an art of ‘the actual plastic reality’ (ibid.) of 
place. And as an art of place, of being-in-the-world, it is an art in which no clear-cut subject / 
object, inner / outer distinctions obtain. In the focus it draws on place, it critiques the “natural 
sign” and makes the dynamic productivity of the perceiver perspicuous. For the interactive, 
productive body situated in place, both touching and touched, installation art is not a thing, 
but a unique, contingent experiential event in time. Neuhaus’ goal of place is consistent with 
this aesthetic. But his notion of the “permanent entity” is decidedly incongruous. As he broke 
with music and professedly took leave of duration in pursuit of the fixity and stability of 
sculpture, sculpture was moving in the opposite direction.  
 In Morris’ art and theoretic work of the 1960s, time gained significance as a critical 
dimension of sculpture. ‘Only one aspect of the work is immediate: the apprehension of the 
gestalt. The experience of the work necessarily exists in time’ (Morris 1993, 17). The ideal, 
geometric “unitary form”, ‘which the viewer never literally experiences’ (ibid., 16), functions 
as an abstract framework for production, a setting for performative presence. The “expanded 
situation” consists of space becoming place; as spatial presentness transforms into the 
dynamic presence of place, the single object of attention dissolves into a contextual event of 
physical interaction. Thing becomes experience, and sculpture becomes an opening on to the 
flow of duration. ‘Time is in this newer work in a way it never was in past sculpture … real 
space is not experienced except in real time’ (ibid., 176). Time ‘expanded the terms of 
sculpture by [inducing] a more emphatic focussing on the very conditions’ of the art 
experience (ibid., 17), by bringing the art experience into place.  
 Olafur Eliasson’s more recent comments attest to time’s centrality within the 
installation art aesthetic.  
 
Devoting attention to time has far-reaching consequences for the idea of objecthood and the 
dematerialisation of the object. Artworks are not closed or static, and they do not embody some 
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kind of truth that may be revealed to the spectator. Rather, artworks have an affinity with time – 
they are embedded with time, they are of time. This is why I sometimes call my works experimental 
setups; they are structures with which visitors can engage. (Eliasson, in Eliasson and Irwin 2007) 
 
Eliasson’s installation work, like that of Leitner and Neuhaus, functions as a framework for 
the perceiver’s dynamic productivity. Unlike Neuhaus, however, Eliasson (similarly to Leitner) 
does not conceive of his work as a permanent, out of time, static entity, but as an event in 
time or a heterogeneity of events in time. He describes the form of installation art as “Your 
Engagement Sequence”, or “YES”. ‘YES or the fifth dimension creates a perspective on the 
world that is personal; it functions to individualise the other dimensions of space [and time]’ 
(Eliasson 2006, 66-7). YES is an event of inhabitation, a dynamic experience of place, a 
performance of presence. Replacing the particular form of a single object of attention, YES is 
the unique, living form produced in and through the interactions of the engaged perceiving 
body as it negotiates its surroundings through time. ‘YES destabilises truth, turning it into an 
individual experience’ (Eliasson, in Eliasson and Irwin 2007); by making YES ‘a necessary 
component of the perceptual process’ (ibid.), installation art negates objectivity. ‘The key 
issue is the role of the engaged spectator or user’ and how ‘the activities or actions of that 
user in fact constitute the artwork’. ‘Without the participation of the user there is nothing’. 
For Eliasson, installation art is innately ‘ephemeral’ (ibid.).  
 Robert Irwin is another artist whose work, centring upon ‘the potential of each person 
to perceive the surrounding world from a unique aesthetic perspective’ (Irwin 2011, 1), is 
‘embedded’ within the flux of time. ‘Everything is subject to fluctuating sets of conditions that 
in themselves are not static, and this dynamic of a world of qualities is the stuff of real-time 
perception … I try to deal with all those conditions’ (Irwin, in Eliasson and Irwin 2007). 
Realising Mondrian’s prediction, Irwin abandoned the canvas and the fixed materiality of the 
discrete object and adopted the ‘actual plastic reality’ of place as his medium. Replacing the 
autonomous thing with the ephemera of the ambient conditions of specific environments and 
‘the dynamics of our perceiving (experiencing) the nature of the world about us’ (Irwin 2011, 
215), Irwin’s art resides in the ‘mutual, motile engagement’ (Krauss 1986, 270) between the 
touching / touched body and its surroundings. It becomes as a multi-sensory event of 
aesthetic attendance to one’s bodily implication with the flux of the world-as-lived-in.  
‘You almost don’t see the hand of the artist’, Irwin remarked as he described 1°2°3°4° 
(1997) during a talk at the White Cube, London in September 2015.3 This installation in the 
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Museum of Contemporary Art San Diego, La Jolla is an exemplary realisation of what the artist 
calls ‘the ethic of phenomenal art’ (Irwin 2011, 215): to artistically act in direct response to 
the specific conditions and solicitations of a given environment, whilst eschewing the ‘kind of 
compounded belief [that it takes] to plan, proselytise, or thrust your abstractions onto the 
world’ (ibid.). Typical of Irwin’s site-conditioned installations, 1°2°3°4° ‘draws all of its cues 
(reasons for being) from its surroundings’ (ibid., 218), setting a contingent flux of physical 
environmental phenomena into relief in order to heighten perceptual acuity and foreground 
bodily being-in-the-world.  
Irwin cut three rectangular apertures in the large, tinted, rectangular windows of a 
room in the museum, an empty, clean, white cuboid volume that boasts panoramic views 
over the oceanfront. The pure, geometric space of the installation functions as a framework 
for production: 1°2°3°4° becomes as a transformation of space into place. The installation’s 
abstract spatial framework – which the perceiver ‘never literally experiences’ (Morris 1993, 
16); to be in space is to experience place – is the setting of a unique performance of presence 
that produces the artwork’s aesthetic content. ‘You’re put in [a] position of actually 
constructing the aesthetics of the experience as you go’ (Irwin, in Eliasson and Irwin 2007): 
1°2°3°4° is not observed, but performed. It stages a process in which perception is drawn from 
object to environment, from the objective world to bodily being-in-the-world, from space to 
place, from presentness to presence, in real time. ‘The glass being tinted makes the cut-outs 
appear to be more in focus’ (ibid.): the eye is immediately drawn to three geometric gestalt 
figures standing out against a ground. But as the perceiver comes to inhabit the space, she 
realises that these are not demarcated objects, but openings on to the wider environment – 
the figure-ground relation is inverted; background becomes focal. Having initially noticed the 
different quality of light that pours through these openings, as the perceiver explores the 
room she comes to hear the waves, feel the breeze, smell the sea air.  She is situated in 
context responding to the immediate conditions of her environment, immersed and engaged 
in the contingent flux of place, ‘acting directly to determine all matters of quality’ (Irwin 2011, 
212). 
1°2°3°4° is never the same from one moment to the next. It is embedded within the 
flow of duration, and its temporality is largely a function of the holistic perceptual attitude 
that it inspires. Visualist space gives way to the tactile place-world as multiple sense faculties 
are implicated. ‘Add all the sounds and the air and so forth and it becomes, on a visceral level, 
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more real’ (Irwin, in Eliasson and Irwin 2007). The natural sign is abolished and focus homes 
in on the productivity of the perceiving body.  
Dynamic, durational, and multi-sensory, an event of aesthetic attendance to changes 
and relations within and between a flux of physical phenomena through time, the experience 
of Irwin’s work has the same features as expanded musical form. It is perfectly possible for 
1°2°3°4° to be music. Expanding the terms of sculpture by situating it in time, Morris – who 
expressly blurred the boundaries between sculpture and music with works like Box with 
Sound of its Own Making and Column (both 1961) – Eliasson, Irwin, and many others open 
their work to the unconstrained potential of expanded musical form. Sculpture and music 
collide in the durational performance of place.  
 
 
The continuity of music and sculpture 
 
This collision is made explicit in the work of Christina Kubisch, who, recalling Leitner, describes 
her sound installation practice as ‘sound architecture’ (Kubisch 1986 / 2011, 198) and stresses 
its continuity with music:  
 
Creative musical experience need not … be limited to academic practice or to recorder recitals 
during “musical afternoons” at home … In contrast to the conditions in concert halls, our ears, 
coupled with the other senses, perceive rotund, spherical, and moving sound. Creative listening is 
the starting point for my sound installations and sound-zones in which the structure of the 
composition is combined with sequences of tone and movement. The audience is able to move 
freely between various acoustic fields distributed throughout the sound zone … These sound zones 
are often created in the open air: in woodland glades for instance, or in buildings that were not 
constructed to act as concert halls, such as deserted factories, shipyards and cellars. (ibid., 199) 
 
As indicated here, Kubisch is clear that her practice aims to expand music’s terms, not secede 
from music, to open up new possibilities for creative, productive, musical experience beyond 
the delimiting structures of concert-hall listening. By situating musical experience in place, by 
“coupling” musical listening ‘with the other senses’ in a holistic, bodily engagement with the 
physical phenomenal flux of an environment, Kubisch’s sound installation does not break with 
a musical past, but makes its background focal. The multi-sensory experience that Kubisch 
describes, akin to the dynamic interactivity between body and world that constitutes Irwin’s 
work, is a performance of presence.  
 115 
With her “electromagnetic induction” structures, Kubisch integrates ‘creative musical 
experience’ with sculpture. Sculptural forms moulded out of malleable cables, wrapped 
around trees and columns, fixed to walls, ceilings and floors, strung across spatial volumes in 
web-like arrangements, bind her sounding material to the specifics of context and motivate 
the perceiver’s exploratory interaction, movement, and contact. Kubisch’s work, physically 
entangled in place, becomes in and through the dynamic, touch-like, reciprocal intertwining 
of the body and its environment, which extends to the touch-like continuity that this work 
engenders between music and sculpture. Pluralistic, indeterminate, and open-ended, 
Kubisch’s sound installation supports the contingent expanded musical form of the touching 
body which has no respect for boundaries. Here, unified in the duration of place, expanded 
terms of music and expanded terms of sculpture bleed into one another.  
 Robin Minard also identifies his sound installation practice as music. In marked 
contrast to Neuhaus, Minard draws distinctions between “traditional” compositional 
approaches – i.e., of the work-concept – and a ‘new approach to music-making’ (Minard 1996, 
73). Evidently recognising that there are possibilities for music beyond the work-concept, that 
the work-concept does not inhere within music per se, Minard importantly characterises the 
relationship between the “traditional” approaches and the “new approach” as a difference of 
‘emphasis’ (ibid.): as a difference of degree, and not a difference of kind.  
 
The removal of music from the traditional concert hall and the placing of it in the much less formal 
surroundings of public spaces held implications not only for the character of music itself but also 
for my basic attitude as a composer. Emphasis was now to be placed on adapted works to existing 
conditions and on the merging of them within given surroundings … This approach contrasted 
sharply with the traditionally isolated act of music composition, to its autonomous conception and 
to its almost exclusively spectacle-orientated character of presentation. (ibid.) 
 
Sound installation, for Minard, takes music out of the concert hall and in doing so dissolves 
its autonomy. The detached, visualist spectacle of the proscenium is supplanted by the tactile 
dynamic interactivity of place. Sound installation practice has ‘implications’ for ‘the character 
of music itself’: it does not break with music, it expands music’s terms. To affect this 
expansion, Minard tells us, sound installation artists shift the emphasis of their work away 
from ‘narrative forms – closed and self-contained – communicated through a musical syntax’ 
(ibid., 81), and towards ‘psycho-acoustic and architectural concerns’ (ibid., 80). ‘The 
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composer’s approach and intentions have changed’ (ibid.), but the sound installation artist, 
for Minard, is a composer nonetheless.  
The “new approach” to ‘composition considers the element of sound to be a main 
contributing factor not only to our conscious and unconscious perceptions of space, but also 
to our conscious and unconscious relationships with our surroundings’ (ibid., 81). Sound 
installation practice’s ‘new approach to music-making’ brings musical experience to bear 
directly upon ‘the complex, reflexive dynamics of space and place’ (Ouzounian 2006, 72), 
making focal its nature as situated, dynamic bodily interactivity.   
 
It considers architectural space to be a multi-sensory event rather than a static object and deals 
with art in general as a perceptual experience, one whose essence is no longer communicated 
through a [narrative] or a physical object, but which instead unfolds in space through our spatial 
perceptions and our perceptual investigations of our surroundings. (Minard 1996, 73) 
 
Recalling the aesthetic of Irwin and Eliasson, Leitner and Morris, Minard depicts sound 
installation as an expanded practice that subverts the natural sign in order to focus the 
productivity of being-in-the-world, that rejects the presentness of the aesthetic thing in 
order to become as an aesthetic experience of performative presence. Sound installation, 
for Minard, is not a permanent entity, but an event in time.  
 ‘The artistic component’ of sound installation practice, is ‘supportive rather than 
primary’, Minard writes (ibid., 73). In the expanded field, the artist’s role is to provide 
frameworks for production: frameworks which support a perceptual attitude that assumes 
no distance from the perceived, frameworks which heighten the perceiver’s awareness that 
what she experiences is determined by what she does, which encourage the perceiver to 
generate a unique and contingent, living, dynamic aesthetic form. In a similar way to some 
of Kubisch’s “electromagnetic induction” works, Minard’s ongoing series of sound 
installations, Silent Music (1994 – ), consist of vine-like configurations of audio cabling and 
piezo loudspeakers bound to the architecture of specific environments. Sculptural presence 
is integrated with musical sonic flux to provide a framework for the becoming of a ‘multi-
sensory event’ of exploratory movement, contact, and interaction. Situated within the 
duration of place, Silent Music, like Kubisch’s work, expands the terms of both music and 
sculpture and engenders a continuity between them. Minard’s sound installation practice – 
pluralistic, open-ended, and expressly continuous with music – supports the open potential 
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of expanded musical form.  
 
 
Sound and place 
 
LaBelle’s account suggests that sound installation makes the “temporalisation of space”, the 
event of inhabitation, explicit by virtue of its sonic materiality. By centring upon the ear’s 
acuity as a receptor of the world’s dynamics, sound installation enhances sculpture’s 
durational potential. The presences within the acoustic world are not static objects, but rather 
temporal events (Cox 2011, 156). According to Don Ihde, 
 
The tradition concerning the experience of sound is one that situates hearing as the temporal sense 
and the “world” of sound as one of flux and flow … Sound dances timefully within experience. Sound 
embodies the sense of time. (Ihde 2007, 85) 
 
Sound installation’s sonic matter pulls one into the here and now, into the dynamic field of 
bodily being-in-the-world, into the becoming of place. As sounds flood through Irwin’s 
apertures, the experience of 1°2°3°4° ‘becomes, on a visceral level, more real’ (Irwin, in 
Eliasson and Irwin 2007). The acoustic world, Marshall McLuhan writes, ‘is the natural space 
of nature-in-the-raw’ (McLuhan 1989 / 2004, 71), where everything is in ‘a state of constant 
flux’ (ibid., 70). Sound extends through space and spreads out in all directions, animating 
spatial volumes with its durational presence, implicating the perceiver in its physical event. 
According to Salomé Voegelin, ‘hearing does not offer a meta-position’ of detached 
observation; ‘however far its source, the sound sits in my ear’ (Voegelin 2010, xii). 
Consequently, sound-based practice in the expanded field, 
 
Must have at its core the principle of sharing time and space with the object or event under 
consideration. It is a philosophical project that necessitates an involved participation, rather than 
enables a detached viewing position; and the object or event under consideration is by necessity 
considered not as an artefact but in its dynamic production. (ibid.) 
 
Sound installation is produced through the specific interaction between sound, environment, 
and perceiver. Its sonic materiality binds perception to the situational unfolding of a unique 
event in time. It consists of ‘a continual production that involves the listener’ as a touching / 
touched body ‘producing the very thing he perceives’. Both the artwork and the perceiver are 
‘thus generated concomitantly’, both are ‘as transitory as each other’ (ibid.).  
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Operating on Neuhaus’ terms 
 
Neuhaus’ vision of a sonic art form that would be experienced as an experience of place 
resonates with Voegelin’s sentiments. For as an experience of place, sound installation is a 
dynamic, ephemeral event, performed by the perceiver who through the act of inhabitation 
– the transformation of space into place – produces ‘the very thing he perceives’. And yet 
with his insistence that sound installation continues in the perceiver’s absence – ‘you don’t 
come to a sound work of mine at the beginning and leave at the end’ (Neuhaus 1994, 130) – 
Neuhaus articulated a contradicting intentionality, revealing that he didn’t consider his work 
to “share” time with the perceiver in the way Voegelin proposes, that he considered his work 
to have a permanence, and thus a degree of separation from the perceiver who is unable to 
experience it fully. The sound stays put, continuously and perpetually present, as perceivers 
come and go. This facet of Neuhaus’ thinking puts him at odds with the expanded aesthetic 
thought of the other artists that we have considered, whose art and theory attest to a shift 
away from conceiving the work of art as a fixed, static, autonomous object and towards 
notions of art as interactive experiential event. On the one hand we have sculptors seeking 
to integrally incorporate time into their work in pursuit of the kind of ‘involved participation’ 
(Voegelin 2010, xii) that Voegelin describes as an essential characteristic of sound and 
listening; on the other, we have Neuhaus, the musician come sound installation artist, aiming 
to remove sound from time, interposing distance between the perceiver and the perceived 
as he targets the very permanence and fixity, enduringness and stasis, that Morris, Eliasson, 
Irwin, and others abandoned.  
 By emphatically ascribing meaning and value to the durational experience of 
presence, the statements of Leitner, Kubisch, and Minard cast sound installation as a practice 
that expands music’s terms, critiquing the natural sign of the autonomous musical work in 
order to make the productivity of the perceiver perspicuous. By emphatically ascribing 
meaning and value to the presentness of the sound installation ‘out of time’ ‘entity’, Neuhaus’ 
statements, ironically, situate his practice within the same domain of ‘particular form’ as the 
autonomous musical work, failing to critique the belief in the artwork as natural sign, failing 
to make clear that the sound installation is not a single object of attention, fully determinate, 
fully present, before the detached spectator. The notion of removing sound from time and 
turning it into an entity describes the operations of the work-concept far more accurately 
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than it does sound installation’s event of inhabitation, dynamic experience of place, 
performance of presence. We’ve seen how the comments of other sound installation artists 
contest Neuhaus’ secession of sound installation from music, and on the basis of Neuhaus’ 
terms it would seem that sound installation has not departed from the sphere of the work-
concept either. Principles of timelessness that Neuhaus’ ascribed to sound installation’s 
conceptual framework – which clash with the very nature of sound and listening and the 
experience of place, and imply a degree of autonomy in the sound installation work that 
contradicts its fundamental difference to the discrete musical work – present themselves as 
confused “cultural terms” upon which an expanded practice could critically operate.  
 Notions of a permanent sound materiality rest upon the ability to perpetuate sound 
indefinitely from a fixed, durable, non-human source. We know that Neuhaus sought to 
realise his intention of turning sound into an entity through the use of electroacoustic 
technology, but is it possible that this medium may be more fundamentally tied into his 
conception? Marshall McLuhan tells us that the medium ‘shapes and controls the scale and 
form of human association and action’ (McLuhan 2001, 9), and from Rosalind Krauss we learn 
that media entrenchment is the fundamental condition of the natural sign. Expanded 
practice, as we have seen, dismantles the natural sign through its substitutions of one 
medium for another. If an expanded practice were to substitute a different medium for the 
electroacoustic medium, could it undermine the natural sign of Neuhaus’ permanent, static 
entity and foreground sound installation’s nature an interactive event in time?  
Even the briefest survey of artists’ statements written by practitioners working in the 
field of sound installation is likely to evince a clear preference for electroacoustic media as 
that which is best suited to the art form’s concepts. And this comes as no surprise, for the 
potentialities of electroacoustic technology have evidently shaped sound installation’s 
conceptual framework from its beginnings to the present day. Minard hints at the kind of 
determining influence that this medium may have had, writing that it ‘permits the broadcast 
of sounds in continuous fashion and within an unlimited time frame; it allows the creation of 
quasi-static sound textures’ (Minard 1996, 73). Electroacoustic technology has permitted 
sound installation art to occupy space in ‘continuous fashion’ over long periods of time, for 
its becoming to emulate the enduring situatedness of visual art forms. Minard’s remarks 
about an ‘unlimited time frame’, about ‘quasi-static’ sound point to the potentialities of 
electroacoustic media as having instilled the idea of removing sound from time and fixing it 
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in space.  
The sound installation artist Carrie Brodie writes that ‘the history of sound as an art 
medium originates – like photography and film – with the invention of new technology’ 
(Brodie 2011, 180). This is plainly evidenced by Neuhaus’ foundational sound installation 
framework. For his notions of a permanent sounding materiality – of ‘sound works without a 
beginning or an end’ (Neuhaus 1994, 42) – are clearly predicated upon the capabilities of 
automated electroacoustic technology, which ostensibly afforded the means to abandon the 
time of music and ‘move the installations into the purview of the visual arts’ (ibid.). Neuhaus’ 
model suggests an ontology of the sound installation work that is bound to the objective 
reality of the equipment used in its construction (fixed, durable, non-human); the disconnect 
between experience and the work within this model is marked by a dichotomy of the 
contingency of human perceptual activity and the enduring thingness of a machine. The 
presentness which is the condition of sound installation’s objecthood, the condition on which 
the sound installation ‘entity’ functions as a natural sign, is bound up with the electroacoustic 
medium. Substituting performance for electroacoustics, performance sound installation 
critiques the conceptual, ideological, and institutional terms of Neuhaus’ sound installation 
model with a view to making explicit its nature as an experiential event in time and, 
accordingly, foregrounding its continuity with music.  
 
 
Performance sound installation  
 
Whilst the electroacoustic sound installation consists in the generation, projection, and 
perpetuation of a sonic materiality through automated electronic systems, the performance 
sound installation consists in the live production of a sonic materiality by situated, human 
agents. Sound installation, as discussed, is fundamentally a performance of place, a unique, 
ephemeral event in time; unlike the electroacoustic sound installation, whose structures the 
perceiver knows to endure beyond the horizons of the installation event, this is all that the 
performance sound installation is.  
In order to disentangle the performance sound installation from the general 
electroacoustic framework, I draw upon concepts from the field of performance studies, 
especially the thought of Erika Fischer-Lichte, who tells us that, 
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The specific mediality of performance consists of the bodily co-presence of actors and 
spectators. Performance, then, requires two groups of people, one acting and the other 
observing, to gather at the same time and place for a given period of shared lifetime. Their 
encounter – interactive and confrontational – produces the event of the performance. (Fischer-
Lichte 2008, 38) 
 
 
From this elementary statement, a number of important issues emerge. Firstly, whilst 
electroacoustics ‘permits the broadcast of sounds in a continuous fashion and within an 
unlimited time frame’ (Minard 1996, 73), performance, as Fischer-Lichte makes clear, is 
always bound to a specific time. Secondly, whilst Neuhaus’ model would suggest that 
electroacoustic sound installation (such as Times Square) is able to continue regardless of 
human presence, the presence of the perceiver as well as that of the performer, is an essential 
condition for performance to occur. Constituted by an ‘interactive and confrontational’ 
encounter, performance is inherently and inescapably social, ‘generated and determined by 
a self-referential and ever-changing feedback loop’ (Fischer-Lichte 2008, 38) as perceivers 
react to performers, who react to perceivers’ reactions, and so on. The perceiver is 
fundamentally implicated in the performance’s becoming and thus, under certain conditions, 
their determining role can be made explicit. Thirdly, by virtue of the unique ephemerality of 
its event, ‘performance’, according to Fischer-Lichte, ‘is experienced as the completion, 
presentation, and passage of the present’ (ibid., 94): not as one continuous, perpetual, 
simultaneous present. Performance exists purely within the flow of duration; the parallels 
with sound are clear. Performance’s evanescence compels its participants to engage the 
dynamics of the here and now – performance brings one to place. 
 The proscenium-style configuration of the concert hall is designed to suppress context 
and with it the participation of perceivers, who are placed in an optimal position from which 
to grasp the artwork as single object of attention. The performance sound installation 
promotes a different idea. Musical performance is not necessarily the presentation of a 
specific narrative: beneath the visualist, separability structures of concert-hall experience, 
musical performance is social, contextual, involving, and dynamic, a medium well-suited to 
exploring ‘the complex, reflexive dynamics of space and place’ (Ouzounian 2006, 72). The 
bodily co-presence of performance always ‘implies the possibility of physical contact’, Fischer-
Lichte tells us (Fischer-Lichte 2008, 38). The demarcated structures of concert-hall experience 
rest upon a situational background of participants inhabiting a shared space, into which 
performers extend their bodies through sound towards others, who reflect back, or reverse 
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this energy in their reactions and so on. On the basic level of musical performance, 
performers, perceivers, and their environment are bound together in reciprocal, dynamic, 
social tactile contact. 
The performance sound installation is geared towards making this background focal. 
As it seeks to amplify the experiential quality of “being-there” inherent to the live musical 
performance, the performance sound installation critically operates on the terms of concert 
hall experience. According to Richard Glover, this could entail ‘extended performances in 
which there is no division between performance space and listening space, in which 
performers are scattered throughout the installation space, and audience members (and 
occasionally performers) are able to move around and within, and may enter or exit at any 
time’ (Glover and Harrison 2013, 29; my emphasis). As in other installation art, the single 
privileged vantage point is replaced by an indefinite number of individual, contingent, and 
shifting perspectives. With performers ‘scattered throughout the installation space’, the 
abstract spatial divisions of the proscenium configuration break down and the performance 
environment is opened up as a unified place for exploration. The ‘bodily co-presence’ 
(Fischer-Lichte 2008, 38) of performers and perceivers, inhabiting a shared space for a ‘given 
period of shared lifetime’ (ibid.), assumes pivotal significance. Each performer appears in a 
specific relation to the total situational context, and ‘able to move around and within’, rather 
than seated in a fixed and detached position, audience members assume the role of 
interactive participants contingently determining relations in their environment. The 
involvement of a mobile audience brings the feedback loop between performers and 
perceivers to the fore as an integral element of the art experience. The perceivers – exploring, 
moving, interacting, in contact with their environment and others – are directly implicated in 
the becoming of the artwork. 
As Glover notes, performance sound installations will often become over an extended 
period, expanding out beyond the usual limits of the musical object’s time-frame. This permits 
the perceiver to enter and exit and traverse the performance environment freely: to 
experience duration. Under such conditions, the elements of a singular narrative, that are 
taken in relation to the whole, are replaced by unique sound events whose relations are 
determined contingently by perceivers from their specific perspectives. Becoming over 
extended durations and obviating the single vantage point, the performance sound 
installation is able to create ‘space that is too big to comprehend [objectively]’, as Feldman 
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once said, leaving the perceiver ‘alone with sensation and time’ (Auping 2007, 144). 
Giorgio Agamben describes gesture as a “means without ends”, ‘the exhibition of a 
mediality’ (Agamben 2000, 57). Aiming to suspend or strip the presentation of a specific 
narrative away from performance, the performance sound installation might target 
Agamben’s “gesture” as its material basis, seeking to lay bare ‘the endurance and exhibition 
of the media character of corporeal movements’ (ibid., 57), to expose the body expressing its 
relations with its environment. As I’ll discuss, the installations devised for this project are 
rooted in this notion, aiming to reduce performance to what Fischer-Lichte identifies as its 
‘existential ground’ of ‘bodily being-in-the-world’ (Fischer-Lichte 2008, 147-8). 
Whilst electroacoustic technology permits the possibility of emitting sound 
continuously and reproducing sound to great degrees of accuracy, such results are far more 
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve through the actions of the human body. The performed 
sound stems from the specific corporeality of the performer and thus, like the performer, is 
always situated in a certain place and time. Owing to its contextual specificity and inescapably 
temporal nature, performance gives expression to the flux of place. As Jurg Frey writes, ‘time 
flows through the performer, and he not so much showcases his own presence as 
he articulates the presence of the overall space. He reacts with seismographic sensitivity to 
the slightest change’ (Frey 2004). In performance situations where the feedback loop is 
uninterrupted and given freedom to take its own course, the particular, momentary and 
chance circumstances of place are integrally woven into the becoming of the art event. ‘Self-
generating’ and ‘ever-changing’, it is the feedback loop, the interaction between performers 
and perceivers, that is, according to Fischer-Lichte, ‘responsible for making every 
performance unique and unrepeatable’ (Fischer-Lichte 2008, 51). Subverting the proscenium 
conditions, encouraging the participation of the perceiver, reducing performance to bodily 
being-in-the-world, and heightening context through the specificity of its unique sound 
events, the performance sound installation provides the conditions for an ‘autopoietic’ (ibid., 
41) feedback loop to come to the fore as the process that actuates the artwork. In 
performance sound installation, the autopoietic feedback loop replaces narrative – presence 
replaces presentness. And to make this perspicuous, the performance sound installation 
integrally incorporates the environment into the feedback loop. Bound together in dynamic 
interactivity, performer, perceiver, and the environment are all implicated in a unique 
performance of place.  
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Replacing narrative as an organisational principle, the feedback loop generates the 
specific materiality of the performance sound installation. For the perceiver attending to the 
performer in their ‘phenomenal being’ (ibid., 141), the instrument or the voice becomes an 
extension of their ‘sensual body’ (ibid., 78), a tool with which this body expresses itself and 
extends itself into its environment and towards others. Following Ihde’s description of sound 
as being at once directional and immersive (Ihde 2007, 77), this sounding sensual body 
extending itself into its environment both has a specific spatial relation to the perceiver, and 
surrounds the perceiver, who is situated at the centre of an omni-directional auditory field 
(ibid.). The perceiver is both witness to and situated inside the expressions of a living 
phenomenal body. But before it touches the perceiver’s eardrum, the sound sculpted and 
projected by the performer’s body is shaped and ‘charged by each interaction with the 
environment’ and thus it ‘[arrives] at the ear [as] the analogue of the current state of the 
environment’ (Barry Truax, quoted in LaBelle 2015, xii). It carries within it both the expression 
of a sensual body and the expression of the environment. The performer’s physical actions 
interrogate and vitalise the environment, act on it to induce its reciprocal responses, reveal 
its sounding personality, ‘articulate its presence’ (Frey 2004), make it live. The perceiver’s 
specific situated position within the environment entitles her to a unique auditory perspective 
that will shift according to her movements. The dynamic interplay between the performer’s 
physical actions – often determined in some way by the presence of the perceiver – and the 
conditions of the environment expressed through sound varies from one position in the 
performance space to another. The sound that one perceiver hears, say within close proximity 
to the performer, will be a different sound to that heard by another perceiver positioned 
further away. The sound that presents itself to perception is a totally unique quality of the 
perceiver’s specific situation. It is sculpted and projected by the performer’s body, charged 
by the environment, and determined by the perceiver, all of whom are performers of a unique 
becoming of place.  
Glover compares performance sound installation to ‘the experience of a living 
sculpture, where one registers that perception of the sculpture will change not only if one 
changes location, but also that the sculpture will continually reorder itself of its own accord’ 
(Glover and Harrison 2013, 34). The performance sound installation is a living art form that 
sculpts a specific materiality through the dynamic, contingent relations between perceivers, 
performers, and their environment, relations that are temporal as well as spatial. Through 
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the self-generating mechanism of the autopoietic feedback loop, the performance sound 
installation continually changes and evolves. The presence and participation of the perceiver 
constitutes the artwork: without the human encounter between the performer and the 
perceiver, without the perceiver determining relations in the space they co-inhabit, the 
performance sound installation would be something entirely different. Whilst Neuhaus 
envisaged the sound installation as a singular work that continues in the perceivers’ absence, 
the heterogeneous performance sound installation begins and ends with their interactive 
engagement, whatever form that may take.  
The performance sound installation targets the “theatre” and duration that the work-
concept was introduced to overcome, the Dionysian that was superseded by the Apollonian. 
By bringing the aesthetic of installation art to bear upon the structures of musical experience 
it endeavours to make focal the presence, physicality, and place are its always presupposed 
ground. Performance sound installation is an aesthetic event that occurs in the world and not 
in the mind; by returning musical experience to the situated dynamic interactivity of the 
touching / touched body, it aims to activate the open potential of expanded musical form.  
This describes the operations of sound installation generally. Bridging the 
electroacoustic sound installation with musical performance in a touch-like way, the 
performance sound installation makes this explicit, revealing sound installation to be not a 
break with a musical past, but a background made focal, not a discrete practice, but a 
continuity between music and sculpture (and other areas) that expands their terms, that 
opens up the expanded field in which they are co-situated. Critiquing the natural sign of 
Neuhaus’ permanent electroacoustic entity with its medium substitution, the performance 
sound installation emphatically highlights sound installation’s lived, physical event in time. 
Existing as an evanescent occurrence, becoming purely within the flow of duration, comprised 
of the dynamic interactivity between human agents and their environment, all implicated 
within a unique performance of place, the performance sound installation makes both the 
productivity of the perceiver and music’s expanded potentiality perspicuous. The two are 
inseparable and both are hindered by Neuhaus’ terms. Critically operating on these terms, 
the performance sound installation makes the argument that sound installation is not a 
determinate, autonomous object – presented and received via institutionally prescribed 
medial means – but an open-ended experiential event that has every potential to be music. 
The following commentaries on the performance sound installations of this project elaborate 
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on this critical operation in further depth. Moreover, they describe the iterative intertwining 
of practical and theoretical work that generated this research, the significance of which, with 
respect to the wider argument posited here, will be explained in the subsequent conclusion.  
 
 
The Bunker … String Quartet: Wednesday 6th August 2014  
 
The Bunker is a largely untouched, underground World War II air-raid shelter situated in the 
heart of Dalston, East London. The space, with a total area of roughly 350 square metres, is 
divided up into nine interconnecting chambers, each a different size and shape. The walls, 
floor, and ceilings are all made of thick concrete, crumbling in places and perennially 
waterlogged, marked by decades of decay. The air that fills the Bunker’s irregular spatial 
volumes is dank and heavy with moisture, and with no natural light other than that which 
floods in from the entrance (but barely reaches the bottom of the stairs), this mysterious, 
subterranean, labyrinthine environment has something of a tomblike character. Upon 
descending into the dark depths of the Bunker, one is forced to rely on other senses as the 
eye takes its time to adjust. A complex of indeterminate, ambiguous, enigmatic surfaces, 
passages, and openings gradually forms around the body, continually changing and evolving 
as the body strives for greater determination, strives to achieve a better hold on its strange 
and unfamiliar surroundings. To enter the Bunker is to become an exploring bodily being-in-
the-world, probing, unfurling, moulding ‘the actual plastic reality’ through temporally-
extended movement, contact, and interaction. The experience of the Bunker is felt explicitly 
as an event of inhabitation; from the first step that descends into it, to the last that rises out 
of it, one performs a unique, durational becoming of a place-world which is dynamic, 
enveloping, and full of secrets.  
 
The impassioned inhabitant digs and re-digs, making its very depth active. The fact is not enough, 
the dream is at work. When it comes to excavated ground, dreams have no limit. (Bachelard 1994, 
18) 
 
 I first encountered the Bunker in December 2013, when, with fellow members of the 
“re:sound” collective, I staged a programme of electronic music within it. In the course of 
executing the event, I became aware of this environment’s extraordinary acoustic properties. 
My collaborators and I found that even the quietest sounds carry right through the Bunker, 
mutating in peculiar ways as they ricochet off the highly reflective concrete surfaces and 
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diffract around obstacles and through numerous apertures. Every chamber speaks in a unique 
way: some have huge reverberation times where sounds hang in the thick air before they are 
eventually subsumed into the walls; others produce clear, discrete echoes; some amplify 
sounds; some distort sounds; each has a distinct, cavernous resonance. Sounds change 
markedly for perceivers depending upon their position in the Bunker. For example, a 
continuous, sustained singing bowl hum produced by a collaborator of mine who remained 
stationary at a single point was transformed entirely (from a rich, immersive radiance; to a 
hazy, mysterious murmur; to a thin, decrepit whistle; to a rebounding, dynamic energy; etc.) 
as I moved from chamber to chamber. And correlatively, the single bowl hum also changed 
dramatically as I stood still whilst my collaborator, producing the sound, walked around. The 
Bunker charges sounds with strong spatial signatures; however, it is often difficult to locate 
the precise spatial coordinates of a sound source objectively. In the Bunker, sounds exist in a 
relational, phenomenal space: the pre-objective space of place.  
Although these acoustic properties caused considerable consternation in December 
2013 as we naively attempted to demarcate different chambers for different (simultaneous) 
performances, I was determined to return to work with them directly. Over the months that 
followed, I conducted numerous experiments in the Bunker, testing how its different areas 
responded to countless different sounds and combinations of sounds, and the state in which 
these sounds would arrive at the ear from myriad perspectival positions. It was in and through 
these experiments in the Bunker, in early to mid 2014, that the topic of this research project, 
and its strategy of unifying compositional practice and scholarship in the one goal of 
supporting an attitude of music as experience emerged.  
By the time that I started this project in July 2014, I had a wealth of records (both 
written and aural) from my experimentations to draw upon as I set about devising a piece 
that would harness the Bunker’s acoustic properties, its environmental conditions, as musical 
material. It was my intent to set up a situation in which the perceiver would produce her own, 
contingent musical form through her dynamic explorations of the Bunker, to bring musical 
experience to bear directly upon the durational becoming of this mysterious place-world. 
Having discovered that adding sound into the Bunker opens up new dimensions of its place-
world, I wanted to make this active, performative, reciprocal production of place explicit 
through the agency of the physical, bodily actions of situated, human instrumental 
performers. It was my aim to implicate the perceiver within a collective performance of place: 
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a unique event in time wherein instrumental performers would act directly on the Bunker by 
physically projecting sound at its surfaces and into its hollows; the Bunker would perform 
reciprocally by revealing its conditions, expressing its specific properties in its acoustic 
responses; and the perceiver, engaged in dynamic interaction with both, would perform a 
living musical form, bound to her sensorimotor activity and defined in relation to a 
background of other possible bodily perspectives, by determining relations between, and 
modulating a flux of environmental phenomena.  
Concerned with expanding the terms of musical experience, I sought to engender a 
continuity between this performative experience of place and the musical past. And in 
something of a play upon its traditional intimacy, upon its traditional introspective enclosure, 
I turned to the string quartet, but with two ‘cellos (rather than two violins) to emphasise the 
low end of the soundworld – to root it within the bellows of the environment. There were a 
number of reasons behind my decision to use a string quartet. I had experimented in the 
Bunker with a ‘cello and a violin and found ways of bringing out some fascinating distortions, 
diffractions, and beating patterns. I discovered that string sounds seem to cast a sinuous trail 
through the Bunker, whilst simultaneously illuminating its hidden cavities. I noticed how the 
qualities of string sounds vary considerably as one changes position relative to their source, 
and that they have capacity to both announce clear spatial signatures and to blend 
amorphously into the environment. Beyond the evidence of my experimentations, the string 
quartet offered a suitable degree of self-similarly, of timbral homogeneity that could serve as 
a “constant” against which “experienced variables” could be related. In addition to this, the 
physicality of string performance is visually, hapticly, proprioceptively, as well as aurally 
engaging, emphasising the performer’s actions as situated, bodily expression. I saw string 
performance as a clear means of highlighting an interrogation and vitalisation of the 
environment, and of maximising the potential for perceivers to develop a sympathetic 
sensorimotor involvement as their bodies meet the performers’ bodies in the dynamic 
becoming of place. And by taking the cultural object of the string quartet – one of the work-
concept’s most centrally valued institutions – out of the proscenium conditions of the concert 
hall and into the dank, dark depths of the Bunker, I hoped to raise questions of how these 
objects appear in terms of a situated context. By situating the string quartet in place, I wanted 
to facilitate the dissolution of its objecthood, to make focal the performative presence of 
touch-like bodily being-in-the-world that is its always presupposed background.  
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During the performance of The Bunker … String Quartet, which took place in the 
evening of Wednesday 6th August 2014, the audience were free to experience, explore, and 
enter/exit the Bunker on their own terms. The four players were positioned at specific points 
in the Bunker environment that were chosen on the basis of my earlier experimentations, and 
slightly adjusted after further experiments with the players a few days prior to the 
performance event. Each player interpreted the same set of instructions (see score) 
independently of one another. They were instructed to perform an ongoing sequence of 
sounds (either monads, dyads, or triads) pitched within the range of F quarter-sharp to A 
quarter-flat (in any octave) in alternation with silence, and for the durations of both sounds 
and silences to continually contract (towards as short as possible, i.e., tremolo) and then 
expand (towards very long, i.e., one minute plus) and then contract again, and so on, in their 
own time for the length of the performance. All performers operated within the same 
parameters, and the installation comprised four self-similar performances occurring 
simultaneously in different areas, overlapping with one another in space and time – i.e., place 
– in unpredictable ways. The duration of the installation is unspecified – each performer is 
instructed to finish when they choose – though prior to its realisation on the 6th August, which 
was part of a larger event, the performers collectively decided on a duration of approximately 
forty minutes. 
 I designed the contracting – expanding process of The Bunker … String Quartet with a 
view to its being clearly apprehensible as a single gestalt that, in the manner of Tenney and 
Glover’s work, would function as simple framework for production. This ideal constant, never 
literally experienced, was intended to foreground the phenomenal dynamics of place. With 
the self-similarly of the installation’s construction – its framework that consisted of a single 
gestalt, a background for myriad overlapping variations articulated throughout space and 
time, and the basic timbral uniformity of string quartet, another background for experienced 
variables – I wanted to highlight the physical expressivity and presence of the performing 
instrumentalists – who were given freedom to act in the here and now, to iteratively respond 
to the evolving conditions of place, by the ad libitum nature of the instructions – of the 
performing Bunker, and of the performing perceivers within the sonic flux. I wanted to make 
focal the interconnection / intertwining of bodies and their environment: the sounds are 
sculpted in the body, charged by the environment, and determined by the embodied 
perceiver. The restricted harmonic content, often densely microtonal, was also geared 
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towards bringing out the performative contingencies of physical, phenomenal presence, 
drawing focus towards the specific materiality of a real-world, living form (as opposed to 
some abstract, autonomous harmonic construction), and to activate the unusual beating 
patterns that varied and shifted as one moved about the Bunker. Furthermore, the Bunker’s 
heterogenous resonance, different in every chamber, seems to centre upon something like a 
very low G. Taking G as the centre of its small pitch spectrum (in every octave), the installation 
was designed to be tuned into, integrated into the environment – devised to draw out the 
expressions of its innate acoustic character.  
 Influenced by the thought and art of Robert Irwin and Olafur Eliasson, as I conceived 
The Bunker … String Quartet I aimed to replace the single object of attention with the event 
of inhabitation, or YES. Taking aim at Neuhaus’ notion of an “permanently entity” that in its 
‘out of time’ condition is categorically distinct from music, I turned to the medium of 
performance to make focal sound installation’s nature as a durational performance of place: 
to make focal sound installation’s nature as a making-focal of music’s background presence 
of dynamic bodily being-in-the-world. Lasting for as long as each performer (as an 
instrumentalist, as a perceiver, as an environment) performed, The Bunker … String Quartet 
was a heterogeneity of unique, ephemeral performances that, in its totality, existed as a 
unique, ephemeral event in time, never to be repeated. Situated in the durational flux of 
place, opening up questions of how music becomes in context as a unique, living, physical 
event of performative presence, The Bunker … String Quartet served the same purpose as this 
thesis: to support and define the expanded musical form of the attitude of music as 
experience. It initiated this integrated research project and established its terms, enabling me 
to identify the specific concerns that, through practice and theory, I have developed over the 
past four years.  
The installation is documented by a video taken by one audience member on her 
iPhone that captures something of her performance. Although the audiovisual quality of the 
video is fairly poor, and it does not accurately convey the event’s phenomenal dynamic, I 
believe that this is an honest way of referring to an artwork that was never intended to be a 
thing – an out of time abstraction – but an experience. This audience member’s decision to 
film her experience was obviously part of her experience, and it seems appropriate that this 
video (that persists as part of her experience) should be the only remaining trace of the 
installation event. Abstracted from place and from the background of other possible bodily 
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perspectives, it is important to stress, however, that this is not the expanded musical form of 
The Bunker … String Quartet, but an objective representation of it that flattens out its 
dimensions. It serves to demonstrate that music’s objecthood is a function of its contextual 
divorce, of presence transformed into presentness.  
 
 
Kai’bur for Shoreditch Church: Saturday 18th April 2015  
 
With Kai’bur, I endeavoured to inject the principles of installation art into the musical work in 
a more explicit way than with The Bunker … String Quartet. Unlike the previous work, Kai’bur 
was fully scored, of determinate duration, and conceived for the experience of an audience 
that would remain seated in the same, forward-facing position throughout. Kai’bur was an 
exploration of how to apply the core pillars of presence, physicality, and place, of dynamic 
bodily interactivity with an environment, that underpin this model of expanded musical form 
to a static, or ostensibly static, experiential situation. It was my aim to make focal the touch-
like bodily being-in-the-world that is the always presupposed background of proscenium-
structured, concert-hall experience, and, correlatively, to dissolve the objecthood of the 
musical work by highlighting its contextual becoming.  
  Seeking to attend to the socio-cultural complexities of the church environment and 
to find ways of emphasising the listener’s bodily presence, I decided to play upon the sense 
of communion, the sense of sharing a space, an experience, and a situation with others that 
this place functions to stage. As the spatial plan in the performance directions (see score) 
shows, the audience were seated on the front few pews on the right-hand side of the church, 
tightly packed together. For the performance of the work, there were over 90 audience 
members intimately, and fairly claustrophobically, squeezed into the front five pews 
shoulder-to-shoulder. I wanted to subvert the detached, insular, visualist listening space of 
the proscenium, to heighten perceivers’ awareness of their own body, of their intercorporeal 
relations with others, of their presence within a specific environment, their direct 
involvement in a contextual, social, experiential event.  
 Sitting amongst the audience, four female vocalists and one percussionist were 
scattered unevenly in a way that ensured that no audience member was further than about 
half a metre away from at least one performer. Performers had invaded the listening space 
and its boundaries had been dissolved. Surrounding the audience in all directions and 
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extending further and further out into the large Victorian church on both the ground floor 
and the gallery above, other performers and loudspeakers were positioned at increasing 
distances (ever further apart), located at specific points to vitalise this vast, static spatial 
volume and activate its performative potentiality. The distribution of the performers and 
loudspeakers, which occasionally projected, without any other treatment or manipulation, 
the sounds produced by the performers who were situated around the audience, was 
designed to create a continuity, from very dense to very sparse, between the central, 
claustrophobic listening space and the total, expansive church space beyond. The visualist 
paradigm of the detached spectator contemplating an external, remote, fully spread out 
spectacle was replaced by the paradigm of the touching / touched body, in and of its 
surroundings, reaching out into its environment, determining the content of its experience 
through dynamic interaction and contact.  
Perceivers were situated inside the nucleus of the performance, sitting next to 
performers, able to see the parts that they were playing from and the stopwatches that they 
were following. The mechanics of the performance were fully on show, its bare bones were 
flaunted, and it unfolded around the listener like a piece of theatre that emphasised the here 
and now. With nothing hidden, anything and everything could potentially become part of this 
theatre. During the performance, I was sat amongst the audience and my whole environment 
became ionised. The squeaking of the pews, the rustling of pages turns, the coughs and 
shuffles of the audience, the sounds of traffic from outside the church, the flickering 
candlelight, the dance of shadows, the movements of my neighbours’ bodies against mine, 
all assumed huge significance. Having dismantled the demarcation of the proscenium, Kai’bur 
activated the open potential of expanded musical form.  
Physical phenomena of distance and proximity were central to Kai’bur’s becoming. 
The work is structured as a continual breathing in and out, alternately contracting in towards 
the central audience and then expanding out into the church via the omnidirectional 
continuity between the (very dense) listening space and the (very sparse) outer church space. 
The breathing in and out structure of the work was intended to draw perception in towards 
the body and out towards the environment, one extending into the other, in constant 
alternation. This structural backbone manifested in two principal ways. At certain times, 
sounds breathed in and out together as a single mass, dramatising the perceiver’s situation 
by intensifying the claustrophobic closeness of the listening space and then relieving this by 
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taking perception out into the open expanse of the broader church space – the passage 
between 20:10 and 22:40 in the recording, or between pp. 36 – 41 in the score, is a clear 
example of this. At other times, tangled webs of individually self-similar sounds emerged, 
webs of different sounds that were differently passed from performer to performer, from 
performer to loudspeaker, and from loudspeaker to loudspeaker, moving towards and away 
from the listener at different rates – listen to 6:50 – 7:40 of the recording, or see pp. 11 – 13 
of the score, for an instance of this. These tangled moments were intended to open up as 
fields of contingency within Kai’bur, moments of complexity and equivocality where 
perceivers were given options to follow different paths, to explore different areas, and to 
discover different sounds that were hidden within the overall texture. The structural 
breathing in and out, alternations between density and sparsity, also manifested in the rates 
of activity through time. In a similar manner to the gestalt process of The Bunker … String 
Quartet, dense passages of loud, short sonic events, of claustrophobically frenetic activity, 
gradually expanded out into sparse passages of quieter, sustained sonic events and silences 
which opened onto the wider environment. These sparse passages would then contract, and 
so on. Kai’bur was an event of breathing the environment into the body and breathing the 
body out into the environment, an event of the reciprocal intertwining of touch-like bodily 
being-in-the-world.  
The projection of the performer’s sounds through the eight loudspeakers was 
intended to enhance the breathing in and out structure of the piece, to foreground 
phenomena of distance and proximity, to harness perspectival shifts by repositioning 
performers’ presence in relation to the listener, and to play upon performers’ and listeners’ 
situatedness in the space. To realise this, I pre-programmed the sound projection in a Logic 
file that sends signals from the microphones (positioned in front the three ‘cellists and three 
outer vocalists) to the speakers in real time. Owing to a series of technical glitches, however, 
the sound projection did not achieve the full effect that I desired, and the performance lacked 
a considerable degree of the piece’s intended dimensionality.   
With Kai’bur, I attempted to tie phenomenal qualities of distance and proximity to an 
intercorporeal bond between performer and perceiver. It was my aim to open up possibilities 
for perceivers to relativise the space, to perform place, by projecting their own (sympathetic) 
proprioceptive feelings/intentions into the church environment in response to the situated 
physical actions of the performers. The material given to the performers was conceived as a 
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series of ephemeral events where (overtly) physical actions interrogate and vitalise the space 
in a particular way. For example, 1:15 to c.a. 6 minutes is dominated by short sound events 
that crescendo exponentially from al niente to as loud as possible, opening up different 
pockets of the space (from very close to the listener to very far away) as they emerge out of 
nothing, end before they can be fully apprehended, and activate the resonance of the space 
which lingers as the only remaining vestige of the event. The notation is prescriptive rather 
than descriptive, directing performance actions rather than indicating determinate sound 
objects. And the performers follow stopwatches, rather than adhering to a metre, which 
permitted a considerable degree of flexibility and an absence of any sense of quantisation. I 
wanted to draw attention to sound’s physical production in the here and now, to highlight 
the performance’s ‘existential ground’ of bodily being-in-the-world, to implicate the perceiver 
within a unique performance of place.  
Kai’bur is driven by timbre and aims to explicitly communicate, visually as well as 
aurally, the energy, movement, breath, touch, strain and gesture involved in human 
production of sound. My choices of performance actions and instrumental forces were made 
with considerations of the conditions of the church environment and how these could be set 
into relief by the performer’s bodily expressivity. Like most churches, the objective of 
supporting and enriching vocal sounds is deeply woven into the acoustic architecture of 
Shoreditch Church. As such, I decided to use seven female vocalists to draw out its innate 
qualities. The vocal parts were dominated by breath sounds ranging from short, sharp 
exhalations, to very long exhalations that forced performers to expel every last trace of breath 
from their bodies. They also included single pitches, sung and whistled, sustained for extreme 
durations, and descending glissandi, or “tumbling strains”, from the highest pitch that the 
performer is able to sing. I chose to use three ‘cellists for the visually engaging nature of ‘cello 
performance and its capacity make the whole church environment hum with its energy. The 
‘cellists dug into their strings with violent, echoing bow attacks, sustained extremely long 
sounds with a single bowing, and executed extended passages of irregular tremolo, 
performed as fast as possible and using the full lengths of their bows. At certain points in the 
performance, they wore seed-pod bracelet shakers on their bowing wrists that loudly 
accentuated their rapid arm movements. During these passages, the ‘cellists projected a 
chorus of erratic, sharp, high frequency sounds that bounced around the walls and contrasted 
with the deep, heavy, mass of their low tremolos that suffused the space. This percussive 
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colouration of the ‘cellists’ tremolos aurally matched the sounds produced by the 
percussionists as they forcefully ground two rocks together. And the ‘cellist’s rapid arm 
movements were mimicked further by the percussionists as they executed their tremolos 
inside the singing bowls, which rang throughout church. 
Such mimicry was a central feature of Kai’bur’s becoming. Aural qualities and means 
of physically expressing sounds, gestures, were passed around the ensemble throughout. 
Actions were picked up, taken forward, varied in different ways, presented at different 
distances from the perceiver, and this drove the dynamic development of the performance 
event. In its structural self-similarity, Kai’bur permitted the phenomenal, the spatial 
signatures, the resonance of the church, and the sympathetic proprioceptive feeling to come 
to the fore. As in The Bunker…String Quartet, the specific materiality of a performance of 
place was emphasised by a tightly restricted harmonic content. For much of its duration, 
Kai’bur was rooted in the single pitch centre of E, emphasised by drones, pedals and sustained 
pitches, before it blossomed into a web of glissandi towards the end. 
During the performance of Kai’bur, I experienced myself as a touching body, unified 
with other bodies in one aggregate touching body, dancing in its space, performing place, 
breathing in and breathing out, drawing its environment into itself, and extending itself out 
into its environment. I felt like an integral, active constituent of a situational event that 
unfolded with me, in me, and through me. I found that my position at the centre of a dynamic 
field of qualities, that continually contracted in towards my body and then ballooned out in 
to my environment, from dense and close to sparse and expansive, tied my perception to my 
body, to my relations with others, and to my connection with my surroundings. I was not a 
detached observer of an autonomous object, but a performer of a unique event of place. 
 Kai’bur resided in the overlap of music and installation. It was an output of this 
research project that was expressly focussed upon demonstrating the continuity between the 
musical work and expanded musical form; through compositional practice, I endeavoured to 
cast the borders of the work-concept as fully permeable in the expanded field. By operating 
on music’s cultural terms, critiquing the conceptual, ideological, and institutional structures 
of concert-hall listening and the natural sign of the self-sufficient musical work, Kai’bur made 
the productivity of the perceiver perspicuous. It did not break with the musical past, but made 
its background focal. It pointed to the event that happens in the world and not in the mind, 
the physical, living form beneath posited ideal object, which, even when ostensibly static and 
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detached, the perceiver generates in and through her dynamic bodily interactivity, 
movement, and contact. Kai’bur suggested that any musical work might be capable of 
supporting the becoming of expanded musical form provided that it is met in a perceptual 
attitude that assumes no distance from the perceived, an attitude of music as experience that 
attends to presence, physicality, and place.  
 
 
The Bunker / Forest … Steel Sheet / Bullroarer: Sunday 1st May 2016 
 
Over the month or so that followed the performance of Kai’bur, my view of the work, 
undoubtedly coloured by my repeated encounters with the recording, changed considerably. 
I became increasingly dissatisfied with what I considered to be its overtly expressive nature, 
its abundance of self-sufficient internal detail, its reliance upon musical tropes of the late 
twentieth century (I came to hear it as almost quoting Nono in a deeply unsatisfactory way), 
its marked goal-directed narrative, and its failure to fully direct musical experience out 
towards the dynamics of place, all of which, I believed, amounted to an espousal, not a 
dissolution, of musical objecthood. With hindsight, I recognise this judgement as somewhat 
unfair. I overlooked the critical point that the recording is not the artwork itself, but a 
representation, an objectification, of it, an abstraction divorced from the flux of place that 
flattens out the dimensions of the performance event: a fully present, fully determinate thing-
in-itself that does not open onto a horizon of other possible perspectives, is not expanded 
musical form. But as it happened, motivated by dissatisfaction, I returned to the Bunker to 
begin a new project in an effort to resolve the problems that I had identified in Kai’bur.  
 The first step towards resolving these problems, I decided, was to pare the basic 
components of the new installation project down to an absolute minimum. Whilst the self-
similarity of performing forces in Kai’bur – seven female singers, three ‘cellists, three 
percussionists, and eight loudspeakers – arranged around the audience at various physical 
distances and proximities had foregrounded the phenomenal qualities of the situation, this 
was obfuscated, I believed, by their combination and by the considerable diversity of their 
materials. I looked back to the earlier Bunker installation, where I thought I had found in the 
string quartet a suitably reduced palette. But now I saw in my design for this installation, and 
heard in the video recording, a conception that (in its ad libitum freedoms, idiomatic process, 
and application of a conventional instrumental grouping) allowed for an expanse of detail and 
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the articulation of familiar rhetorical devices that distracted from the physical phenomenal 
flux. For the new installation, I decided to opt for unconventional instrumental means with a 
far more limited expressive potential. The steel sheet, with which I had previously tested the 
Bunker’s acoustic responses to great effect, fulfilled these criteria. But the steel sheet alone 
seemed insufficient. Without wishing to compromise the aim of minimal internal relations, I 
needed one more instrumental force that would fulfil the above criteria and that would 
effectively activate the Bunker’s performative potential. When I visited the Bunker with a 
bullroarer – an ancient ritual instrument used since the Neolithic to invoke, awaken the 
hidden energies of nature – the choice was made.  
 To overcome what I had identified as the problem of Kai’bur’s goal-directed narrative, 
which drew the perceiver along a specific developmental trajectory, I reverted to the format 
of a mobile audience, free to explore and enter / exist the installation environment on their 
own terms, and considerably expanded the duration of the total installation event. If the time-
frame of Kai’bur’s twenty-five-minute duration could function to demarcate a differentiated 
musical object, the new work had to have a time-frame ‘that is too big to comprehend’ 
(Feldman, in Auping 2007, 144): a time-frame that would not be graspable as a figure on a 
ground, and that would give definition to the unique duration of each perceiver’s experience. 
I wanted the experience of each perceiver, and each of the different experiences that 
perceivers would have as they entered that Bunker at different times, to be clearly 
apprehensible as a unique musical form. And whilst, on the one hand, the limited scope of 
possibilities afforded by steel sheets and bullroarers was a positive attribute, providing a 
background that would, in itself, quickly become uninteresting were it not for the contingent 
environmental acoustic phenomena and perspectival shifts that it foregrounded, on the other 
this presented the problem of how to ensure that there was sufficient change throughout, so 
that each experience would be recognisably different. To insure continuous change, I resorted 
to mapping out the work. 
 Unhappy with the extent to which Kai’bur implicated environmental experience 
within the production of musical form – believing this to be overshadowed by the expressivity 
of performer physicality, not activated by it – I was intent on explicitly focussing place with 
the new work. In addition to the live performance of steel sheets and bullroarers, I decided 
to include recorded sound within the installation’s design. The idea was to project a different 
environment into the Bunker so as accentuate place in their collision. I wanted the sound 
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projection to act on the Bunker environment, to throw its conditions into relief, to perform 
the becoming of its place-world. For this to be effective, it was necessary to project a highly 
contrasting environment, and I chose a wild forest in Buckinghamshire. Over the next six 
months or so, I made countless field recordings in this forest in varying conditions. I also made 
field recordings in the Bunker. And as well as recordings of these two environments’ ambient 
sound, I made recordings of steel sheet and bullroarer sounds in both. Continuing the focus 
on distance and proximity that had featured in the earlier installations, I recorded the steel 
sheets and the bullroarers at a range of different distances – from as close as possible to very 
far – in both environments. After months of recording, I had a vast catalogue of recorded 
material with which to construct a kaleidoscopic meta-spacetime that cut in-and-out and 
swirled around the time and place of the installation’s event, creating a dialectic intended to 
highlight the here and now, expand the dimensions of place, and draw attention to the 
situated corporeality of the performance. The metaphysical / real-world dialectic was a play 
upon presentness / presence relations, specifically the juxtapositional procedure that the 
Beethoven scholarship has identified in the late works (see Chapter One). Here, however, the 
metaphysical was not a single object of attention, but one of the terms of an expanded 
performance of place. It was also an investigation of the natural sign of the electroacoustic 
permanent entity, and how this might be shattered in its relations with instrumental 
performers, its implication within a living sculpture, within an ephemeral, autopoietic 
feedback loop.  
 The Bunker / Forest … Steel Sheet / Bullroarer comprised five steel sheet performers, 
five bullroarer performers, and six loudspeakers that projected the collage of recorded 
fragments. Through numerous experiments in the Bunker, I chose specific locations for each 
performer and each loudspeaker. Having devised the spatial plan, I mapped out every sonic 
event (with the exception of those that fall within a number of ad libitum passages) for the 
full two-and-a-half-hour duration of the installation. As mentioned, the primary aim was to 
ensure continuous change, to ensure that the installation would be different for every 
perceiver who entered. I made a broad plan of forty-three different phases, each a different 
idea or combination of ideas, a different (roughly specified) length, a different amalgamation 
of the installation’s components, a different spatiotemporal expression. In an effort to 
preclude the construction of a grand narrative design, I detailed each phase on a separate 
sheet of paper, shuffled these multiple times, and laid them face down in a draw. When it 
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came to mapping out the installation in detail, I worked through each of the randomly ordered 
phases in turn, plotting each event in time in a fairly intuitive way within the specified 
parameters. I felt that through this process I was engendering a continuity between music 
and sculpture, between designing an ephemeral flux and fashioning a physical, material 
presence, the two of which would meet in place. The plan that I constructed is not a score of 
the work itself, but framework for its contingent production. It does not ‘indicate’ or 
‘instantiate’ (Levinson 1980) a sound structure; it guides actions. With the construction of the 
plan for this situational event, I wanted to realise the function of the score in the expanded 
field.  
  The performer material indicated is not descriptive but prescriptive, and it is intended 
to permit considerable scope for spontaneous expression and response. Directing 
performance acts (such as HARD HIT or FAST for 10 seconds) rather than a desired sounding 
result, the framework fosters the production of a live sound matter that is contingent and 
unstable. I wanted to free up the performers’ presence – their direct involvement in a real-
world situation, their dynamic interactivity with the environment and others – as much as 
possible, and I decided that it was necessary to obviate the barrier that reading from parts on 
music stands imposes – a barrier that did not obtain in The Bunker … String Quartet, but did 
in Kai’bur. As an alternative, I transposed each of the performer’s parts indicated in the plan 
into an aural score – a recording of me counting down each event and, where applicable, the 
dynamic gradations, other variations and endings of each event – which they listened to 
through headphones. All of the aural scores, which included a two-minute interval for 
performers to assume their positions, were synchronised at the start of the performance.  
 The plan indicates the types of recorded material (occasionally specifying exact pieces 
of recorded material) that were to be projected through each of the six loudspeakers 
throughout. It includes directions for dynamic gradations of material, how the projection of 
material through different speakers should be aligned, and how material should be panned 
between speakers – the ambient environmental recordings of the forest tended to include 
the sounds of planes, which were panned across the Bunker space, often overlapping in a 
web-like configuration, blurring with the hum of the bullroarers in a complex way. Following 
the plan’s specifications, I pieced together the collage of recorded material in a Logic file, 
which fed (via an audio interface) into the six distributed loudspeakers during the 
performance, synchronised with the performers’ aural scores at the beginning.  
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 Preparing the Bunker for the installation was challenging, to say the least – as noted 
previously, it is an uncompromising environment: dark, wet, and decaying. The first stage was 
to hang the large (and heavy) steel sheets – measuring 2.5 metres x 1.5 metres – in the precise 
locations indicated in the spatial plan. Perilously balanced on the top of ladders, friends and I 
drilled into the thick concrete beams that support the Bunker’s (concrete) ceilings to install 
secure hooks from which the steel sheets could be suspended. We did this a few weeks prior 
to the installation event to allow the sheets time to rust, to integrate into the Bunker 
environment, to take on its properties. The suspended sheets had a powerful sculptural 
presence which transformed the Bunker’s space. The next stage, executed the day before the 
installation event, was to set up the speakers and sound projection. This also presented 
considerable difficulties. There were only three power outlets in the Bunker, so it was 
necessary to run a complex of power cabling, as well as audio cabling, across the ceilings of 
the different chambers and passages.  
 Having overcome these challenges, on the day of the installation everything went 
more or less according to plan. Despite being regulated to some extent by the framework of 
the score, The Bunker/Forest … Steel Sheet/Bullroarer became as a unique performance of 
place comprised of the dynamic interactivity between the performing instrumentalists, the 
performing loudspeakers, the performing Bunker and Forest, and the performing perceivers. 
For the performance, the Bunker was lit with the small flames of hundreds of candles, which 
set the space in motion, transformed space into place, with a low-level, enveloping, dynamic 
of light and shadow. On the steel sheets and with the bullroarers – chosen to exhibit the pure 
media character of corporeal expression, to bring out the innate acoustic qualities of the 
Bunker, and to permit a great degree of aural variety from different perspectival vantage 
points – the performers acted out their physicality, extending their bodies into their 
environment. Both producing sounds that are at once strongly directional and immersive, the 
mercurial relationships between the thunderous attacks and rich decays of the steel sheets 
that echoed through the space, and the shadowy, otherworldly hum of the bullroarers that 
became increasingly agitated and propeller-like as one moved closer and heard the activation 
of the air, highlighted the flux of place. The speakers augmented the play of this interaction / 
intertwining, at times magnifying performance actions to consume the whole environment, 
at others displacing them in some remote, distant space, positioning and repositioning sounds 
to transform the Bunker into an intensive, multi-dimensional, dynamic plenum of 
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phenomena. The Bunker responded to these interventions in strange and unpredictable 
ways, reflecting, absorbing, distorting, amplifying, sustaining sounds in a wild flow of 
expressivity. When perceivers descended into the Bunker, they entered into the place-world, 
becoming exploring, moving, interacting bodies physically in touch with their surroundings. 
As they engaged with a multi-sensory, immersive dynamic of phenomena, they moulded the 
‘actual plastic reality’ of their environment, producing a unique, durational form that 
unfolded in and through their sensorimotor activity. The content of their experience was 
determined by what they did, by their contingent movements about the Bunker, by their 
probing of its conditions, by their interactions with other performers: their experience was a 
performance of presence.  
As one of the bullroarer players, I was acutely aware of, and unavoidably responsive 
to the presence of those around me, and other performers reported similar experiences. The 
audience unquestionably affected the becoming of the artwork. I also found myself directly 
interacting with the resonance of my concrete chamber, learning different tricks and refining 
my ability to make it speak as the installation progressed. After the performance, audience 
members remarked on their various encounters with the performers, on how different their 
experiences were each time they descended into the Bunker, how different the steel sheet, 
bullroarer, and recorded sounds were in each chamber, and how the sounding substance of 
the installation warped and changed as they moved through the space. The Bunker / Forest 
… Steel Sheet / Bullroarer bound its participants together in a unique interaction, immanent 
and becoming. It was an ephemeral heterogeneity of lived events of expanded musical form, 
a living sculpture that existed purely in the flow of duration. In the place-world of the Bunker, 
music and installation, architecture, theatre and performance art, converged. It was an 
opening on to the expanded field of the touching body that has no respect for boundaries.  
Like the other installations of this project, The Bunker / Forest … Steel Sheet / 
Bullroarer defied accurate documentation. I made an audio recording of the installation in 
full, but this can do nothing more than give a vague impression of its soundworld. And 
developing the documentation strategy of The Bunker … String Quartet, I collated video 
footage taken by multiple audience members into a short video, which is intended to reflect 
The Bunker / Forest … Steel Sheet / Bullroarer’s nature as a heterogeneity of different 
performance events, a heterogeneity of different dynamic perspectives. Neither of these 
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pieces of documentation are the artwork itself. They are an objective representation of it. The 
Bunker / Forest … Steel Sheet / Bullroarer was not a thing, but an experience.  
 
 
Copeland Park … Trombones: Saturday 1st October 2016  
 
Having said that, in the aftermath of The Bunker / Forest … Steel Sheet / Bullroarer I reflected 
on the possibility that some perceivers may indeed have posited the work as a thing. Is it 
possible that The Bunker / Forest … Steel Sheet / Bullroarer presented itself to certain 
perceivers as a spectacle, fully spread out before them? Could its continuity, which I had 
intended as continuous change, have been interpreted by some as a continuous presentness? 
The answer to these questions (and similar questions that I considered) was yes, I decided. 
Expanded musical form is not something that a composer can create. It is a function of 
perceptual attitude, and the best that a composer can do with respect to its becoming is to 
support an attitude under which it is produced. Satisfied with the extent to which presence, 
physicality, and place had played out in The Bunker / Forest … Steel Sheet / Bullroarer, and 
buoyed by numerous comments that I had received attesting to the uniqueness and 
contingency of the musical experiences that it had fostered, I deemed the work to have been 
successful in supporting the attitude of music as experience. But I also came to understand 
that investigating and defining the terms of this attitude, and the terms of the attitude of 
music as thing in theory was equally important, that supporting the attitude of music as 
experience with theoretic work is in itself composition. Theoretic work that defines and 
supports this attitude has the potential support the becoming of expanded musical form just 
as practical work designing and initiating performance sound installations does – although in 
more general way and with wider applications. With this in mind, and having spent the best 
part of a year on the project of The Bunker / Forest … Steel Sheet / Bullroarer, I turned to focus 
predominantly on theory from this point, to explore and develop the questions that the 
installation work had raised.   
 A couple of months later, however, I received a commission for a new work from 
organisers of the Peckham chapter of Art Licks Weekend 2016. So, I set to work designing a 
performance intervention in Copeland Park, Peckham that would last for the entire afternoon 
of Saturday 1st October. Copeland Park is a busy public space with bars, cafes, food stalls, a 
market, and other small businesses. Over roughly four hours, five trombone performers 
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spread throughout the park produced coordinated bursts of sound – ranging from a second 
or less to several minutes in length – interspersed with irregular intervals that ranged from a 
few seconds to over half an hour. The five performers were situated in fixed positions at 
varying distances to one another, occupying five different nested spaces across the park. One 
was positioned on the roof of the Bussey Building, one on the roof of The Nines, one inside 
The Nines (a bar and events space), one in a large parking garage, and one in an alleyway.  
 The performers were given simple instructions that permitted considerable freedom 
for spontaneous expression, encouraging them to respond intuitively to the presence of 
those around them and to the conditions of their environment. Interactions between 
performers, members of the public, and the environment – the immediate circumstances of 
place – were integrally woven into the performed sound material, which would fleetingly 
charge the park with a raw, primal, imposing energy. The different situations of each 
performer, the different spaces that they inhabited – the different settings for production – 
gave their sounds markedly different qualities, and their distribution across the park, 
intended to activate perspective, brought phenomena of distance and proximity to the fore. 
Elemental and self-similar characteristics of the work were geared towards highlighting these 
contingent, perspective and interaction-determined aspects, to focus the experience of 
“being there”, and to open perceivers' ears up to the untamed flux of worldly sound that 
flooded through the "intervals" between the performers' "bursts". The trombone sounds 
challenged, transfigured, conversed and intertwined with the ambient conditions of the park, 
sounding and other; the installation, as performance, integrated into the dynamics of this 
expressly social environment. 
 Copeland Park … Trombones was scored, and the players read from parts on music 
stands. They followed stopwatches, synchronised at the beginning of the performance, and 
their parts indicated the clock-time beginnings of each event. The notational system that I 
devised is clearly explained in the performance directions that accompany the score, and as 
such there is no need to repeat this here. It was designed with a view to coordinating events 
over considerable distances (none of the performers could see one another) and over a long 
period of time. As mentioned, it was also designed with a view to facilitating the performers’ 
spontaneous responses to the environment: the performers acted on the environment, and 
the environment acted on the performers reciprocally. The performers’ spaces would 
respond in different ways to their sounds, other performers would respond, imitate, interact 
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with the performers’ sounds, and members of the public asked the performers questions, 
expressed their opinions directly to them, requested certain sounds / actions, and exhibited 
their responses in a host of other ways. Some people danced, some booed, some sang in 
mimicry or interaction, some laughed, some shouted, some dropped glasses in shock, some 
were visibly contemptuous, some were clearly interested and engaged, all were involved in a 
unique performance of place. By allowing freedom for the performer’s dynamic interaction 
with the environment, I hoped to make the touch-like intertwining the explicit driving force 
of the installation’s becoming.  
 The pitch material was mainly formulated on the basis of concerns of register. Dealing 
with register, I attended to different affordances of physical expression – different stains, 
strengths, energies, stabilities, etc. Pitch relations tended to be either very open – octaves 
that foregrounded registral differences in physicality – or very dense – microtone clusters 
that, widely dispersed in physical space created an interesting effect that prominently 
articulated phenomena of distance and proximity. I did not set out to create an abstract sound 
language, but to provide a framework for the production of a specific sounding materiality, 
situated in place. 
 The decision to use trombones as the installation’s basic structural component was 
motivated by the instrument’s capacity to project sounds that carry over long distances. The 
self-similar trombone sounds voiced variant spatial signatures (qualities of distance and 
proximity) to great effect. The use of trombones also permitted clear exhibition of the 
expressivity of performing body; at dynamics and registers specified in the score, trombone 
performance is physically demanding, and the demands placed upon the body were 
powerfully articulated in the installation’s sound matter.  Furthermore, as discussed in 
Chapter One, the trombone gives a strong gestalt sensation, immediately apprehensible 
within the phenomenal flux, and is rich in cultural associations. Dislocated from its familiar 
context, the trombone functioned as a clear background against which the experienced 
variables that resulted from its unusual situation could stand out as foreground. Contingent 
socio-cultural meanings, associations, ideas, etc. that the cultural object “trombone” triggers 
could intermingle with physical phenomena in a dynamically and iteratively produced specific 
materiality, both sonic and social, both perpetual and conceptual. One member of the public 
remarked on being reminded of his childhood experiences of cartoons, another of her more 
recent experiences of hearing the distant foghorns at sea. For others the installation variously 
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recalled Mahler, the chorus of vuvuzelas at Notting Hill Carnival, and the babel of car horns 
in rush-hour traffic. The specific materiality of Copeland Park … Trombones unfolded from the 
unique socio-cultural and bodily perspective of each perceiver. In its lack of self-sufficient, 
internal detail, its self-similar and elemental nature, and its fragmentary character which 
precluded any sense of autonomous narrative, Copeland Park … Trombones foregrounded the 
contingencies of perspective, functioning as a clear framework for the production of 
expanded musical form.  
 The commission to design a work for Copeland Park was an invitation to further 
explore the sociality of performance sound installation. For this, the trombone was a fitting 
tool. This project sharpened my understanding of expanded musical form as an entanglement 
of matter and meaning, of how, in the expanded field, the perceptual and conceptual features 
of artworks are both necessary. This was to become a central thread of my theoretic work. 
Beyond its more explicit focus on sociality, Copeland Park … Trombones played out the same 
basic concerns and employed the same basic techniques as the previous installations without 
developing them in any substantial sense. It prompted a return to theory, where I believed 
that, for the time being, there was far more that I could do in terms of defining and supporting 
the attitude of music as experience. Like the Bunker installations, the work is documented by 
a short, video taken by an audience member, and a field recording that I made of one of the 
bursts. Owing to its fragmentary nature, its vast spatiotemporal extension, its situation and 
intertwinement within a busy public environment, Copeland Park … Trombones eluded 
documentation to an even greater extent than the other installations. It is my hope that, for 
the same reasons, it was very difficult for perceivers to constitute this artwork as an object.  
 
 
Conclusion – on supportive theory and practice  
 
Throughout this project, practice and theory have worked in tandem. They have iteratively 
picked up on, developed, explored, tested questions raised by one another in their 
directedness towards the same goal: the goal of supporting and defining an attitude of music 
as experience that would open up music’s expanded field. Influenced by Irwin’s writings, 
which I see as an integral part of his practice – supporting and defining an attitude of art as 
experience, directing aesthetic attention towards ‘the dynamics of our perceiving 
(experiencing) the nature of the world about us’ (Irwin 2011, 215), and thus activating ‘the 
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potential of each person to perceive the surrounding world from a unique aesthetic 
perspective’ (ibid., 1) – I wanted the written component of this project to do more than 
merely describe my practical work, to be more than an adjunct to practice. I approached the 
theoretic element of this project as compositional work, geared towards enabling expanded 
musical form, towards activating its open potential. I have endeavoured, in practice and in 
theory, to direct musical attention towards the dynamics of bodily being-in-the-world in an 
effort to promote the possibility for music to become wherever the perceiver finds it. As 
Cage’s oft-quoted aphorism of Henry James Thoreau goes, “music is continuous; only listening 
is intermittent”. Music as experience is continuous insofar as it can happen at any time and 
in any place – it is an open potential; each of us are responsible for when, where, why, and 
how we experience music. 
 The statements of artists cited throughout this thesis have demonstrated the 
importance of theory in the expanded field. Morris, Eliasson, and Irwin expand the terms of 
sculpture, actuate the shift from thing to experience, by ascribing meaning and value to time 
with their words as well as their plastic constructions. Leitner, Kubisch, and Minard foster the 
open potential of expanded musical form by clearly establishing a continuity between their 
sound installation practices and other musical practices with their aesthetic texts. Neuhaus’ 
comments shut down possibilities, rather than opening them up. As they emphasise 
presentness and articulate a separability structure, his statements support an attitude of art 
as thing and undermine sound installation’s dynamic, pluralistic, tactile nature. In the 
expanded field, the artist’s role is first and foremost that of supporting a perceptual attitude 
that assumes no distance from the perceived. Here, just like practice, theory functions as a 
framework for production.  
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Notes 
 
1 Ihde 2007, 73 
2 Mondrian 1937 / 1964, 130; original emphasis 
3 A video of this talk (23rd September 2015), at which I was present (and after which I had the good fortune to 
meet Irwin), can be viewed online: 
http://whitecube.com/channel/channel/robert_irwin_in_the_auditorium_2015 
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Appendix  
 
 
 
Included here are plans / instructions / scores for 
 
• The Bunker … String Quartet (2014)  
• Kai’bur for Shoreditch Church (2015)  
• The Bunker / Forest … Steel Sheet / Bullroarer (2016)  
• Copeland Park … Trombones (2016) 
 
 
 
These materials, along with the audio and audiovisual documentation of the performance 
sound installations of this project, are also included in PDF format (where their detail is more 
discernible) on the CD that accompanies this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Bunker…String Quartet 
 
For violin, viola and two violoncellos 
 
To be performed in the Dalston Bunker 
 
 
 
 
William Davy Cole 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instructions for all four players 
 
 
Independently of one another, the four players perform a continual succession of  
- sound – silence – sound – silence – etc. throughout the duration of the piece. 
 
 
 
1. Pitch 
 
 
The sounds can either be three or two pitches played simultaneously or a single pitch 
played alone.  
 
 
All pitch must be derived (ab libitum) from within the small range of F quartersharp – 
A quarterflat (inclusive). Every pitch(point) within this range is permissible and at 
any (and every) octave.  
 
 
When sounding multiple pitches simultaneously, the players can choose pitches 
(within the range) that are at the same octave (see example A below) or at different 
octaves (see example B).  
 
 
 
To facilitate the sounding of multiple pitches simultaneously, it is advisable that the 
players tune their instruments as follows:  
 
 
Violin tunes A and G strings (II and IV) down a semitone, viola tunes A string (I) 
down a semitone and D string (II) down a tritone, violoncellos tune C string (IV) 
down a fourth.  
 
 
Players can repeat pitches or combinations of pitches across successive soundings, 
although the pitch material shouldn’t remain exactly constant for too long.  
 
 
Players are encouraged to explore all possibilities, i.e., of the number of pitches 
sounded, the pitch(point)s chosen, combinations of pitches, different octaves etc.  
 Players may also sound stable or fixed pitches, ‘gliss.’ from one pitch to another, or 
perform any kind of vibrato or bending of pitch so long as they remain within the 
specified range. 
 
 
 
2. Durational Values 
 
 
Between the extremes of long and short, durational values must contract – expand – 
contract – expand – etc. throughout the piece like a swinging pendulum.  
 
 
The sounds and silences must progressively and continually get shorter towards 
extremely short, or shortest possible, (i.e., tremolo) and then longer towards 
extremely long (i.e. 2 minutes +), then shorter towards extremely short, then longer 
towards extremely long, etc.  
 
 
Sound and silence must always be proportional, so that when there are very long 
sounds, there are very long silences and when there are very short sounds, there are 
very short (or no) silences.  
 
 
The contraction and expansion (or acceleration and deceleration) should exponential 
(see example below), but the length of time that one ‘cycle’ takes is entirely up to the 
player (variation is encouraged).  
 
 
 
 
  Long 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Short 
 
         Time  
 
 
Players can start at any point in the cycle between extremely long and extremely 
short. 
 
 
 
Durational 
value 
3. Other 
 
 
All sounds must be bowed. 
 
 
All dynamics, bow positions, bow pressures, bow speeds, etc. are entirely ad libitum. 
Players are encouraged to incorporate a great deal of variation and to explore the 
broadest range of possibilities of sound quality, utilising their knowledge and 
understanding of their instruments, and testing the physical potentialities of their own 
bodily expression.  
 
 
The duration of the piece is unspecified: all players end when they are ready, although 
there should be some level of agreement prior to performance to avoid any huge 
disparities (such as one player continuing half an hour after all the others have 
finished!) 
 
 
The players will be positioned at specific points in the Bunker, which have been 
chosen to maximise its acoustic properties.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
William Davy Cole 
7/7/2014 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
k!I`b"# 
 
 
 
 
 
William Davy Cole 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 William Davy Cole 
 
    k!I`b"# 
September 2014 – February 2015 
 
Duration: c.a. 23 minutes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for three violoncellos 
      seven female vocalists 
      three percussionists (each with two large hand-held rocks and singing bowl) 
      and eight loudspeakers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
k!I`b"# must be performed in a large, long indoor space. The work was conceived for performance in 
Shoreditch Church (St. Leonard’s), London on Saturday 18
th
 April 2015. The diagram below refers to 
how the performers and loudspeakers are positioned within Shoreditch Church; if k!I`b"# is 
performed in another venue, these positions must be replicated as closely as possible.  
 
The audience are seated in the front six or seven pews (this may be extended or reduced depending on 
audience numbers). Singers IV, V, VI and VII, and percussionist III are positioned randomly amongst 
them and are unamplified throughout. Speakers 1, 2, 3 and 4 are placed on the floor, immediately 
surrounding the audience (as closely as possible); speakers 5, 6, 7, 8 also surround the audience, but 
are elevated on stands – in Shoreditch Church 5 and 7 are positioned on the balcony and 6 and 8 are 
positioned on ground level – and are set back at a greater distance. The three ‘cellos and singers I, II 
and III have unidirectional hyper-cardiod microphones positioned in front of them and on occasion 
their sounds are amplified and projected through the loudspeakers. These performers, as well as 
percussionists I and II, have specific individual positions around the church which are detailed in the 
diagram below. ‘Cello I, singer I and percussionist I are positioned on the balcony and the other 
performers are positioned on ground level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S II 
(ground) 
S III 
(ground) 
P II 
 
VC III 
 
VC II 
 
VC I 
(balcony) 
 
S I 
(balcony) 
 
P I 
(balcony) 
 
1 
(floor) 
 
4 
(floor) 
 
3 
(floor) 
 
2 
(floor) 
(ground) 
 
6 
(stand) 
(ground) 
 
8 
(stand) 
(ground) 
 7 
(stand) 
(balcony) 
 
5 
(stand) 
(balcony) 
 
AUDIENCE  
+ 
P III,  
S IV, S V, S VI, S VII 
balcony balcony 
ground level 
pews pews 
Notes on performance 
 
For all performers 
 
Feel: 
 
The overall feel of k!I`b"# must be hard, raw, earthy and primal. The sounds are all physical, 
primitive and simple, without adornment or embellishment - there must be absolutely no vibrato on 
any sound unless precisely indicated.  
 
 
Space-time notation: 
 
Space-time notation is used and execution of the piece requires that all performers use stopwatches.  
 
To begin the piece, all performers must have their stopwatches to hand and ready to start. One of the 
performers, preferably one that all others are able to see clearly (such as VC III), counts the whole 
ensemble in (THREE… TWO… ONE… START! or something that effect). If any of the performers 
miss the cue, or their stopwatches fail to start for whatever reason, they should alert the ensemble and 
this initiation process should be restarted.  
 
Continuous time is written out at the top of each system in intervals of 5 seconds:  
 
 
 
Vertical lines mark the passing of every 5 seconds and divide each system into five 5-second ‘bars’. 
The vertical lines are solely for the purpose of providing reference points for performers and should 
not influence how any sound might be approached (for example, no special emphasis should be placed 
on sounds that are positioned on a vertical line).  
 
Performers should interpret the temporal position of sound events based on their spatial position within 
the 5-second bars.  
 
 
For the majority of the piece, performers interpret their material fairly autonomously, though there are 
a few instances where synchronisation occurs. These points of synchronisation are indicated by a 
vertical dotted line with arrows above each of the sounds that are to be synchronised.  
 
 
 
Every moment of synchronisation in the piece features a precise percussion sound and, as such, at 
these points other performers should follow the percussionists.  
 
 
Silence is represented by empty space.  
 
If a sound is sustaining, rather than a single attack, the line extending from it indicates its duration:  
 
 
 
For example, this half whistle/half breath sound (see singer notes below), beginning at 5.55 and ending 
at c.a. 6.04, lasts c.a. 9 seconds. 
 
 
Lines: 
 
Where the line is thick (with no arrow), the sound remains unchanged throughout its duration other 
than in the ways specifically indicated (for example, if there’s a crescendo or decrescendo).  
 
 
 
 
Where the line has an arrow pointing towards a subsequent sound, there should be a gradual transition 
from the first to the second sound. A short vertical line intersecting the (arrowed) line indicates when 
the transition should begin. Where there isn’t a short vertical line, the transition should begin from the 
moment that the first sound starts. 
 
       
 
 
Glissandi are indicated by a thin line that connects the starting to the finishing pitch. Glissandi should 
always be continuous and regular throughout their duration, unless other wise stated.  
 
 
 
 
indicates that performers should vary the glissando as they choose, i.e., slowing down 
and speeding up as if ‘rubato’, within the given duration and pitch range. All glissandi in the piece are 
descending and performers varying their glissandi ad libitum must only do so in a downward direction: 
pitch must never rise.  
 
 
Clefs and Pitch: 
 
Three clefs are used to indicate pitch: treble clef, bass clef, and high, middle and low clef: 
 
 
The latter specifies register (high, middle and low) rather than precise pitches and is to be interpreted 
by performers as they see fit, for example here S II begins singing the highest she can and then 
‘glisses’ down to any pitch in the low part of her register.  
 
 
 
(Where this clef occurs in the ‘cello parts, it refers to the high, middle and low registers of the string or 
strings specified, not the whole instrument) 
 
Where there is no clef, or where a clef is crossed out with a diagonal line, all pitch is indeterminate: 
 
  
 
 
  = highest pitch possible (where this indication occurs in the ‘cello parts, it refers to highest pitch 
possible on the string specified, not the whole instrument). 
 
 
 
Dynamics:  
 
Two types of hairpin are used:  
 
 
Conventional hairpins indicate a gradual, regular crescendo or decrescendo. Starting and finishing 
dynamics are always given. Where a conventional hairpin has a small circle around the joined end (al 
niente), this indicates that the sound should begin or end as imperceptibly as possible (from or to 
nothing):  
 
 
 
 
This hairpin indicates a very sharp, rapid crescendo, that the sound should get exponentially 
louder throughout its duration. It should begin from nothing and end as loudly as possible.  
 
 
Where the same dynamic is to be maintained over a number of successive sounds, the marking is given 
for the first sound, in brackets for the second sound and applies for all subsequent sounds until a new 
dynamic marking occurs.  
 
 
Amplification: 
 
Singers I, II and III and all three ‘cellos are amplified on occasion. The purpose of the amplification is 
not (generally) to make the sounds louder, but rather to project the sounds in different parts of the 
church through the loudspeakers, or to surround the audience in a particular sounds. The score details 
which sounds are amplified through which loudspeakers:  
 
 
 
For example, here this sound played by VC III is amplified through speakers 1, 2, 3 and 4. Performers 
should not adjust or modify their playing/singing in any way when they are being amplified.  
 
 
 
For the violoncellists 
 
 
Scordatura:  
 
ALL MATERIAL IS PERFORMED ON THE TWO LOWEST STRINGS (III, IV), which are detuned 
as follows:  
 
 
 
 
The C string (IV) is tuned down a minor 6
th
 to E and the G string (III) is tuned down a minor 3
rd
 and a 
quartertone.  
 
 
 
 
Finger pressure:  
 
Three degrees of finger pressure are indicated in the score:  
 
1. Normal pressure (or open string) is indicated by a normal, full, round notehead:  
 
  
 
2. Half way between normal pressure and harmonic pressure by a half white (or empty)/half black (or 
full), diamond notehead:  
 
 
 
 
3. Very light, harmonic pressure by a white (empty), diamond notehead:  
 
 
 
 
 
Bowing:  
 
Bowings and bow changes are given above every sound. For each bowing, performers MUST USE 
THE FULL LENGTH OF THE BOW and, as such, the bowings indicate bow speed. The thin line that 
extends from the bowing marking indicates how long the (full) bowing should be. Where a sound is to 
be produced with a single bowing (no changes), the line will extend over its entire duration:  
 
 
 
 
Bow changes that may occur within a single sound are written out above it and performers (as with all 
other events) interpret when these take place based on their location within the space-time notation. 
Such bow changes within a single sound are usually accented and, as in the example below, usually 
part of an accelerando towards tremolo:  
 
  
 
As in the example above, arrows are used to indicate acceleration towards tremolo.  
 
 
 
 
Tremolo:  
 
As with all bowing in the piece, all tremolo must be performed with the FULL LENGTH OF THE 
BOW. It should be irregular, rough and physical.  
 
 
 
Bow positions:  
 
The following abbreviations are used to indicate bow positions:  
 
S.P. = sul ponticello     S.T. = sul tasto 
 
P.S.P. = poco sul ponticello    P.S.T. = poco sul tasto 
 
M.S.P. = molto sul ponticello   M.S.T. = molto sul tasto  
  
 indicates that performers should move ad libitum (rapidly) between sul ponticello and sul 
tasto. Any position within these two outer limits is permissible.  
 
 
 
 
Bow pressure:  
 
Bow pressure is normally relative to dynamics, but where extreme heavy pressure is required, this 
symbol is used above the sound:  
 
 
 
This occurs between 6.50 and 7.30 over very short (staccatissimo), loud sounds, usually an open string 
or combination of open and stopped strings. The sound should be roaring, rasping and produce 
unpredictable high frequencies.  
 
 
 
 
High, middle and low clef:  
 
As mentioned above, all material is played on the two lowest strings, so when a high, middle and low 
clef appears, it refers to the high, middle and low registers of one or both of these two strings (not the 
whole instrument). The string or strings that the material is to be played on is indicated in the score: 
three of these indications occur:  
 
 
 = all material should be performed on the third string (III) and every sound is 
an artificial harmonic where the lighted touched (harmonic) pitch is perfect forth higher than the 
stopped pitch (producing a sound two octaves higher than the stopped pitch). Where the highest note 
possible is required (   ), this sound be the highest artificial harmonic that the player can produce on the 
third string.  
 
 = all material should be performed on the third string (III), but not as an artificial harmonic, 
rather as a normal stopped pitch (normal pressure).  
 
 
 = all material should be performed on both the third and forth strings (III and IV) as a double 
stop barred at the same height on the fingerboard on both strings (as if playing a perfect fifth dyad in 
normal tuning). This will produce a dyad of an octave minus a quartertone.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Breath sounds are almost always indeterminate in terms of pitch (whatever feels comfortable) and are 
usually notated on the middle line of the stave.   
 
Occasionally breath sounds transition into pitched sounds, either sung or whistled, in which case they 
should be pitched the same as the destination pitch.  
 
 
Sung sounds:  
 
Almost all sung sounds are produced with the phoneme ha!  (har), except on a few occasions when 
they are produced with the phoneme a!  (ar).  
 
All specified pitches (i.e., those that are not indeterminate or interpreted in a high, middle and low clef) 
are based around E4 or E5. The pitch material of the ‘cellos is also entirely based around E, though 
several octaves lower. Singers should tune their pitches ‘spectrally’ to the ‘cellos, as if drawing out the 
upper partials of their sounds.  
 
Absolute 100% accuracy in terms of tuning is certainly not necessary, especially in the passages where 
pitches are microtonally inflected. If a pitch is notated to be a quartertone sharp or quartertone flat, this 
needn’t be exact, it should just slightly raised or lowered.  
 
Just to reiterate, there should be absolutely no vibrato or embellishment on any sung sound – all 
material should be primitive, basic and stark.  
 
On pages 12 – 14, sung pitches are imitated and shared throughout the singers. Where the “AS S II” or 
“AS S VII” (for example) is written above an indeterminate pitch, this indicates that the same pitch 
that has just been sounded by S II or S VII should be sung.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 









































 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Bunker / Forest … Steel Sheet / Bullroarer  
 
 
William Davy Cole  






















































 
 
 
 
 
Copeland Park … Trombones 
 
William Davy Cole 
Performance Directions  
 
 
 
The five players will be located at specific points in Copeland Park, fanning 
out from the NINES and into the surrounding area at increasing distances.  
 
It is unlikely that the players will be able to hear or see one another from their 
separate spatial positions, and as such each player operates independently.  
 
Each player will use a stopwatch, which they refer to throughout the duration 
of the performance.  
 
All players will meet at a central point at the beginning of the performance to 
start their stopwatches together. Once all stopwatches are synchronised, 
each player will move to their separate position; there is a two-minute interval 
before the first “event” to allow for this.  
 
Once started, the stopwatches run continuously throughout the full duration of 
the performance.  
 
 
 
 
The performance is constituted by a series of “events”.  
 
There are generally large intervals between events: most events are fairly 
short bursts of sound that (briefly) interrupt the ambient sounding conditions of 
the environment, and are usually followed by long stretches of time (before 
the start of the next event).  
 
The stopwatch times at which each event starts are given at the top of every 
system.  
 
Vertical dotted (bar) lines, with a specific stopwatch time (and a downwards 
arrow) above, indicate the beginning of each event. Material immediately after 
these dotted lines should be performed at (or as close as possible to) the 
stopwatch time given (for the beginning of the event).  
 
With the exception of the ad libitum sections (explained below), every element 
of material is performed only once (as written).  
 
The durations between events do not indicate the duration of material: within 
certain parameters (explained below), the duration of the material is 
contingent upon each player’s individual interpretation.  
 
Once players have performed the material given in their parts, they wait until 
the beginning of the next event; where no material is given, they play nothing 
for that event.  
 
There are four “ad libitum sections” (see 37.00, 1.31.00, 2.00.00, 3.25.00). 
Here the players are given specific elements of material and instructed to 
work with these elements, on their own terms, for a certain duration (e.g., 3’ (3 
minutes)). As indicated in the score, the players’ ad libitum performance here 
should be irregular: variety in terms of the order of material (i.e., no lengthy 
repeating patterns or regular alternation), duration, dynamics, expression, 
etc., is strongly encouraged!  
 
 
 
 
The material has been designed with a view to drawing upon and facilitating 
the individual input of each player.  
 
Within certain parameters, players are free to execute and colour each 
element – in terms of duration, dynamic contours, expression, small pitch 
inflections (bends) on occasion, and so on – as they wish.  
 The overall feel of the performance should be raw, primal, and physical. 
Players should endeavour to avoid all common / conventional gestures and 
clichés (absolutely no glissandi!) and imagine, instead, that they are some 
kind of primordial man who has chanced upon a trombone in the wilderness 
for the first time! 
 
Sounds need to carry over large distances, and as such the dynamics of each 
element should be in the range from ff – fffff. Whilst small variations and 
fluctuations in amplitude are permissible across the duration of a given 
element, generally these should occur within a fairly narrow range: avoid long 
or particularly pronounced crescendos/diminuendos (no cresc. or dim. 
throughout whole duration of an element).  
 
All pitch can be subject to slight inflection; microtones needn’t be exact. A 
wavy line above a sustained sound element indicates that pitch should be 
bent up and down (within a tight range) ad libitum (this instruction occurs in 
brackets as small pitch bends are permissible throughout).  
 
When performing, players should be aware that through their physical, bodily 
actions they are vitalising, interrogating, illuminating the environment, that by 
projecting their bodies into the environment through sound they make it 
breathe and reveal its sounding personality.  
 
 
 
 
There are three categories of duration for the sounding material:  
 
- A horizontal arrow (                          ) above a notehead indicates that 
this element should be sustained for as long as the player is able.  
 
-  An accented notehead (  ) indicates that this element should be fairly 
short: approximately 1 – 2 ½”, or within the range of at  
♩ = 60.  
 
- An accented notehead with a staccato ( ) indicates that this element 
should be very short: approximately 0 – ½”, or ≤  at ♩ = 60.  
 
 
Rests, or pauses, usually used to indicate delayed entry into an event, also 
fall into one of three categories of duration:  
 
= long pause: approximately 4 – 6”, or at ♩ = 60.  
 
  = normal pause: approximately 1 – 5”, or at ♩ = 60.  
 
  = short pause: approximately 0 – 1”, or ≤ ♩ at ♩ = 60.  
 
Where pauses occur next to one another on the stave in succession, this 
indicates multiple, or rather longer, rests, i.e., each pause is to be taken in 
turn.  
 
 
Within these ranges, the durations of both sound elements and pauses are 
contingent upon the players’ individual interpretation. (Where possible, the 
durations of the sound elements should be, at least in part, determined by the 
players’ physicality, by the contingencies of their bodily action).  
 






 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
